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Will the reelection of Ahmadinejad strengthen Egypt's security apparatus' approach toward Iran? (Reuters photo) |
Egypt has full diplomatic relations with almost all states worldwide. The Islamic Republic of Iran managed in the aftermath of its eight-year war against Iraq to end its isolation, and to restore full diplomatic ties with various European states, Central Asian republics, and Gulf states. Only the United States, Israel, and Egypt eluded that development.
Egyptian-Iranian relations therefore pose a dilemma for researchers and analysts. Diplomatic relations between the two countries have been severed for the past three decades and the recent polarization in Middle East politics suggests that no rapprochement is likely in the foreseeable future.
But why have diplomatic relations between the two pivotal states that share the same region been cut for so long?
Flawed Interpretations
| The Egyptian regime is well aware of the vast economic benefits that would be gained if ties with Iran were restored. |
Scholars and commentators have used various interpretations to explain the three-decade "rupture" in Egyptian-Iranian relations. The explanatory power of these theories, however, is limited and insufficient to reveal the real reasons behind the continued rift between Cairo and Tehran.
It is often suggested, for example, that Iran's occupation of the United Arab Emirates' three islands (Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa) is the stumbling block to the normalization of Egyptian-Iranian diplomatic relations.
This view overlooks the fact that various Arab states have lingering land disputes with non-Arab ones — to mention but a few; Syria versus Turkey, and Morocco versus Spain, as well as Israel's decades-long subjugation of the Palestinian land and people.
During Mubarak's reign, Egypt's solid relations with Turkey, Spain, and Israel have not been jeopardized by these conflicts.
Ironically, Egypt is using the card of solidarity with fellow United Arab Emirates while the latter is Iran's major trading partner in the Arab World.
Other analyses explained Egypt's disinterest in mending fences by pointing to Iran's reluctance to join or advocate the Arab-Israeli peace process.
This assumption disregards the fact that Syria has been Iran's closest Arab ally for the past few decades.
During that period, Syria accepted the right of Israel to live within secure borders, attended the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, and engaged in various direct and indirect peace negotiations with Israel. The Syrian-Iranian alliance remained intact, nonetheless.
A street in Tehran named after Sadat's assassin and the burial of the last Iranian Shah in Cairo have been frequently listed as the major bone of contention between the two countries.
It stands to reason, however, that they were used as a pretext to block normalization of bilateral relations.
The Iranian government, in a gesture of goodwill, had already changed the name of the street in 2004.
Besides, pragmatic foreign policies do not hold strategic interests hostage to symbolic nuances. Egypt continues to maintain cordial relations with Israel, even after an Israeli documentary, "Shaked Spirit", confirmed the killing of Egyptian prisoners of war in the 1967 War.
The Egyptian regime, which has relinquished political independence at the expense of economic development, is well aware of the vast economic benefits that would be gained if ties with Iran were restored.
To cite one example, an influx of Iranian tourists visiting Egypt's Shiite sites is expected once political relations are restored. The annual revenue accruing from Iranian tourism is estimated to exceed $ 5 billion.[1]
The Decision-Making Process in Egypt
| Mubarak's heightened attention to security matters, naturally, led to the increasing role of the security apparatus in domestic and foreign decision-making. |
No understanding of Egyptian-Iranian relations is possible without taking into consideration Egypt's foreign policy decision-making process and the dynamics governing the relationship between the different players involved in foreign policy planning and execution.
Just like the case in many developing countries, foreign policy decision making in Egypt is marred by excessive centralization and personification.
In many developing countries, the process is predominately dominated by the man at the helm, and the input of other groups or institutions is negligible, inevitably leading to the personalization of power.
This development has become the norm in vast areas of the post-independence countries in Asia and Africa. In fact, some influential voices advocated it. For example, King Hassan II of Morocco explained:
"I am obliged to personify power as strongly as possible. For people, they do not obey a program or a plan. They obey men, a team of men, and it is all for the best if that team is embodied in a chief and symbolized by one face, one voice, and one personality ."[2]
As a hydraulic society where taxation — hence control — is facilitated, Egypt's rule has historically been centralized.
The process was further eased by the tendency of the inhabitants to be "docile" and "obedient" — a feature that many historians and anthropologists observed. Centuries ago, sociologist Ibn Khaldoun (1332-1406) wrote:
" Some countries are destined for empire. The ruler need never worry about protest movements or revolt[s] which are rare; such is Egypt's case…There we find only one sovereign and his obedient subjects ."[3]
Centralization has been institutionalized since the revolution of 1952. The constitutions of 1956, 1958, 1964, 1971 all granted the president draconian powers, and subordinated to him other organs of decision-making bodies.
In the light of this situation, a close look at the Egyptian leader's personality, worldviews, and political style is imperative for understanding Egyptian foreign policy.
28 years at the helm of Egypt's political system have revealed that President Hosni Mubarak's decision-making style is characterized — more than anything else, — by caution and gradualism.
Unlike Presidents Gamal Abdel-Nasser and Anwar Sadat, who tended to be confrontational — while Nasser and Sadat took decisions sometimes on the spur of the moment, and often without much deliberation, Mubarak has opted for a cautious, reconciliatory style in foreign policy.
In addition, Mubarak has exhibited a high sense of insecurity towards internal and external threats, and an obsession with maintaining domestic stability.
A mixture of persona and myriad domestic and regional threats fueled this disposition.
According to Dennis Ross, special Middle East coordinator under former US president Bill Clinton, the stability of Egypt is "always the preoccupation of President Hosni Mubarak."[4]
It could be argued that this preoccupation with personal and regime security has been intensified in the aftermath of the potent Jamaat (violent Muslim movements) insurgency that shook the country in the early 1990s and the failed assassination attempt on Mubarak's life in Addis Ababa in 1995.
It is also widely believed that Mubarak harbors a deep sense of mistrust and animosity towards Muslim parties, within Egypt and in the region as a whole.
His cold — even antagonistic — posture towards regional Muslim parties, like Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and the Sudan (under the alliance of President Al-Bashir with Hassan Al-Turabi), reinforces that assumption.
Within this context, it is worthwhile remembering that militant Muslim groups assassinated Mubarak's predecessor in a military parade that he himself witnessed, and they posed the greatest threat to the Egyptian regime in the second half of the 20th century.
The Muslim Brotherhood, the prime representative of moderate Muslims, has represented the most formidable political threat to the dominance of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP).
Mubarak's suspicions are, in the light of these threats, not entirely unsubstantiated.
Mubarak's heightened attention to security matters, naturally, led to the increasing role of the security apparatus in domestic and foreign decision-making.
Since any political or economic decision could, directly or indirectly, impinge on the "security" of the nation or the regime, security organs have been systematically consulted on a wide range of political and economic issues.
The past few years witnessed an increased involvement of the security establishment — particularly the General Intelligence — in a number of important foreign policy issues, particularly the Palestinian question and the Sudan.
That came, inevitably, at the expense of the role and influence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. General Omar Soliman, the head of the General Intelligence, has become in charge of negotiations with Israel and the Palestinians, as well as the reconciliation talks between the belligerent Palestinian factions.
Security-Driven Foreign Policy
| Still the opinion of the security apparatus had to be consulted |
In contrast to diplomats, who consider the multiple facets of the political process, the opinion of security agencies is focused on security alone, hence often jeopardizes "politics" to maintain "security".
Driven by the need to avoid risks at any cost, estimating threats and setting the necessary precautions to face these threats are usually exaggerated.
These inherent differences between the mindsets of the diplomacy establishment and the security apparatus manifested itself in the question over resuming diplomatic relations with Iran.
Senior diplomats, including former ministers of Foreign Affairs Amr Moussa and Ahmed Maher, have opted for a gradual rapprochement towards Iran that could culminate in the full restoration of diplomatic ties. Yet, the security apparatus objected.
Since the mid-1990s, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly tried to convince Mubarak to ease up tensions with the Iranian regime, particularly after the latter shifted its approach from revolution and conflict to moderation and pragmatism.
The closest attempt came in 2003 when Mubarak met with the Iranian President Mohamed Khatami in Geneva on the sidelines of a UN technology summit.
Expectations of an imminent rapprochement were aborted on the rock of Mubarak and his security aides' desire to keep Iran at arm's length.
It is important to remember that in Egypt's political system, President Mubarak is the final arbiter between the different bodies that assist him in decision-making process.
To facilitate control, the structure of decision making is based on vertical lines of communication.
The policy recommendations of the different institutions that are engaged in the process are presented directly to the President, and horizontal communication is limited.
In other words, different players are battling for Mubarak's ears in spite of the centralization of the Egyptian political system. Apparently, since the second decade of Mubarak's presidency, the security apparatus has enjoyed nearly the power to veto decisions, both domestic and foreign.
This development came as a result of Mubarak's perceptions of an increasingly dangerous domestic and regional environment, and his wariness of any development that might jeopardize the security of Egypt and the dominance of its regime.
So even at times when Mubarak was receptive to the proposals made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, still the opinion of the security apparatus had to be consulted. On many occasions, an initial presidential approval of the ministry's recommendations has been withdrawn because of the reservations of the Intelligence Apparatus or the State Security Intelligence.
Certainly, since it is the President who eventually decides which recommendation to endorse and which to reject, it is reasonable to say that the rise of the influence of security agencies in the past few years was only possible because their advice was sanctioned by Mubarak.
Moreover, it must be remembered that the most fundamental beliefs and opinions of some politicians are resistant to alteration, and are hardly adaptable to changes in the environment.
In fact, politicians often make sense of the world by relying on a fixed set of beliefs and images, and they aim at maintaining consistency among the different facets of that predetermined paradigm.
Mubarak is no exception; his perceptions of political Muslim movements and the Islamic Republic of Iran have hardly undergone any change over the nearly three decades of his rule.
This rigidness explains Egypt's unchanging attitude toward Iran over the last 30 years, in spite of the change witnessed in Iran's foreign policy during these same years.
By understanding the motivations and dynamics of Egypt's foreign policy decision-making process, one can conclude that mending fences with Iran is not anywhere close.
References:
[1] Mohamed Magdy Morgan, “Egypt and Iran and the Cultural Bond,” Al-Ahram, 3 May 2006, http://www.ahram.org.eg/archive/Index.asp?CurFN=opin5.htm&DID=8840.
[2] Shaheen Ayubi, Nasser and Sadat: Decision Making and Foreign Policy, 1970-1972 (Maryland: University Press of America, 1994), 7.
[3] Ibid., 10.
[4] Dennis Ross, “Egypt’s New Role,” The Washington Post, 2 July 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22192-2004Jul1.html.
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