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A Pakistani soldier aims his RPG during a battle between the Pakistani military and Taliban in South Waziristan(Reuters Photo). |
In June 2009, the Pakistani military announced the start of “Operation Rah-e-Nijat" (Path to Salvation), and since then, the Pakistani air force and the army have been relentlessly attacking militant positions in South Waziristan, to soften -both militarily and psychologically- the target.
This has since been followed by a land-incursion by the Pakistani army in the dominated area of the Mehsud tribe, on Oct. 17.
It is important to note here, that this time, the government of Pakistan seems to have learnt from its previous ventures into Mehsud territory.
And therefore, before launching a full scale military incursion in the heartland of the TTP (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan – Movement of Taliban of Pakistan), the military tried pulling every string possible to weaken and undermine the movement, including using the influence of the Waziri Tribal leaders in this battle.
This military policy, however, entails a price: Ignoring some activities of the members of these tribes in North and South Waziristan, including launching attacks inside Afghanistan, according to a number of analysts.
This was also to chalk out peace deals with two important militant leaders currently operating out of North and South Waziristan, namely; Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir.
Successful Policies?
In terms of combat operations, these compromised deals are essential if the Pakistani army is to succeed, against the TTP. If for any reason, the Waziri territory becomes hostile towards the Pakistani army, it would be extremely difficult - if not entirely impossible - for the army to conduct any operation in the region.
The failure to form an alliance with the Waziris in the past was one of the basic reasons explaining why the Pakistani army could not seriously dent the activities of the Taliban in South Waziristan in the several operations it carried out there.
The strength of this alliance, however, is already being put to test through repeated drone attacks in the region, and it is therefore up for speculation, as to how long will the Pakistani army be able to hold such deals in this devastated region.
After all the doom and gloom through much of early 2009, the Pakistani army has been relatively successful at regaining control of Bajaur, Mohmand, Swat and Darra Adam Khel.
Now, considering the fact that the very artery that feeds militant activities inside Pakistan, lies in South Waziristan, this operation should therefore be seen as predicted extension of the Pakistani Army’s operations in the country.
Forces in Operation
| Overall there are 60 to 80,000 active duty soldiers in this th. eater of operations |
- Three divisions of the Pakistan Army. – 21,600 troops. Reserve: 1 brigade / division, bringing the total to about 28,800 troops.
- Corps of the FC [South Waziristan Scouts, Shawal Rifles & Tochi Scouts]. Each corp has about 2000 men. Bringing the total number of fighting troops to 6000.
- Support units like Armor, Engineers, Supply and FACs (forward air controllers or ground liaison officers) are in use in addition to the above mentioned troops.
Waziristan is already playing host to 11 and 12 corps of the Pakistani army, in addition to the troops mentioned above. In total, there are 60,000 to 80,000 active duty soldiers in this theater of operations.
Operational Goals and Tactics
One thing for certain is that the Pakistani military does not seem to be operating under the belief that they will be able to "exterminate" all militants or even eradicate their top leadership in the near future.
By all accounts, and that of the ISPR - Inter-Service Pakistan Relations- the suggested course of action seems to be denying the TTP a safe haven in South Waziristan, to the extent that it can enable the government of Pakistan to exert administrative control over the area and to replace the TTP’s authority with that of the "traditional" tribal leadership.
A step that certainly is not going to be easy, especially when having in mind that for the last few years, the TTP has managed to kill over 600 tribal elders, hence completely decimating the previous tribal leadership in the area and replacing it with its own.
From the progress made so far, it can be ascertained that the Pakistani army seems to have an effective military strategy in place. They are moving in slowly, and are taking over important towns by first encircling them through control of surrounding peaks and then clearing them.
The ground assault force is backed up by Cobra helicopters providing close-air support, while jets with precision munitions are being used to eliminate hardened bunkers and anti-air craft machine guns.
Taliban's Response
| It has to be kept in mind, that the confrontation will not be restricted to South Waziristan. |
The TTP cadres, in my opinion, simply do not have the option of melting away anymore. Whilst some will definitely disperse, ultimately, the militants will balk at the idea of giving up the strongest of their strongholds.
South Waziristan has been central to operations of not only the TTP but also their "guests" (some Arabs, Uzbeks and Chechens). They have invested eight years worth of their time and effort to build an environment and support infrastructure that is conducive towards their militant activities.
The fact that the Pakistani army has managed to wrestle back the control of tribal agencies surrounding South Waziristan, namely; Malakand, Mohmand, and Bajaur, is making it very hard for the TTP cadres to move to surrounding agencies.
With no way out, there should be no doubt that they will give the Pakistani military a nasty fight. Thus I believe that the military is in for a bloody and a long drawn fight in the region.
In addition to the military conflict, given the nature of this war, it has to be kept in mind, that the confrontation will not be restricted to South Waziristan.
As it can be witnessed by the events of the last three weeks, the TTP has successfully managed to launch suicide attacks against some vital places in Pakistan: the World Food Program office in Islamabad, General Head Quarters in Rawalpindi, Federal Investigation Agency, Elite Police force training center and a police training center in Lahore, Pakistan Aeronautical Complex in Kamra, International Islamic University in Islamabad, and a high profile targeted assassination of a Pakistan army brigadier, resulting in about 200 deaths, so far.
Let alone the Oct. 28 devastating bombing in Peshawar–which the TTP has denied any accountability for– that killed over 100 people, most of whom are children and women.
The TTP has promptly condemned this attack, and previously, in several statements, the movement stressed out that it does not target civilians. This stand has confused many analysts making them uncertain of those who could be behind such an attack.
This specific attack which no one claimed is especially puzzling in this nerve-wracking bloody time of confrontations between militants and the military.
Militant attacks, while spectacular, may not be kept up at the same pace, for long. Given the number of the past attacks, it would be fair to suggest that, they may have resulted in depleting the number of suicide attackers available to TTP. Hence we might see a drop in attacks, inside mainland Pakistan, in the near future.
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