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Embedded in the Iranian psyche is a longing for a leader who would come from the unknown world to solve all problems. |
On Friday, Ayatollah Khamenei closed the door of political maneuvering after a turbulent week. Following Mousavi’s rejection of Khamenei’s offer to partially recount the votes in the June 12 disputed presidential election, Iran’s Supreme Leader made his final decision: giving his total support to Ahmadinejad and suppressing protests regardless of the consequences. The Iranian people have taken to the streets of Tehran, which left dozens injured and around seven dead.
Why are the Iranian people protesting? Is it their love for Mousavi or their despise for Ahmadinejad? Why haven’t the angry protestors admit that they are a minority that should accept the majority’s choice?
The transition of power mechanism in a democratic system ensures that both the next and previous leaders believe in the country’s constitution and the general principles that govern the system’s performance; therefore, the country’s character and soul – which determine both political and social cultures – remain the same. In this context, the supporters of the losing candidate accept the majority’s choice because it not an option that they prefer death to.
What happened in the Iranian presidential election was different from what usually happens in democratic countries. Does this mean that there is a major ideological difference between Mousavi and Ahmadinejad that makes the supporters of Mousavi ready to sacrifice their lives?
Republicanism or Theocracy?
| Most protestors were children when Mousavi was prime minister. |
There are no substantial ideological differences between the four candidates who ran for presidency. All of them believe in the Guardianship of the Jurist theory, participated in the 1979 revolution, and embrace almost the same political, economic, and cultural views, which is the case with all the members of Iran’s political elite.
However, the Iranian political system itself is unique as it consists of two elements that are two faces of the same coin: republicanism and theocracy.
Republicanism is the side that values citizenship rights, considers people the source of authority, advocates government accountability through the parliament, and protects minority rights.
The other face of the Iranian system is theocratic and sectarian as it considers Al-Waliy Al-Faqih (the Islamic Jurist) – the most powerful figure in the system – the source of authority. Notably, the position of the Supreme Leader is for life, and the country’s most senior official can legislate and suspend the parliament.
Squeezed between the two faces of the system, the Iranian people stand bewildered and unable to understand whether they are the source of authority or not.
While sometimes the Iranian system displays its republican face, at other times it shows its theocratic one, suppressing its people under the name of obeying the Jurist, whose authority is derived from his link to the Occulted Imam.
Most of the angry masses who took to the streets in Iran are young people who did not know Mousavi as a prime minister, and most probably the majority of them were children during that time. However, they flock to the streets, sacrificing their lives to support the democratic, republican side of the Iranian system.
These young people have been suffering from the theocratic side of the system that mixes religious and worldly matters in a way that makes people subordinate to scholars.
The Iranian people are not sacrificing their lives as part of a political game; rather, it is a vital battle for the soul of Iran. Therefore, Mousavi has been their logical choice.
A Hero from the Unknown World
| Mousavi is not a member of any of the political movements Iranians have become disillusioned with. |
During the early days of his political campaign, Mousavi announced that he had returned to the political arena after 20 years of abstention from any type of political activity because he believed that the system had gone astray, and that he would attempt to modify the constitution to add more power to the post of president and limit that of the Supreme Leader.
Also, Mousavi is not a member of any of the political movements that the Iranian people have become disillusioned with. After announcing his candidacy, it was difficult to categorize him as a Conservative or Reformist; however, he has become part of the Reformist camp because of his outspoken refusal for ignoring the republican side of the system.
But still there is an emotional motive behind the fervent support of the Iranian masses to Mousavi; embedded in the Iranian psyche is a longing for a leader who would come from the unknown world to solve all problems. And because this longing is one of the cornerstones of the Shiite creed, Mousavi has come to symbolize the hero, whose potentials were clearly reflected during the Iran-Iraq war.
On the other hand, these angry protestors have seen Ahmadinejad kissing the Supreme Leader’s hand during the early days of his presidency, as if he was expressing the submission of the people to the theocratic side of the system. Also, in Mousavi’s words, the incumbent president has turned Iranians to “beggars,” who wait for government loans.
Notably, Ahmadinejad has spent billions of dollars from the surplus oil revenues in cash distributions, and Islamic scholars and religious seminaries were among those who benefitted the most.
However, Ahmadinejad’s cash distributions have failed to please everyone. That is why see people protesting against Ahmadinejad.
Iran’s Political Elite
| There are rumors that the Supreme Leader has promised Rezaei to be the next president. |
The Iranian political elite consists mainly of Islamic scholars who participated in the 1979 revolution, and whose ranks were determined by the level of their contribution and their closeness to Ayatollah Khomeini.
In addition to the scholars, there is also a large number of civilian revolutionaries, who believe in the Guardianship of the Jurist theory and who has been active on the Iranian political arena since the revolution. This group of politicians dress in Western clothes and believe that a balance should be created between the republican and theocratic faces of the system.
Although most of them were suppressed during the early days of the Islamic Revolution, there is also a small group of outspoken liberals and socialists, who have expressed a de facto approval of the Guardianship of the Jurist theory; however, they always find refuge in the republican side of the system and fervently reject the theocratic side. As a result, they are in a constant conflict with the system.
Among the four candidates who competed for presidency on June 12 was Mehdi Karroubi. The two-time parliament speaker is one of the most prominent Reformist scholars because he is a typical Islamic scholar, and at the same time he is ready to deal with non-clerical revolutionaries as well as liberals and socialists. On the other hand, Mousavi, a civilian revolutionary, has insisted on preserving the two faces of the system.
When it comes to the other two candidates, there were no substantial differences between Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Mohsen Rezaei. Perhaps Rezaei’s candidacy was a rehearsal for the upcoming presidential election, given that there are rumors that the Supreme Leader has promised him to be the next president.
Thus, Ahmadinejad is the only intruder, who does not belong to the Iranian political elite. He belonged to the Revolutionary Guards, and he values the theocratic face over the Republican face of the system. Some observers even compare him to Hitler, who used the democratic system in Germany in the 1930s to ascend to power then destroyed the system from within.
Ahmadinejad does not believe in the multiple party system or that the people are the source of authority. He has declared that he is an adherent to Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi’s thought, which gives the Jurist all powers regardless of what the people think because his authority is primordial and granted by the Occulted Imam.
Ahmadinejad’s ideas, however, were not the reason behind the clash between him the members of Iran’s political elite; rather, it was the fact that he did not abide by the rules of the game, refusing to share power with his allies.
What happened under Ahmadinejad can be described as a “political coup” that was planned by the Supreme Leader, who wanted to get rid of the political elite. Thus, the current unrest can be perceived as a counter-coup that aims at preserving the dual nature of the system and curbing the power of the Revolutionary Guards.
The difference between the angry protestors and the Iranian political elite is clear; their motives for engaging in almost a suicidal clash with the Supreme Leader and the security apparatuses are different. And with the differences in motives comes the differences in actions.
Although Iran’s political elite are more organized than the demonstrators in the streets of Tehran, their motives do not go beyond the limits of the political game; therefore, they might make maneuvers or compromises as the pressure on them increases. Yet, the Iranian people do not have anything other than their lives to sacrifice for their beliefs.
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