Will Changes Take Place in The Former Yugoslavia?

The new Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica (Kosch-tu-neet-sa) and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) defeated Slobodan Milosevic and his Socialist Party, which was aligned with his wife’s leftist JUL (Yugoslav Left) Party, outright in the Yugoslav presidential election of September 24, 2000. Milosevic tried to force the Yugoslav Supreme Court to throw out the election results and to call a new election in order to hold on to the presidency. This latest political maneuver of his was met with mass demonstrations on October 5, 2000 which saw thousands of protestors storm the Yugoslav parliament building and other important institutions that Milosevic was holding onto, including the offices and studios of Serbian television and radio. On that day, Kostunica became the new President of Yugoslavia.

Kostunica consolidated power in what has been called a Yugoslav revolution. He was able to come to power without violence. It was feared that Milosevic would call out interior police and perhaps the army to squash the demonstrators. Though it is unclear what actually happened, it seems that Milosevic did call for his security forces to intervene; however, they did not. Either the commanders of the security forces refused to order action or the actual personnel refused to act.

The Yugoslav revolution was, however, complicated by the structure of the election. Only federal Yugoslav institutions were up for election. Yugoslavia is made up of two republics of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro. Montenegro’s pro-western leadership boycotted the election, calling it unconstitutional. The Serbian governmental institutions, even more significant than those of the federal state, were not up for election. The DOS threatened to call the protesters back to the streets in the event that Milosevic’s allies would not give up their power in Serbian republic institutions. Following lengthy negotiations, the DOS and Milosevic’s allies reached an agreement to form a new Serbian government and to call for Serbian elections on December 24, 2000.

Given this context, four issues remain unresolved; each of which should be considered when evaluating what will or should happen next in Serbia. The four issues, all inter-related, which I will briefly comment on are: (1) the status of Montenegro, (2) the fate of Milosevic and other indicted war criminals, (3) Yugoslavia’s diplomatic charm offensive, and (4) the status of Kosova.

Serbia’s junior partner in the rump Yugoslavia is Montenegro. Montenegro’s leadership would like to steer towards independence, or a new structure within Yugoslavia where Montenegro would be a sovereign state sharing with Serbia a common currency, armed forces and a foreign policy. Though Kostunica has met with Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic (Ju-kahn-o-vich), they have not resolved the issue of Montenegrin desires for independence, so the question of Montenegro lingers as the new Serbian elections approach.

The second issue involves the fate of Slobodan Milosevic, an indicted war criminal for war crimes committed by forces under his control in Croatia (1991-1995), Bosnia (1992-1995) and in Kosova (1998-1999). During his election campaign in the summer and fall of 2000, Kostunica called the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague a political tool of the west being used disproportionately against the Serbs. He said that he would not cooperate with the Tribunal. Since his election, however, he seems to be changing his views. He first claimed that Yugoslavia had more important priorities than the Hague Tribunal. His rhetoric has steadily evolved to the point where there is now discussion about the opening of a branch office of the Tribunal in Belgrade—viewed by some diplomats as the first step towards arresting Milosevic. Kostunica and his allies are also currently considering trying Milosevic in Serbia for crimes committed against Yugoslavia’s economic infrastructure and financial system. Milosevic is believed to have amassed fortunes in overseas bank accounts for himself, his family and his cronies. Either of these trials would be positive, although clearly, Milosevic must eventually stand trial for his role in war crimes committed in Bosnia and Kosova. Furthermore, Yugoslavia still harbors other war criminals such as the Serb military commander in the Bosnian war, Ratko Mladic. Yugoslavia ought to be compelled to fully comply with the Tribunal’s orders and its efforts to bring those guilty of war crimes to justice.

Despite Yugoslavia’s failure to live up to its obligations under international law with regard to the Tribunal, Kostunica and company have been on an effective diplomatic charm offensive over the past month or so. Many of the sanctions that Milosevic’s Yugoslavia was under have been lifted. Yugoslavia applied as a new state (as did all the other successor states to the old Yugoslavia) to the United Nations and was accepted. It also rejoined the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Lastly, it re-established diplomatic relations with the major western powers which were severed during the 1999 NATO air war against Yugoslavia, including with the United States. Though some sanctions remain, many have been lifted. This may have been premature given the uncertain fate of Milosevic and many of his cronies. There remains a danger that the progress in Serbia will backslide in the upcoming December elections.

Lastly, these diplomatic carrots have been given to Serbia in spite of the fact that it continues to work against the international community on the issue of Kosova. Kostunica continues Milosevic’s rhetoric that Kosova should remain a part of Serbia. The Kosova Albanians, a majority of whom are Muslims, do not want to be a part of Serbia. The moderate Albanians under political leader Ibrahim Rugova and the harder-line Albanians under former Kosova Liberation Army leader Hashim Thaci agree on the desire for Kosova’s independence. The international community seems to be somewhere in between the views of the Serbs and the Albanians, calling for Kosova to remain in Serbia and in Yugoslavia as an autonomous province. Some policy circles agree with the Kosovar Albanians, however, that this solution is no longer tenable for Kosova. One international commission has recently reported to the U.N. that they believe that Kosova should be given conditional independence, based on its treatment of its minorities, which include Serbs, Bosniaks, Roma and other minority groups.

Though some argue that giving Kosova independence would spark calls for partitioning Bosnia, it should be noted that Kosova and Bosnia are quite different cases. Kosova, prior to Serbia’s war there, was a highly ethnically segregated society where ethnic Albanians were the overwhelming majority. The Albanians and Serbs speak vastly different languages and their cultural norms differ drastically. In Bosnia, the ethnic groups were geographically intermingled. Before the war, what is now the Serbian entity in Bosnia had almost a Bosniak majority (Bosniaks are primarily Muslims and they are the plurality population in Bosnia). A partition of Bosnia would, therefore, reward the genocide and ethnic cleansing committed by the Serbs, while independence for Kosova would recognize the historical demographic trends of Kosova. These trends are: 1) that if Kosova remains a part of Serbia, within 50 years, the Serbs will be a minority in Serbia; and 2) the Albanians and Serbs of Kosova have always led separate lives. These facts differ drastically from those facts underlying the context of the war against Bosnia.

What should the international community do next? Two issues remain very important: (1) Milosevic must be brought to justice in the Hague; and 2) Kosova should be given conditional independence. Is this possible? Yes. The international community should convince Kostunica that both are in his interest. The first would take care of Kostunica’s biggest problem: Milosevic’s extradition to the Hague would solve Kostunica’s lingering Milosevic problem since he presumably continues to hold the loyalty of some armed elements within Serbia.

The second point could be in Kostunica’s interests because it solves Serbia’s demographic problem as it relates to the Albanian question. Furthermore, he is politically insulated from the fallout of letting Kosova go. He could simply state the truth: that Kosova is already lost – and it is Milosevic who lost it by dragging the Serbs into a winless war against the largest military alliance with the greatest power projection capabilities in the history of the world. The international community might be able to convince Kostunica of this by stating that it supports these options, and promising to lift further sanctions and funnel more financial aid into the rebuilding of Yugoslavia’s economic infrastructure if Kostunica goes along with them.

Whatever happens next, it is clear that the Milosevic era was costly for the Serbs, and even more costly for Serbia’s neighbors. Hopefully, the changes that took place during 2000 can be consolidated for the long term, and the people of former Yugoslavia can get back to living normal lives.