Afghanistan Q & A

Interview with Mutiullah Tayeb

Mutiullah Tayeb

* Realistically speaking, even after the loya jirga and Afghanistan's first post-Taliban constitution, are prospects for stability in the near future positive, in light of the ongoing insurgency, revitalized drug trade, ethnic tensions and the lack of any serious reconstruction efforts?

- Despite the great hopes held by many inside and outside Afghanistan regarding the outcome of the loya jirga, which endorsed the new Afghan constitution after 22 days of debates, polarization and the formation of blocs along political, ideological and ethnic lines, despite these great hopes, it's difficult to expect a return to a total peace that can lay the groundwork for justice, development and permanent stability in the near future.

I base this somewhat pessimistic prediction on a number of facts, the most important of which are:

• The relative peace that prevails in Afghanistan at the moment depends for the most part on external causes, such as the international military and security presence in Afghanistan and the continuation of global, especially American, political and financial support for the current regime.

• A general understanding between the regional powers prohibiting score-settling on Afghan territory; possibly reached after strong American and international pressure.

• The inability of the Karzai government to deal with the causes of internal conflict, and its transformation from a means to paving the way for peace to a new party to the political conflict.

• The weakness of the central government's control over most of Afghanistan, where local commanders affiliated with the various political parties are in control and directly affect daily life.

• The Karzai government's inability to fulfill its promises in terms of raising living standards, establishing security and providing jobs, in light of the delays in international aid.

• Ongoing battles and skirmishes in the Pashtun south against US and international forces, and the continuing armed struggle in the north between the Uzbeks and the Tajiks.

• The numerous divisions that appeared during the loya jirga between the various factions delineated future areas of conflict, particularly nationalist and ideological, expected to erupt again during the implementation of the constitution, in light of the resentment felt by certain Afghan sectors towards the new constitution.

All the above, coupled with official UN reports and the January 7, 2004 statement by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan regarding the security situation in Afghanistan, in which he indicated that deteriorating security might force a postponement of elections, a concern expressed in mid-December by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the former UN envoy to Afghanistan. Keeping all the above in mind, one is undoubtedly reluctant to give rein to any optimism regarding the return of stability, prosperity and a comprehensive peace to Afghanistan in the near future. The most we can be optimistic about is that the convening of the loya jirga and the discussions that took place there constitute a positive groundwork in the mindset of the rival Afghan factions, who appear to be somewhat convinced of the need to conduct politics through political and media activism, rather than through the barrel of a rifle or a tank.

* If and when presidential elections are held in June 2004, what is the likelihood of them being free of interference by militias or warlords, who have been accused of manipulating even loya jirga debates through their coercion of delegates? Have any contenders for the presidency announced their intention to run against Karzai? What would their prospects be if this is the case, as from an outside perspective, Karzai seem to be relatively dominant in his role as a compromise candidate for the rival factions?

- In the first place, it's difficult to expect presidential elections on time, according to the estimates of the United Nations, which oversees voter registration. This is because the registration process is conducted slowly, with only 270,000 voters registered so far out of a total of more than 10 million. Additionally, there is strong opposition to the registration process emanating from a faction that describes itself as being "popular," which accuses the UN of disregarding registration criteria and demands an end to the process.

This is the "popular" faction which led opposition to Karzai and his supporters during the loya jirga and which demanded a parliamentary system, or checks on the president's powers in the constitution. It has announced that it will not support Karzai in the coming elections, which means there may be powerful competition facing Karzai, who announced his candidacy on January 10, 2004-perhaps from former president Burhanuddin Rabbani, or any other candidate nominated by Karzai's opponents.

President Karzai's candidacy announcement was accompanied by assurances that his government continues to do its utmost to ensure elections are held between June and September of the current year, despite predictions by the UN and other international reports that it will not be possible to hold elections that early.

Actually, numerous observers inside and outside Afghanistan believe that Karzai's insistence on holding presidential elections is a reflection of Bush's overzealous desire to score a political success for his Afghan agenda before wading into his own presidential elections next November. This interpretation has weight in light of the dearth of success Bush has had with the Iraq war, and the lack of any tangible benefits on the Afghan front in the period following the removal of one regime and the installation of a regime loyal to Washington.

Internally, there is no doubt that the role of local commanders and warlords will remain significant in any case, as it is difficult to marginalize those who make war in Afghanistan when peace is being made, and their role will become increasingly important when Karzai's government switches focus from establishing peace to asserting future political control, and as such I expect the immediate future will see these warlords plied for support with financial and political bribes, particularly by Karzai's government and his Washington-backed team, as they exercise total control over their territories.

I also expect it will be a trying period for all the Afghan factions, in which they will seek to spread their influence and control at the expense of many of the principles which they espouse for media consumption domestically and internationally.

* A great deal is made of efforts to ensure the new constitution has popular support with the masses, so to speak. I understand they invited Afghans to submit their views in writing or even on audiotapes sometime prior to the loya jirga. Does the final product really meet the average Afghan's expectations? And can it guarantee there will be no further eruptions of ethnic warfare? Does it provide a broad enough basis for a common Afghan future free of ethnic divisions?

- President Karzai announced the constitution's drafting committee in October 2002, and the Committee presented its final draft to the President on November 3, 2003. The loya jirga was convened on December 14, 2003 to ratify the constitution, so the preparation of the constitution took about eleven months before it was publicly presented. The average Afghan citizen was given a chance of slightly over a month to familiarize himself with the constitution and its clauses-an inadequate opportunity in my opinion, given the specific case of Afghanistan's just emerging from a quarter century of war, and still suffering from occupation, armed conflict and profound ethnic, religious, and political divisions.

Even though the Committee made assurances that it had sent over 100,000 copies of the draft to all the provinces of Afghanistan and to all Afghan communities outside the country, the final draft presented for discussion in the loya jirga indicates that the Karzai government played a significant role in formulating the final draft, in furtherance of his desire to gain an endorsement for a presidential system in the constitution.

However, the more important issue is that those assembled in the loya jirga as representatives of the people in their areas were not directly elected, but rather were selected through limited elections from among a group of elders or influential figures in a given area. This allowed many individuals, who would otherwise have found it difficult to win in free and fair elections, to enter the loya jirga by virtue of their military power. This is besides President Karzai's appointment of 50 representatives; an undoubtedly undemocratic step which limited the number of individuals directly representing the people in the loya jirga.

The Afghans are very tired of unending civil wars, wars by proxy and foreign invasions, and as such they've placed great hope in this constitution. One has to admit that this is the first time they've been given an opportunity, albeit limited, to express their opinion on their country's constitution, and to follow news of the loya jirga's activities through the media. However, the future of the constitution depends on how its implementation will proceed, particularly during its first test in the upcoming presidential elections, as well as on how flexible President Karzai's opponents will be on their differences with him, in addition to the government's record in fulfilling its promises of political reform and establishing security.

* Is there some sort of constitutional mechanism for minority representation in popular elections? How is the ethnic breakdown of Afghanistan reflected constitutionally to guarantee that the larger ethnic groups do not dominate the political process by default? I'm under the impression that the Afghan people directly elect the president. If this is indeed the case, what safeguards prevent a situation where one ethnic group becomes entrenched in power?

- Those fears, or questions rather, drove those factions opposed to a presidential system to demand a parliamentary system that would secure equal opportunity for all ethnicities, given that Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic country and that no one ethnic group comprises more than 50%. Suggestions that the Pashtun are more than 50% of the population are contradicted by a number of impartial sources, including the UN.

As long as the agreement calls for direct presidential elections, then we're discussing a case where one individual garners the support of more than 50% of the voters, which sets the stage for interethnic coalitions between parties, as there are currently no political parties in Afghanistan that represent all ethnicities, despite their Islamic or liberal ideological leanings.

In my opinion, parliament will play an important role in placing limitations to prevent the entrenchment of power with a specific ethnic group, as well as curb any leanings by a president towards a personal or dynastic dictatorship along the lines of the "hereditary republics" we see in some Islamic countries.

Additionally, the elected popular councils across the regions and provinces play an important role in fulfilling the national aspirations of the various ethnic groups, despite the loya jirga's refusal of demands that every province elect its own governors.

Generally speaking, we mustn't forget that the Afghan democratic experiment is still new in the post-conflict phase, and we're not really expecting it to be very fair and to live up to international standards. But if the Afghans are able to exercise their political views through the acknowledged political frameworks and tools, then this in itself is a significant achievement.

* The new constitution designates Afghanistan as an Islamic republic. As an Egyptian, I'm all-too familiar with nominally Islamic countries, in which a clause or two in the constitution refers to Islam, whereas in actual fact, laws that are contrary to Islam are passed, implemented and upheld on a regular basis. Is this the situation we're looking at for Afghanistan? Will it be a secular republic that pays lip service to Islam, or will there be an actual attempt to implement Islamic law, despite the inevitable international condemnations that such an attempt would bring?

- Before answering your question, let me state that 99% of the Afghan population is Muslim, 15% of which is Shi'ite and the remainder is Sunni. Islam as a religion has suffused the traditions and customs of the Afghans, and the average citizen is devoutly religious. This is in addition to the prominence of traditional religious scholars, who are symbols of religion and religiosity in the country, as well as the Sufi tariq sheikhs and a number of Islamic political parties who played a significant role in the Jihad against the Russians.

The Islam that dominates the life of the average citizen is a traditional Islam blended with tribal customs, particularly in the Pashtun south, and therefore it is easy for the people to respond to any slogan that bears the name of Islam, regardless of the content, and they are easily provoked by any suggestion or slogan that blatantly violates Islam. This attitude was behind the rebellion against King Amanullah's hastily imposed Western reforms in the '20s of the previous century, and against the revolutionary slogans pronounced by the communists in the 1978 coup.

As such, it is logical that the constitution would contain this clause and others that assert the Islamic nature Afghanistan. And just as you suspect that these clauses could be for domestic consumption and that in reality Afghanistan would proceeds towards secularism, as desired by the United States, the West and the liberals who support them in Afghanistan, just as these issues have raised your suspicions, there are also great Western fears that these clauses may become powerful tools in the hands of the Islamists and may restrict what the West considers democratic principles, as expressed recently in the Human Rights Watch Report on the Afghan constitutional process.

I expect some effort will be exerted to find a more flexible approach to the interpretation of Islam and its laws, to satisfy both domestic needs and foreign expectations, which is a difficult balance to maintain for any government wishing to win internal and external support for its future projects… so there will be difficult compromises to make.

Doubtless, the Afghan political arena will witness substantial debate about the interpretation of these broad clauses that simultaneously confirm the Islamic nature of Afghanistan and its adherence to international conventions, as well as a substantial amount of one-upmanship between the parties to the conflict to appear more Islamic during political battles.

* It's reported that in the north there's still a substantial amount of fighting between rival militias. How profound are the grievances that give rise to these clashes? Are they territorial disputes, or are they mainly drawn across tribal/ethnic lines? And will the new constitution provide a commonly agreed upon framework for dealing with such clashes? Will all the warlords commit to such a mechanism, and respect its provisions, or does it merely look good on paper?

- The north enjoys a more diverse ethnic background than the south, as it is inhabited by various ethnic groups, the most prominent of which are the Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmen, as well as some Pashtun communities that settled in the north during the past century as part of a policy of seeking a demographic balance for the Pashtun rulers. The north has also recently witnessed a strong Shi'ite presence, particularly the city of Mazar-e-Sharif, due to the significant influx of the Hazara ethnic minority from central Afghanistan during the past quarter of a century.

Despite the conflict that raged in these areas on ideological grounds during communist rule, ethnic loyalties have now started to supercede ideological loyalties. These areas still suffer from these divisions, particularly because they fuel the struggle for influence and control between rival commanders.

It is my belief that the constitution did not clearly address the problem of ethnic conflict, and while a number of ethnic factions were able after tense discussions to secure the right to use their languages officially in their areas, this undoubtedly did not put an end to the conflict between those groups and local commanders who play the "ethnic card" in settling old scores and for exerting their influence and control in those areas. The central government may be forced in future to interfere to put an end to these kinds of clashes, but this is currently unlikely due to the central government's weakness.

In general, the north and the rest of Afghanistan need a clear power-sharing mechanism at the provincial level until the use of the "ethnic card" in political feuds between competing factions is brought to an end.

* How have efforts to disarm the warlords or militias been proceeding? Is it likely that the immediate future holds a situation where only the central Afghan government maintains a monopoly on force? What incentives does the government offer for the militias to renounce their weapons? And what have the warlords' reactions been to these efforts, and where do such armed formations stand vis a vis the new constitution?

- The formation of a unified army and police force is considered a priority for a return to peace and for the maintenance of security. The Karzai government and the international forces keeping the peace in Afghanistan have been making efforts towards that end, despite the fact that results have been largely unsatisfactory due to the time taken by the process. For example, the results of the disarmament process in the north and other areas is incomplete, as many commanders have withheld their heavy weaponry with the excuse that while the Taliban threat still exists they cannot hand over all their weapons. Others have criticized the process for focusing on the north, and have demanded that the process be conducted in a more balanced fashion that would not stir up suspicions between different areas.

The disarmament process, started with a budget of $35 million provided by Japan, focuses on collected and disarming weapons, and provides financial payments of up to $200 to individuals who hand in their weapons. Meanwhile, other important issues remain on hold, such as re-training all those fighters and finding them honest means of earning a living so that they do not turn to crime.

Theoretically, all independent military groups are required to disband, and they will be partially incorporated into the new 70,000-strong Afghan army, or the approximately 80,000-strong police force. As for the weapons, they are to be collected and inventoried by the military. Practically though, with the ongoing battles in the south and the south east between government forces and US troops on one side and Taliban and opposition forces on the other, as well as the continuation of the political conflict inside the chambers of the current government, it is difficult to imagine that the disarmament process will proceed in the needed fashion and within the expected timeframe.

The important point which I would like to indicate in this issue is that Afghanistan, with it's unique ethnic make-up and the collapse of its familiar conceptions of social contract, requires a new social contract that fulfills the modern needs of Afghanistan and can keep pace with the political and social developments being witnessed by Afghanistan in the post-war period. I consider the new constitution to have remedied to new situation to a certain extent, though the implementation phase will be the real test for both the constitution and the willingness of the various Afghan factions to coexist with the new situation.

* How will the new constitution facilitate Karzai's efforts to impose central control over the outlying regions of Afghanistan, where he has so far failed to assert his authority in terms of taxes and official presence? And how is it likely to affect the ongoing insurgency in several parts of the country that seems to be aided and abetted by Taliban sympathizers?

- The new constitution grants substantial powers to the Afghan president, whether Karzai or any other, in moving to establish the central government's control. But practically speaking, actual events have proven that the establishment of the central government's control over all the provinces of Afghanistan will require a substantial amount of time during which a unified army and police force can be established through a political accord with all the political factions; all this is in addition to the actual need for spreading security and initiating the reconstruction of the country and improving living standards for the average citizen.

These issues are all interlinked; neglecting one link will make it difficult to work towards total stability in a balanced approach. Security has deteriorated in the south particularly, after the explosions in Kandahar that killed a large number of innocents, particularly children, as well as the killing of a group of Hazara Shi'ites by unknown attackers in Helmand province - a harbinger of ethnic disturbances in these areas.

In my opinion, the central government in Kabul must seek to establish control through a process of political reconciliation with all political forces, including the political wing of the Taliban, which was not declared war on the government, and granting greater space for political representation in government of all the ethnicities of Afghanistan, as well as working seriously towards improving living conditions in the far-flung areas of Afghanistan.

In the case of the government's failing to fulfill these difficult roles, then it would be natural to not expect success for Karzai, or any other future-president, in unifying the disparate totality of Afghans, away from the "carrot and stick" game Afghanistan is now being subjected to by the international community.

* There was a substantial amount of opposition to a strong presidential system before the conclusion of the talks, with Karzai threatening on one occasion to resign if his proposed system was not incorporated into the constitution. How is it, in light of Karzai's negative reputation as an exceedingly pro-American ally and his failings as president, his proposals-and effectively his place as president-accepted by the majority of the loya jirga? Is Karzai more popular than the foreign observer is led to understand? Or is he merely exceedingly adept at political maneuverings?

- President Karzai's personal insistence on a presidential system, his numerous statements during the loya jirga and his threats, in my opinion and in the opinion of many, were a blatant interference in the workings of the loya jirga, leading some to protest, asking whether they were being called upon to endorse an Afghan constitution or President Karzai.

It is true that the clause pertaining to the President's powers was a major obstacle in the loya jirga's discussions, and there is no doubt that the opponents of the presidential system were successful in limiting these powers through granting parliament a larger role in ratifying presidential decisions, thus opening the path to an agreement on a presidential system.

President Karzai and his team were perhaps pleased by the endorsement of a presidential system, despite the fact that Karzai personally lost a lot of support from the groups that backed a parliamentary system. These were the same factions backing him since the Bonn Conference of December 2001. Doubtless this negatively affects Karzai's chance for success in the upcoming presidential elections, as well as transforming him from a presidential candidate for all political and ethnic factions to a Pashtun candidate at best.

President Karzai currently enjoys domestic support from the liberals and the Pashtuns, as well as being the acceptable candidate for the US and the West. Furthermore, he is recognized regionally, by countries such as Pakistan and perhaps India, as the person to deal with. President Karzai also enjoys US backing; a double-edged sword, as it may precipitate a serious confrontation on both the domestic and regional levels in the future.

* There have been calls by a number of Afghans of different backgrounds that some sort of court be established to deal with crimes perpetrated by all sides during the past 20 years, including torture, disappearances, etc, by the pro-Soviet government, the Taliban, and various tribal/ethnic groups at various phases in the conflict. But I understand that many former commanders currently hold office, among various other obstacles to such an initiative. Are prospects for justice good? Is reconciliation in the true sense of the word possible with so much blood spilled?

- In the past quarter of a century, Afghanistan has lived under many different regimes, and all have been complicit in the atrocities of Afghanistan's internecine wars, beginning with the global powers, with the foremost being the United States of America followed by Russia, to the regional powers to the Afghan factions and local military commanders. The problem however is that calls for a tribunal to prosecute one group and not others are often motivated by political considerations more than a desire to see justice done.

It is my opinion that what Afghanistan needs is forgiveness and reconciliation, and joint efforts to reestablish the rule of law and justice and fairness, rather than retributive tribunals which will only fuel more hatred in a country that is still suffering from tribal ties and profound ethnic divisions, and that has just emerged from a series of destructive wars, or indeed still suffers from them.

Based on all the above and in appreciation of the difficult times Afghanistan is currently going through, the groups making such calls should be more pragmatic in dealing with the past, and favor Afghanistan's long-term strategic interests.

Establishing justice now hinges on spreading the foundations of social justice and the fair distribution of power, wealth and opportunity between all Afghans, to achieve a national reconciliation that can help overcome the crisis of a bloodied past that is full of painful memories for all.

1- Mutiullah Tayeb is a researcher and specialist in Central Asian affairs. Born in Northern Afghanistan, he completed his Islamic studies in 1994 and worked in political research institutes in Pakistan, as well as editing various political publications.