 |
|
|
|
Tue. May. 26, 2009
|
|
|
Politics in depth > Asia > Politics & Economy
|
|
|
|
|
|
Party Politics in Iran’s Election
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
A woman walks past electoral posters for Secretary of the Expediency Council arbitration body and Iran's upcoming presidential election candidate Mohsen Rezai in Tehran,( Reuters photo) |
With the tenth presidential election of the Islamic Republic just around the corner, many questions have been raised about the role of political parties in the presidential race, especially with three of the four main candidates not being clearly affiliated to any political party.
While Mirhossein Mousavi, Ahmadinejad and Mohsen Rezaei have decided to run for president without the backup of any political party, Mehdi Karroubi belongs to the National Trust (Etemad-e Melli) Party which he established after losing to Ahmadinejad in the 2005 presidential election.
Though the period between the 2005 election and the one set for next month is short, it allowed for major and pivotal changes in Iran’s political state of affairs.
Political parties in Iran took the time to evaluate and revamp their performance and frame of reference after being defeated by Ahmadinejad, who was not supported by any party up until the second round.
The failure of both Reformists and Conservatives was a strong blow to Iran’s political parties, proving the ability of the Supreme Leader to steer the political wheel without the help of any party.
Marginalizing Traditional Conservatives
| Iran has a huge number of retired Generals, who believe that they have the right to enjoy the fruits of the revolution. |
Ahmadinejad’s victory was accompanied by three major changes in the political arena: 1) the failure of the Reformist project; 2) the end of the mutual, limitless support between the Supreme Leader and Traditional Conservatives; and 3) the military’s involvement in politics.
Upon being elected, Ahmadinejad set out to reform the administrative make-up of the country in the name of carrying out an “administrative revolution.” Those with military and intelligence background replaced the technocrats who had been administrating the country under both Rafsanjani and Khatami, forming a base of support on which Reformists depended.
The “administrative revolution” resulted in dismissing a number of Traditional Conservatives.
Throughout the past four years, all the attempts for creating an alliance between Ahmadinejad and Traditional Conservatives failed, which affected the relationship between the Supreme Leader and Traditional Conservatives.
The Military’s Involvement in Politics
Ahmadinejad’s presidency was characterized by the heavy involvement of the military in politics, which took two forms: first, the direct involvement of retired military personnel, such as Ahmadinejad and Mohsen Rezaei, in politics; and second, the political statements made by the Revolutionary Guards from time to time.
The Revolutionary Guards is packed with commanders who once belonged to the Revolutionary Committees that supported Khomeini during the early days of the revolution, and who were all granted analogous military titles after turning into a regular army.
Consequently, the Islamic Republic has now a huge number of retired Generals, who believe that they have the right to enjoy the fruits of the revolution they fought for after spending most of their lives in the battlefield. So, they have a strong desire to work in politics, with the conviction that they should enjoy certain privileges.
Also, the in-service commanders of the Revolutionary Guards have been making political statements recently, emphasizing what they perceive as their internal duty of protecting the revolutionary principles and combating any deviation even by the political leadership.
Thus, the use of force for enforcing the Supreme Leader’s decisions has been in the background for some time. The involvement of military personnel in politics is a reality today, which has brought about the revamp of the Iranian political scene.
Liberals & Socialists
| Mehdi Karroubi has hard feelings towards Reformists who abandoned him in the 2005 presidential election. |
Ahmadinejad’s government suppressed the calls for democracy by the Islamic Iran Participation Front (Jebheye Mosharekate Iran-e Eslaami), with the implicit approval of the negligible number of Reformists participating in the decision-making process.
As a result, the gap between Democrats and Developmental reformists, represented by the Cadres of Building and Construction, widened despite the common ideas they embrace: both sides call for allowing more political freedom and broadening the base of private ownership, yet Developmental Reformists believe that economic development brings about political development while Democrats believe that the opposite is true.
Developmental reformists have become closer to the Qalibaf group – known as the alliance of Developmental Reformists with Traditional Conservatives, while Liberals have separated from the Cadres of Building and Construction and became closer to the Qalibaf group.
Such a change deprived the Cadres of Building and Construction of its theorizing force, namely the Liberals who used to provide them with electoral programs like what happened in the presidential election won by Rafsanjani, who raised the slogan of democratic development.
At the same time, the Liberals lost the chance of working via an official political body, and of using the newspaper of the Building and Construction Cadres, through which they reached out to their supporters.
Thus, the influence of the Liberals on the political arena has nearly diminished.
Just as the Liberals were the theorizing force for the Building and Construction Cadres, the Socialists played the same role with the Democrats (The Participation Front).
However, the Democrats had to distance themselves from the Socialists because of the pressure Ahmadinejad's government put on some Socialist leaders, such as Sayed Hashem Aqajeri and Ezzatullah Sahabi. Also, the Socialists came to believe that the Democrats were ready to compromise their principles.
So, the Socialists have joined the Liberals in their political isolation after losing their official political representation and their means of communication with people.
Military Fundamentalists
| Ahmadinejad said he saw an aura of light surrounding him while giving his speech in the United Nations. |
Ruhaniyun-e Mobarez, one of the main Reformist groups, chose to ally itself with the Building and Construction Cadres and the Qalibaf group rather than with Mehdi Karroubi, one of the founders of the group.
It is important to note that Karroubi has hard feelings towards Reformists who abandoned him in the 2005 presidential election despite his mediation efforts that led to the release of many imprisoned Reformists.
Karroubi, known as the sheikh of reforms, insists on not being part of any coalition, yet he concludes deals of mutual cooperation with most political groups without allowing any of them to become a separate entity under the umbrella of his party.
On the other hand, Military Fundamentalists have grown in strength, gaining control of all the positions of power, with the help of Traditional Conservatives represented by Iran’s Islamic Coalition Party, Ruhaniyat-e Mobarez, the Union of the Qom Seminary Teachers, and other Conservative parties.
Traditional Conservatives, however, were soon marginalized by Military Fundamentalists, which culminated in almost a severance of the relationship between Ahmadinejad and the scholars of Qom.
Despite helping Military Fundamentalists in suppressing Democrats, the Qalibaf group was also marginalized, and Qalibaf was not granted a ministerial position during the past four years.
One of the main characteristics of Military Fundamentalists is that they oppose the party system because they believe that society needs a firm leadership.
So, they used the democratic aspects of the Iranian political system, such as the multiple party system and the right to vote, in spite of their disapproval of them.
Military Fundamentalists believe that they do not derive their legitimacy from the Guardianship of the Jurist theory or the traditional Shiite religious reference system; rather they claim that they are in direct contact with the Occulted Imam, according to what Ahmadinejad said during his speech in Mashhad after returning from his visit to the Columbia University.
In his speech, Ahmadinejad said that he saw an aura of light surrounding him while he was giving his speech in the United Nations, and claimed that other people saw it as well.
Also, Ayatollah Meshkini, former head of the Assembly of Experts, stated that the Occulted Imam was the one who approved the members of Iran’s seventh parliament, raising a wave of criticism among Reformists.
It is important to note that despite all these contradictions, all the political groups in Iran still believe in the theological government and the Guardianship of the Jurist theory, and, with the exception of a number of Liberal groups, they think that more political participation can be acquired through peaceful means.
Colorless Candidates
| The Iranian people are following a mirage while the political elite are occupied by their internal rivalries. |
Khatami’s presidency was characterized by a louder voice for Liberals who rejected the Guardianship of the Jurist theory. In response, under Ahmadinejad, the philosophical idea of the Primordial Guardianship of the Jurist was proposed, widening the gaps between the various groups in the Iranian society, and reducing the chance of finding a middle ground.
The current situation is alarming because it can dismantle the Iranian society, which can lead to a diaspora similar to the one that happened during the early days of the revolution when intellects and capitalists left the country.
Thus, the current map of political forces in Iran has little to do with the one that existed during Khatami’s presidency.
The Reforms Front – also known as the Second of Khordad Front – has lost its Socialist and Liberal members, the intellectual nature of the Building and Construction Cadres and Ruhaniyun-e Mobarez has changed, and Traditional Conservatives have found a more aggressive opponent than Reformists, i.e. Military Fundamentalists.
At the beginning, Traditional Conservatives thought they could lead Military Fundamentalists, but later they found out that it would be more realistic to ally themselves with the fledgling force.
In the midst of all this, Iran’s political parties are incapable of proposing candidates who have true party affiliations; therefore, they have been waiting for candidates who do not belong to any political party to make deals with.
In this context, parties have been competing with each other to convince candidates to declare their loyalty to them. On the other hand, candidates have been trying to find a middle ground in order not to lose the support of any party.
The end result of all these political manoeuvres is a number of colorless candidates who offer inconsistent ideas.
The situation on the Iranian political arena is indeed tragic; political parties are helpless and presidential hopefuls lack reliable party backing that can direct them and spare them the humiliation of begging for votes. What is even more tragic is the state of the Iranian people who are following a distant mirage while the political elite are occupied by their internal rivalries.
|
|
|
Dr. Fathi al-Maraghy is an expert on the Iranian Political System in al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. He is one of the founders of Mokhtarat Iraniyya (Iranian Selections) publication. Al-Maraghy, who travelled to Iran several times, speaks Farsi fluently.
|
 |
what is this?
This widget will help you to store, organize, search, and manage your favorite online content through a range of social bookmarking services. These services permit users to save links to websites that they want to remember and/or share. These bookmarks are usually public, but can be saved privately, shared only with specified people or groups, or shared only inside certain networks. Authorized people can usually view these bookmarks chronologically, by category or tags, or through a search engine. Most social bookmarking services also permit their users to vote and rank public bookmarks to determine which are the best ones according to the number of votes they get.
|
 Send content to your friend |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Contact Politics in Depth
|
|
|
|
|
IslamOnline.net is not responsible for the content of external linked Web sites.
|
|
|
|
|
