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North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear facility |
As the world continues to watch the massive military buildup of US forces in the Gulf, North Korea's startling confession that it was developing nuclear weapons and was willing to respond to any US attack by unleashing a “sea of fire” caught strategic experts off guard. International media has been inundated with commentary contrasting the approaches the Bush administration is taking towards eliminating weapons of mass destruction in Baghdad and Pyongyang.2
While both Iraq and North Korea are members of President Bush's “axis of evil,” the US administration's approach towards Iraq emphasized muscular options: either unfettered access to weapons sites and full compliance to US dictates or forceful regime change involving full scale invasion. In contrast, from the very beginning, a diplomatically-oriented strategy was taken towards North Korea.3
These inconsistent policies have prompted many to point out the irony of advocating military action against Iraq, which has not yet proven its possession of weapons of mass destruction, and diplomacy towards North Korea, which already boasts possessing or developing them.
Before the current crisis erupted, US-North Korean relations were officially guided by the so-called 1994 Agreed Framework Deal signed between President Bill Clinton and Korean President Kim Jong Il, in which Washington promised to provide North Korea with heavy fuel oil and food aid as well as help build nuclear energy plants in exchange for Pyongyang's promise to shut down its nuclear weapons program.4
The new North Korean posture began in December 12th, 2002, when it announced it would restart a shuttered nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, the one covered by the terms of 1994 agreement. North Korea is believed to possess one or two nuclear weapons and probably has enough fuel at the Yongbyon reactor to produce about five to six nuclear weapons by the end of the year. 5 In late December, North Korea expelled representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency who were monitoring the Yongbyon facility and threatened to restart its plutonium-based nuclear program. Kim Jong Il seemed prepared to renounce the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, or NPT, which his country had signed in 1985.
North Korea's Motivation
Projecting power through uncertainty |
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One of the points of strength in North Korean diplomacy is its ability to project power through uncertainty. The aura of mystery and unpredictability that shrouds the North Korean leadership and its intentions keeps the world guessing as to what the true motives of that country really are.6 This makes its opponents reluctant to provoke it as they are unsure of the possible consequences.
It is difficult to precisely discern the exact motivation behind North Korea's recent moves. What is certain, however, is that North Korea has been alarmed by the Bush administration's “axis of evil” rhetoric, its continuous threats against Iraq, and the new US doctrine of preemption.7 Its nuclear admission could be intended as a response to a hard-line shift in US policy and a warning to the US against preemptive action.8
It could also be a way in which North Korea would be able to extract economic aid and other political concessions on more favorable terms from the United States through some sort of negotiated compromise. North Korea tends to take an extreme stance before entering talks, so that any slight concession is seized by its opponents as a sign of progress. 9 It employed the same type of nuclear brinkmanship in 1994 when it forced the Clinton administration to negotiate face to face and sign the Agreed Framework. Even Madeleine Albright eventually went to Pyongyang for talks with Kim.
International and Regional Dimensions
The US-North Korea interplay masks competition between the US and China. |
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The cohesiveness of any regional system is a very important factor in assessing the chances of success for an intrusive actor like the US. In contrast to a fragmented Middle East, where most Arab regimes lack a strategic doctrine, compete amongst themselves to gain US favor, and face very little organized opposition to their activities, the regional environment in East Asia is vastly different and clearly not in favor of the US. This has made the simple task of intensifying political and economic pressure on North Korea, let alone war, all the more difficult for the Bush administration. Russia and China have vowed not to assist the US in any confrontational stance against North Korea. Russia, which already sells military equipment to North Korea, suggested that “attempts to isolate North Korea can only lead to a new escalation of tension.” 10 Another Security Council member, China, now provides North Korea with food, energy supplies and aid. The Chinese fear a refugee crisis on their borders should the situation in North Korea deteriorate. 11
From a strategic perspective, North Korea's defiance and continued existence protect China from a Korean Peninsula wholly controlled by the US. 12 China is aware that one of the critical US objectives in Asia is to prevent the rise of a hegemonic center of power (either one dominant state or a combination of states acting in unison) capable of dominating the Asian land mass. 13 Under such circumstances, the relative power position of the US in international politics would decline and America's global economic, political, and military reach would be impeded. 14
A defiant North Korea allied with China poses a strategic threat to American assets in Asia and, by extension, to US global hegemony, should the balance of power between the US and China tilt to the latter's favor. Hence, the interplay between the US and North Korea masks a more hideous competition for regional, and possibly global, dominance between the US and China.
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| South Koreans protest US policy outside US embassy in Seoul. |
Recent history has shown how difficult it is for the US to maintain regional support for action in North Korea. In 1994, when the North refused to comply with international inspection of its nuclear facilities, the United States sought to impose sanctions on it. But the sanctions were resisted, not only by China (which would have vetoed any attempt to impose them through the UN Security Council), but also by Japan, which was reluctant to curb remittances to the North from Koreans in Japan and argued that such a coercive strategy was premature.15
Even in this current crisis, South Korea – a major US ally – played down US containment efforts, suggesting that engagement and dialogue were “the best means to address issues with the north.” 16 Both North and South Korea have been engaged in normalization activities and efforts for the past two years aimed at unifying the peninsula under the so-called “sunshine” policy. Any US attempt to intervene militarily in the affairs of the peninsula are largely cast in a negative light by local Koreans.
Anti-US protests in South Korea have therefore drawn thousands to candlelight vigils, and many students attacked US bases with firebombs.17 South Korean President elect – Roh Moo Hyun – who made the immoral conduct of US troops a major theme in his campaign, spoke at one rally beneath a banner that read “Yankee Go Home.” 18 Coffee shops, restaurants, and bars have banned American GIs from entering with signs branding them as “murderers.” This happened after two US soldiers charged with negligent homicide in the deaths of two Korean high school girls were acquitted in a military court.19 According to a recent poll by the Korea Times, many respondents viewed US troops as a source of tension on the Korean peninsula. 20 The young voters who elected Roh do not see American troops as saviors, but rather as an occupying force and believe peace with the north could easily come about, if only Washington would stop meddling.21
The Military/Strategic Dimension
North Korea can mobilize a force three times the size Iraq can. |
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The US administration has currently ruled out the use of military force against North Korea due to the latter's military being much stronger than that of Iraq and hence exerting a deterrent effect on the US. Strategic experts estimate that North Korea can mobilize a force three times the size Iraq can.22 Unclassified US intelligence reports state that North Korea has mass produced chemical weapons, including mustard, phosgene, sarin, and nerve gases. 23 It is believed to have thousands of bombs, artillery shells, and multiple rocket launcher warheads that are chemically armed, and able to attack Seoul and much of South Korea's industrial base. 24
Pyongyang commands an army of 1.1 million soldiers and 4.7 million reserves in addition to hundreds of short range SCUD ballistic missiles capable of delivering chemical and biological payloads to South Korea. 25 Some 37,000 US troops are stationed south of the border that divides the Korean Peninsula, making them “potential sitting ducks” if the North launched an attack.26
The Iraqi military currently has one-third of its Gulf War II strength. |
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North Korea also has three longer-range missiles already developed or in their final stages: The No-Dong (1,000 km range), Taepo Dong (1,500 km-plus range [can bypass US and Japanese air defenses]) and the Taepo Dong 2 (4,000-6,000 km range – [can reach Guam or Alaska]). 27 North Korean war games and exercises emphasize infiltration and sophisticated covert attacks such that “no other force in the world is better organized for covert and asymmetrical warfare.” 28 It has a unique force structure of some 88,000 men in its Special Purpose Forces Command, including an 8 battalion special reconnaissance force, 5 airborne brigades, 2 amphibious brigades, 6 sniper brigades, 9 light infantry brigades, and 17 reconnaissance battalions. 29
In contrast, Iraqi military power has been isolated and is hemmed into the middle of that country. It cannot easily attack US troops or US allies in the region since it has been facing constant US and UK combat air patrols flying from nearby bases for more than a decade, enforcing no-fly zones over its northern and southern areas. 30 In addition, the Iraqi military currently has about one-third of its Gulf War II strength, with almost 389,000 troops compared to some 950,000 in 1991. 31 Moreover, most of its biological and chemical weapons were destroyed after the War. 32
Conclusions
More countries realize the effectiveness of the nuclear bargaining chip in dealing with superpowers. |
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The current crisis illustrated the inability of the Bush doctrine, with its emphasis on preemption and constant reliance on military power, to deal with all types of threats wherever they may be. While the choice to use diplomacy with North Korea and force with Iraq is generally guided by rational strategic concerns due to multiple geostrategic differences in each case, the current crisis showed the incoherence of the Bush doctrine and its shortcomings. It also showed the failure of the US-led nonproliferation regime to address the security interests of many new or would be proliferators, since countries are beginning to realize that nuclear weapons are much needed guarantors of security and effective bargaining chips in dealing with superpowers. Hence, the benefits from acquiring nuclear weapons for many developing countries like India, Pakistan, and now, North Korea, seem to outweigh the costs.
International politics is often about timing and trigger points for action. 33 North Korea managed to choose the proper timing for action amidst a US administration that is divided among itself and faces an unfinished war in Afghanistan and a crisis in Iraq. 34 North Korean behavior also exposed the limits of US military power when faced with a determined nuclear armed adversary and a regional and international setting not in its favor. Despite being one of the world's poorest and most isolated countries, North Korea has vividly illustrated that power is not an absolute concept and a smaller state can challenge a superpower, if it knows how and when to use its limited capabilities and exploit the regional and international setting to its favor – another lesson for the Arab and Muslim world.
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