Taliban A Different Reading

The most recurrent features of Taliban in the media coverage of Arab, Islamic and other origins is the narrow-minded and intransigent treatment of society, with particular reference to women's education, work and presence in social life. Then, there is Taliban's approach to the media and entertainment, including television, music and film. It is an approach that seems incomprehensible to a world entering the twenty first century in which societies are bound to interact culturally and exchange influence whether they like it or not. Here, Taliban insists on departing from the world's beaten track to adopt an eccentric model that seems unintelligible to the tumultuous world. Taliban is therefore portrayed in negative terms as a plight to the Afghan people who need foreign help to save them from the ills and views of a constricting movement.

Taliban, which presents itself as an Islamic government (an emirate), may be blamed for creating the negative perception of its policies and rule. But there are other scenes and aspects to be considered in the movement's experience if one is to be fair and unbiased by the Western media machinery, which uses Taliban's pitfalls or mistakes to misrepresent and discredit the validity of Islam as a system of government. An objective view of Taliban's specific experience needs to be developed.

It should first be realized that Taliban governs the Afghan people, and not a European or Westernized, liberal Arab society. It bans the education of girls who have reached puberty on the basis that it is unable to provide enough education for males in a country where the very basics of life have been minimized by war and poverty. The movement did not in actual fact drive women out of education and work to confine them to their homes simply because women were not present in these areas in the first place. The Afghan society by nature tends to be extreme in dealing with anything that has to do with females and how they mix with males. This makes Taliban's measures totally acceptable to the Afghan people. The culture of the society allows this to happen. Kabul women who are prompted by the media to denounce the barbarism and backwardness of the governing movement are not representative of this culture. It is easy to find this kind of liberated woman everywhere, even in rural areas, let alone the capital. In addition, the liberated views and resistance to traditionalism are characteristic of the population of Kabul. Such examples, which are coveted by the media, do not honestly represent the attitude or the reaction of the political street to Taliban's policies. For an objective view, one should turn to the daily life in Afghanistan's countryside where the Taliban pattern is followed without any need for the sticks of the squads "enjoining right and forbidding evil" which are active in Kabul.

In jurisprudence terms, Taliban is an extension of the Deoband (traditional Hanafi jurisprudence) which is widespread in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. This trend does not characteristically tolerate leniency in matters decided by religion. Religious injunctions in Deoband jurisprudence are final and cannot be debated. Once in power, this trend decided that imposing Islamic injunctions was an indubitable religious duty. Politically, the movement is an extension of the seven-faction Mujahideen. First emerging as a Pakistani movement and an extension of Deoband jurisprudence, Taliban has gone a long way to control Afghan provinces and major cities that surrendered willingly to it, turning in their leaderships, militias and hardware. While Taliban is spearheaded by extreme Deoband jurisprudence, its body consists of a mixture of defunct Afghan factions or ones that disappeared from the arena for one reason or another. Taliban is not an alien sprout that grew like a fiend in the Afghan soil. It is the outcome of a combination of elements that are deeply rooted in this soil. Government by another faction may be more rational and diplomatic than that of Taliban, but the gap between the two will not be as wide as may be expected.

The Taliban movement managed to restore something that Afghanistan has been missing throughout its twenty years of war and chaos. It has achieved full peace and security in the areas it controls; a point that has been acknowledged by Taliban's own opponents. This particular success was behind the surrender without many field leaderships of Taliban fighting. Cities and strategic positions have been successively yielding to the movement without the least resistance. From the moment the movement controlled Qandahar - its earliest military triumph - to the fall of Kabul and earlier the southern, eastern and western provinces, hostilities have lasted for less than one year (from November 1995 to September 1996). A single province would have stood months of fierce fighting before it gave in. It may be argued that the Afghan people who are said to have taken to fighting and cannot live without arms or the smoke of battle have grown tired of their cherished calling and begun to look forward to retirement. They have found the peace established by the movement irresistible in the areas under its control. The memory of war barons and governors instituted by field commanders in the villages and cities under their control has been erased from minds of the Afghan people. To feel once again that lives and property are secure is a blessing that outweighs everything else in life for anyone who has experienced war and fear for so many years. Taliban has been able to allay people's fears. But it has not been able to provide enough means of sustenance because it inherited a country in a shambles: a bare skeleton without the basics of survival. The curse of war still gnaws at the remaining bones of this skeleton. If anything remains of it, it will be finished off by the UN sanctions imposed by Washington in response to Taliban's refusal to turn in Osama Ben Laden. Taliban has honourably insisted on refusal, and is not intimidated by the suffering that will be incurred by its government and people. And yet, there has been neither rebellion nor revolution against Taliban in 90% of the Afghan territories. It may therefore be assumed that the Afghan people do not see Taliban as the backward and cruel movement perceived by the Western and Arab media.

It is true that Taliban does not introduce to the world a civilized image of Islam by means of a winning diplomacy. It also does not seem to have a specific philosophy of government framed in Islamic terms. This is how Taliban looks like to external observers. But the movement should also be seen in terms of the specific internal situation of Afghanistan. The environment in which the movement is active, the Afghan society with its local features, people and culture, should not be ignored. Without this perspective, no fair assessment of Taliban can be made. One would hope that a strong and broadminded leader like Ahmed Shah Masoud could have come to power in the country. But things being what they are, Masoud is unable to move forward. It is unlikely that his forces will be able to take control of the entire Afghan territories. At best, he may remain entrenched in the tough northern valley resisting Taliban attacks. Hence, it will be in the interest of Afghanistan to have Taliban gain full control of the country to put an end to the ongoing destruction. It is much better for the country to have a movement with a record of political and social blunders - if this is really what Taliban is all about - than continue to be engrossed by endless war and devastation