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Cost-benefit considerations, rather than Muslim solidarity, did play a pivotal role when it comes to recognizing Kosova,(Reuters photo) |
The issue of Kosova and the international recognition of its statehood these days are obviously far from media attention, with the Middle East permanently boiling, North Korea showing off its nuclear power, and the global economic crisis rightly stealing most of the headlines and prime time minutes.
But, this absence from news bulletins does not mean that there is dust over Kosova, or for that matter, the wider Balkan region has finally and permanently been settled.
More than a year after proclaiming independence from Serbia, Kosova has been recognized by 60 countries, including the United States of America, most of Europe's largest states, and some very important Muslim countries, like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Malaysia.
Still, on June 15, when Kosovars will mark the first anniversary of the entry into force of their constitution, the shadow of a great number of states hesitating to endorse its statehood will certainly bring some rainy clouds above the celebration.
In addition, the one single question that is bound to "spoil" the celebration is going to be the unclear future regarding Serbs living in Kosova and the neighboring state of Serbia.
Serbia is still persistent in its stubborn refusal to accept the reality of an independent Kosova.
It does an incredible job to keep many countries — including too many Muslim ones — from recognizing the newest Balkan republic. Furthermore, the whole international community is highly reluctant to engage with Kosova in a meaningful way.
So, the just, multiethnic concept of the internationally supervised state does not break down — again — in the whirlpool of ethnic divisions and the renewal of conflict.
Hence, today, Kosova's success is measured not by what it did, but by what it did not do, or to put it even more accurately, it is what it could not do.
Shooting in the Dark
| This negative position of Egypt, Syria, Iran, Libya, and Indonesia is damaging the Kosovar perspective. |
The challenges and risks Kosova still faces are huge, and they are mainly the result of the unfinished business of building the state of Kosovars.
Kosova should be fully functional and capable of fulfilling its obligations towards the international community in general, and its own people, citizens, and communities in particular — majority and minority alike.
So, before we determine what needs to be done, let us first analyze what does not work in Kosova.
First of all, the new state is not properly functioning, because Belgrade openly backs Serbs illegal parallel structures that work against the Kosovar state in most of the Serb-controlled areas.
And, with its extremely visible example in the North of the country, the Kosovar government is not capable of exercising its authority over the whole of its territory.
On the other hand, division among the international community regarding Kosova's status has a disastrous effect on the situation as well, since it provides Serbia with energy to persist in its policy of working openly against Kosova and its new legal order.
The worst case of this external negative impact is that five EU member countries do not recognize Kosova, which directly influences the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosova (EULEX), forcing it to declare itself "status neutral".
This, in itself, is certain nonsense, because the mission foreseen to implement the laws of an independent Kosova is neutral toward the very same independence, which it is supposed to implement its laws.
Similarly, the hesitation of some Muslim countries to join Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other 11 member countries of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in recognizing Kosova has a negative impact.
Just two weeks ago in Damascus, Muslim countries of OIC have shown division regarding adopting a unified position regarding Kosova.
The chance, yet again, to stand in support of Kosova has been squandered, mainly due to the lack of understanding among some Muslim governments.
Belgrade today is not the capital of the Socialist and Non-Aligned Tito's Yugoslavia, whereas the Republic of Kosova is not an American idea implemented against the will of the people there.
The result is almost absurd; in case of Kosova, the United States is the biggest supporter of independence for a nation which is 90 percent Muslim. Quite the contrary, the Muslim world at large is supportive of the Serbian position, and is denying the Kosovar people the possibility to build their own society, free of external repression and control.
This negative position of some Muslim and Arab countries like Egypt, Syria, Iran, Libya, and Indonesia is damaging not only the Kosovar perspective, but also the credibility of the Muslim world as a constructive player in the global stage.
In addition, the lack of progress in economy, social welfare, combating unemployment, education, medical healthcare — because of incompetent local institutions, and the severe lack of funding for priority projects — could end up with popular disappointment over the political elite and the international community.
This, on the other hand, will make the perspective of addressing major political issues related to Serb minority and political stability even more difficult.
The recent visit of US Vice President Joe Biden to the region with his clear message that Kosovar statehood is irreversible — while the region's perspective lies within the process of European integration — was more than welcomed although it still feels like a single shot in the dark.
The Way Forward
| The only proper way forward for the world is to recognize the independent Kosova. |
Now, it is more than obvious that the one single change that could produce a multiple positive effect in Kosova would be making the state functional.
The easy answer is the implementation of the original status plan known as the "Ahtisaari proposal", named after the mediator of the 2005-2007 Kosova-Serbia peace talks; former president of Finland, and Nobel Peace laureate Martti Ahtisaari.
The plan —taking into account the history, geography, political realities, and population indices — presents a unique solution to what it sees as a unique problem.
The plan includes mechanisms to guarantee minority rights, with extensive autonomy for the Serb community, while it also provides solutions for economic, security, and regional cooperation.
Ahtisaari's plan also regulates the complex roles of different international actors, making them all work in the same line towards the goal of creating a multi-ethnic, tolerant society, in which the majority gets independence — provided that minorities get the equal share in prosperity and security.
The plan recognizes that the Serbian criminal and orchestrated campaign of mass killings and deportation has permanently made Belgrade lose all the rights to ever rule the Kosovar people and territory again.
This fact has been recently reinforced by the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, where five of the former highest political, military, and police leaders of Serbia and former Yugoslavia have been found guilty of "joint criminal enterprise" against Kosova Albanians.
But, the Ahtisaari Plan is also meant to provide a future for a tiny place of little more than 2 million people, of which 90 percent are Albanians and only 5 percent are Serbs, who have grown to view each other as enemies.
A future in which reconciliation will be possible in a place where, for instance, in spring 1999 Albanian Muslim population had to suffer from the Serbian campaign of terror that left more than 12,000 people killed, almost a million deported, and half of the country ruined.
Over 500 villages and 220 mosques, which were 50 percent of Kosova's mosques, were completely destroyed.
So, the Ahtisaari Plan actually wanted everybody to look toward the future and leave the past behind.
But, that is easier said than done.
The premise is that everybody, including Serbia, recognizes Kosova.
Since this did not happen, it is very difficult to see how Kosova can become a functional body without having the support of the world — the very same world that demands Kosova to be conscientious, and to act responsibly toward its minorities and people.
Therefore, the only proper way forward for the world is to recognize independent Kosova, so that they will give the Kosovars the means to build the society that the world claims they want to see in place.
In that case, all the credit will be shared, only the mistakes will be ours.
Seen under this light, Kosova's success needs to be measured not by what Kosova did not or could not do, but by what the world at large did not allow Kosova and its people to do.
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