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A North Korean soldier at the border village of Panmunjom
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As the world watched the US sharpen its rhetoric against Iraq, US officials, in October 2002, said Pyongyang admitted to a State Department envoy that it had been pursuing another nuclear arms program based on enriched uranium.
Since then, the world has been witnessing a flurry of hostile messages between Washington and Pyongyang, dubbed part of Bush's famous “axis of evil,” along with Iraq, and Iran. One, however, cannot help but be surprised, to say the least, at North Korea's suicidal attitude.
After their surprise announcement, the US cried foul and suspended a 1994 deal to give fuel to the energy-starved state, in return for the latter's quitting their quest for nuclear weapons. However, Pyongyang reacted defiantly, to put it mildly, and took a series of rapid steps, in one direction, towards full escalation with the only superpower.
Digging the reasons behind North Korea's apparent defiance, observers and analysts came up with some theories that may shed light on the stance of a poor country, under isolation for more than four decades now.
Fear
The first theory, according to some observers, focuses on the fears that North Korea has developed since June 2002, when Bush declared his famous “axis of evil” term, followed by the “pre-emptive strike” policy. According to holders of the theory of fear, Pyongyang, watching the US' uncontrolled threats against Iraq, massing up troops to invade Baghdad, came to the conclusion that they were the next prey.
Putting into consideration the hostile nature of the Bush administration, following 9/11 attacks, North Korea had to find a way out of what appeared to be a military standoff in the making. Therefore, and instead of waiting for the inevitable to come, Pyongyang chose to resort to the cliff-hanger policy, at a time they deemed appropriate; as Washington and the whole world were looking at one direction: Baghdad.
According to the “fear” observers, North Korea, once it started the standoff and came across a tough American diplomatic campaign, became sure that there is no turning back now. Therefore, seeking a nuclear weapon, to hide behind in any future settlement seemed the best option available. Once they have nukes, the Americans will think twice, to say the least, before pulling the trigger.
In light of this conclusion, explaining the fast pace of developments can be an easy job; expelling the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) experts, removing the monitoring equipment from its nuclear facilities, moves described by the Americans as “dangerous, unprecedented, irresponsible and unilateral actions that exacerbate its long-standing non-compliance.”
Moreover, press reports, leaked by North Korea two weeks ago, said Pyongyang needed only 30 days to actually produce nukes. Some analysts dismissed the reports as “exaggerations,” while others viewed them as a way to get the Americans to “sit and talk now.”
Anyway, almost 10 weeks into the crisis now, every party is trying to convince North Korea, via diplomacy (unlike the case in Iraq), to comply with the international community's resolutions, and give up their nuclear aspirations.
No Catch
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| In the streets of Pyongyang |
Other observers have another theory that could, however, be linked to the theory of fear; namely that North Korea actually has no catch for the US to “mass up troops and fight a war.” Unlike oil-rich Iraq, North Korea has no resources to cover up for the high price of a strike. So the only motive for the Americans to push hard for a military showdown, according to such observers, could be scoring an easy and quick victory.
However, that, too, is highly doubtful. There is even a slim chance that the North Korea actually possesses nukes. Pyongyang, for sure, is aware of such odds.
Holders of such a theory go even further to say that North Korea is the party that is trying to blackmail Washington, making use of the current global circumstances. Pyongyang is the party looking for a catch; at least to sign a non-aggression pact, along with a higher share of energy.
Diplomacy as a One & Only Option
Having touched briefly on the development of the crisis, reasons or fears behind North Korea's defiance, it is only logic to look at the other side of the crisis, before drawing conclusions, or trying to visualize how the crisis may be wrapped.
Immediately after North Korea's confession, in October 2002, the US froze its talks with Pyongyang, and also froze fuel shipments, in line with the 1994 deal, to the fuel-starved state. However, it was very clear that Washington's stance is restricted to “diplomacy only.”
Even when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, on December 23, issued a clear threat to Pyongyang, bragging that “the US can handle two conflicts at one time,” all other senior officials in Washington were quick to assert one message; “war for Iraq, diplomacy for North Korea.” Then Bush made it clear and declared the crisis with Pyongyang is not “a military showdown, but a diplomatic stand-off.”
This is a clear contradiction, to say the least. Bush has two enemies; both fall within his “axis of evil,” both are rogue states, both are accused of a “bad human rights record and bad governance,” both are accused of seeking mass destruction weapons. However, one of them denies the possession of any banned weapons, opens its borders and sites to what some call “humiliating inspections,” and even defies the US Intelligence Agency (CIA) to come up with any evidence to the opposite.
The other enemy, on the other hand, voluntarily admits seeking nuclear weapons in the past, then dismisses IAEA experts and removes monitoring equipment, and declares it is about to actually possess nukes.
Sound logic dictates that diplomacy should be employed with the first party (that happens to be Iraq), while military is the only option for the second (North Korea). The US does the opposite.
In trying to explain such contradiction, some observers say that Washington could never be pushed into a nuclear confrontation, thus economic and diplomatic sanctions are the only options available. Others, however, come up with other reasons to explain the bizarre situation.
Washington wants to finish the job in the Gulf area first and then focus on North Korea, to make sure whether Pyongyang has actually produced any lethal nukes. However, all the signs, so far, indicate that Washington is not likely to change course in handling the Pyongyang crisis.
The question remains: how could such a standoff be contained?
Most analysts believe that North Korea will keep its defiance, forcing the United States to eventually blink first. A compromise is seen possible, as long as the US is defied by a state that realized before it was too late that the current US administration listens only to the logic of power, even though it talks too much about democracy, freedom, and human rights.
By deciding to preserve its right to survive, North Korea may have just proven to the whole world, Arabs in particular, that there is always a way, for the poor, to survive in a world governed by the logic of power.
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