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A political settlement between Israelis and the Arabs, especially the Palestinians, is still Israel's top priority. Its security cannot be established as long conflict with the Palestinians in the occupied territories (of 1967) and those inside Israel (of 1948) escalates. A strategic study of Israeli home affairs confirms this.
Conflict within Israel has been taking place between the Right and the Left wing parties, representing the two branches of Zionists between workers and capitalists. The issue of the territories occupied in 1967 was one of the pivots of this conflict. Right wingers advocated annexing these territories and granting its inhabitants autonomy within the framework of Israeli control, according to the theory of "Israel's total land," (i.e., Palestine's total land).
The Left, whose government occupied the land in 1967, warned against the impact of this dual-nationalism on Israel's Jewish identity, if the case may be that the Palestinians accept this view as a final solution to their struggle. Hence, "two states for two peoples" was voiced, according to the theory of justice of division. It follows that this slogan actually bestows legitimacy on Israel in the first place through the Palestinians' recognition of Israel by splitting Palestine. This is established on more than three-quarters of their homeland - an area larger than the one granted to the Palestinians to establish their state. Thus, territories occupied in 1967 were figuratively speaking "hostages" to compel the Palestinians and the Arabs to recognize Israel. The debate took respite due to the Intifada in 1987, which urged the Right and the Left flanks of Israel to deal more seriously with the Palestinian people's demands for an independent state and application of the UN Resolution no 224. This was obvious in the landslide victory of the Labour Party where it was dubbed the "Party of Peace," after defeating the Likud in 1992. Also the progress achieved by the Likud and Labour governments throughout the settlement process, though in different degrees, caused the break in discussion.
Changes in Israeli 's Home Affairs
However, the problem did not end with the Zionists' Right and Left wing recognition of the existence of the Palestinian people and the necessity of implementing the UN resolutions. In the meantime, changes in Israel's home affairs announced the end of Zionism's control over public life. Ethnic and religious factors suppressed by Zionism for decades started to emerge. With the first hint of separating the Knesset elections from those of the Prime Minister and electing the Premier directly as of the year 1996, the true weight of Israeli divisions and relative retreat under the weight of the two Zionist parties - Likud and Labour - appeared.
Remarkably enough, the Sephardim sect, who dissented from the Likud and to a lesser extent from Labour, joined the Shas Party, which represents the traditional Jewish values of Sephardim. It stands between fundamentalism and secularism and revives folkloric habits and practices closer to eastern culture than orthodoxy. Therefore, it is distinguished from secularist parties such as the Western fundamentalist parties represented by "Agwadat Israel Party," and the Zionist religious group represented by the Zionist religious party "Mifdal," which is also of western origins. Incidentally, Shlomo Ben Ami, for instance, believes that there is nothing called a secular Sephardic Jew.
Shas' source of power
This growing emergence of Shas at the expense of Likud and Labour (two Western religious parties) has seriously complicated Israel's internal structure. This can be with regards to the timing under which Israel's status has started to be determined regionally through the settlement process and its role internationally, or with Shas' position on the Israeli political map. Shas stands at the crossroads between all kinds of conflict in Israel as it hoists the banner to suit every occasion, and this is the main reason behind the rise in its strength.. As a religious party it deals with religious issues within the secular-religious conflict. As a party for the Sephardim Jews (who may be the economically and socially oppressed people, including the Sephardim of the Arabs) it considers the Sephardic-Ashkenazic conflict. And as a Jewish party with regard to all issues of the Jewish identity of the State, vis-à-vis the requests of the Arabs, and the post-Zionism generation) it is concerned with the Arab-Jewish conflict. All these banners exacerbate the conflict between the Right and Left over power, while Shas keeps, with its social, religious and ethnic weight, the balance between the leaderships and the parties on the Right and Left. Thus, it is not possible for any Israeli government, whether Likud or Labour, to have an internal or external affair passed without the approval of Shas. This explains Netanyahu's dependence on Shas in 1996 - which was a partner in Rabin's government - to topple the left-of-centre government and reach power. Then there is Barak's dependence on it too - although it supported Netanyahu during the 1999 elections - in forming a ruling coalition and attempting to appease it through sacrificing his traditional ally, the Left wing Meretz Party, and yearning for Shas to rebuild the collapsing coalition. Meanwhile, the Likud leadership is voicing promises in order to be reinstated in power.
Israeli Policy Paralyzed
The problem is that the Likud party does not have a fixed attitude towards the settlement process, despite the victories it is winning and depth it is achieving from the vacuum resulting from the fall of Zionism and relative retreat in the weight of the two Zionist parties. Moreover, it used this fatal process for Israel to use as a bargaining card at the strategic level with the two Zionist parties to affect the "formation of home affairs" in a way that please the Sephardim. They actually represent the Sephardim culturally and socially, without paying heed to foreign developments and Israel's relations with the Arab World and the so-called "New World Order". Consequently, Israeli policy is paralyzed, as it is unable to adopt steps in the settlement process that can achieve the minimum limit of Palestinian requests. This minimum limit is, at the same time, what is required to end the peace process in a way that will make Israel acquire international legitimacy and make it a member or partner in its region, especially as the Palestinian negotiator has offered the maximum amount of concessions. Besides, it is impossible to force Israeli and international pressure on the Palestinians; i.e. this pressure has achieved the utmost results expected from them, and their continuation will put an end to the whole process, according to Palestinian leaders, who have nothing to negotiate with.. Will Shas pay heed to this?
Pure Pragmatism
Shas will not take heed. The Party sees settlement only in light of a ruling from its religious voice, Rabbi Ofadia Yousef, that if adherence to land threatens the lives of the Israelis and abandonment of the land achieves peace for them, then they should give up this land.
Regarding the regional and international environment under which Israeli ship sails with all its contradictions in this stage and the impact of this environment on the Israeli internal balances, it seems that there is no actual pressure on Israel to compel it to withdraw. It also seems that it is heading for normalization (i.e., a natural state) in which trends grow to consecrate the status quo without any cost. It is not going to relinquish a wasted chance where there are advantages of peace and its fruits. However, it is clear that Israel has managed to get more prizes without paying that "illusory cost." It has normalized relations with some Arab and Islamic countries (although the peace process is faltering); widened its international relations; deepened its alliance with the US and NATO; concluded a partnership agreement with the European Union; and infiltrated into the developing countries, which constitute the strategic depth of the Arab World, as an international agent for development, assistance, technology, and arms supplier.
In this context, we cannot, however, disregard the direct responsibility of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). It stood as a barrier between the Palestinian people who launched the uprising and the occupation forces. It got rid of, with its own hands, the factors of power that caused the split between the Right and Left in Israel during the years of the Intifada that preceded the entry of the PNA into the self-rule area, and convinced the Israeli leadership of the existence of the Palestinian people and its right in establishing a state of its own. What more does Israel want in order to withdraw from the occupied territories? What could possibly make it withdraw?
Legitimacy of Existence
Although Israel has achieved the above-mentioned targets, it has not yet acquired the legitimacy of existence that can only be granted from the Palestinian side. The PNA recognized the State of Israel only on the condition that the Palestinian State should be established on the remaining quarter of Palestine at the end of the peace process. The proclamation of the Palestinian State fell due to the conditions of the settlement process, but it was put off more than once till there was no room for anymore delay.
If we consider that Palestine (not Jerusalem alone) is an Islamic land that belongs to the whole Muslim Ummah, which should struggle to liberate it, the recognition of Israel's existence by the PNA and other official Arab and Islamic parties that cooperate with Israel should not grant it such legitimacy. Here lies the dilemma. The Palestinian side (at the official and popular levels) threatens that it will erupt if Israel does not allow it to establish its states within the coming weeks. The Muslim Ummah is changing beneath the official surface exactly as Israel has changed and as its ethnic, religious and national elements has blown up from under the official Zionist cover. From here emerges the importance of the ongoing settlement process to the Israeli leaderships, as well as the regional and major states, which analyze the march of those changes and count their possible impact. This is especially after Israel's successive losses in the military and security department in a way that made it lose reverence and factors of deterrence owing to commando wars launched in Palestine and South Lebanon.
Alternatives to Regional Movement
Regional environment is expected to affect the equations of internal conflict in Israel, which govern Israel's conduct in the settlement process. In this context, two alternatives can be imagined: Israel and the US will succeed in compelling the PNA to suppress popular wrath and wait till Israel grants it a state under Israel's own conditions when Israel is good and ready. At this very moment, there will be no true motive in the Israeli environment to support the settlement process, and pressure on the Israeli leadership will compel it to concentrate on internal affairs, disregarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, the building of settlements, confiscation of land and suppression of Palestinians will increase, as experience has shown.
A qualitative change will take place in the Palestinian-Israeli balance through the unity of the Palestinian people with its PNA. Thus, they will work together to "call the Palestinian State into existence" on their land, enter true confrontations with the Israeli forces to liberate the West Bank, and put an end to the building of settlements. At this very point, Israeli society with all its trends may be aware of the seriousness of this situation. Thus all trends will be unified vis-à-vis the Palestinians, who should be boosted politically and financially by the Arab and Islamic Ummah as well as the developing countries, as was the case was during the Intifada. This support should only stop after achieving tangible progress. At this very moment Israel will retreat and there will be public opinion at home urging it to pull out, similar to what happened in the late 1980's and Israel's withdrawal from South Lebanon.
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