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Unlike during the 1960s and 1970s, students' protests seem to be ineffective in dictating Egypt's foreign policy towards the Arab and Muslim world, Dec. 28, 2008. (Reuters Photo) |
When Israel launched massive air strikes against Gaza, starting December 27, which left behind hundreds of dead and hundreds more clinically dead and wounded, many myths chattered, and with them uncountable clichés and slogans that have for years occupied Palestine's political landscape. Hamas itself, out of desperation, perhaps, was involved in disseminating some of these myths.
Shortly after forming a Palestinian government in the Occupied Territories in March 2006, Hamas found itself facing the potential of a major international boycott, facilitated largely by the United States, at the behest of Israel. The Hamas response to the threats of isolation, boycott, and subsequent siege was a self-assured strategy centered around the idea that the Oslo peace ventures had denied the Palestinian struggle its "strategic depth", namely appealing to and engaging Arab and Muslim nations. Various Hamas political leaders announced their government's intentions of reversing what they considered a self-defeating path taken by their predecessors who insisted on pivotal US involvement in the peace process, despite Washington's unmistakable bias and "unconditional support" of Israel.
"Arab and Muslim Brothers"
| Hamas began realizing the mistake of overstating the significance of the largely symbolic support they obtained in previous months. |
Even before the Hamas government was formally announced in Gaza, the Islamic movement's representatives took their case to Arab and Muslim countries, hoping to secure enough backing that would render any future Western boycott ineffectual. On their hectic tours in the Middle East, South East Asia, and Africa, Hamas officials received many verbal pronouncements of support, some timid, others passionate and promising.
But when Israel and the United States began to carry out a systematic campaign of boycott, which morphed into a lethal siege against the Palestinian population of Gaza, Hamas began realizing the mistake of overstating the significance of the largely symbolic support they obtained in previous months.
As Israel upgraded its siege in the following months, reaching the point of denying the Gaza Strip the most basic necessities, and as weary Gazans found themselves without electricity, little food and medicine, and flooded with sewage water, the Hamas government renewed its call on their "Arab and Muslim brothers" to come to the rescue, but, once again, to no avail.
In June 2007, Hamas and Fateh predictably clashed. Their confrontation was brewing for years, and — aside from the Saudi initiative — little genuine efforts at reconciliation were made to prevent an all out conflict. However, when both forces collided in Gaza, and an immediate compromise seemed unfeasible, some Arab governments began to routinely call on Palestinians to "unify their ranks". Those same governments were actively engaging one party, Fateh, and completely dismissing the other. As Fateh received the accolades of political validation, military training, and so on, Hamas representatives were shunned, as their deposed government, along with 1.5 million Palestinians were locked up behind Israeli walls, trenches, but also Egyptian fences.
Locked Up Behind Walls & Fences
| Israel didn't heed Egypt's call for "restraint" as it carried out a massive onslaught that turned the open-air prison into a massive graveyard. |
Since then, the situation in Gaza grew more dire, but also more confusing. If one watches Arab media, or listens to fiery comments made by Arab officials, one will easily reach a definite conclusion: The Arabs, both governments and peoples, are greatly irked by Palestinian divisions, and deeply disheartened by the humanitarian crisis underway in Gaza, one they would decisively and enthusiastically describe as a "crime against humanity", "genocide", or even a "Holocaust".
Even international and UN human rights observers have used every loaded, yet applicable term to underscore the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. That too achieved little, save the garnering of much deserved sympathy to a persecuted civilian population for simply exercising their democratic right to vote.
But what makes the official Arab criticism of the Israeli siege peculiar and highly confusing to some is the fact that some Arab countries are themselves involved in maintaining the siege on Gaza. Egypt shares a border with the Gaza Strip that is not interrupted by any Israeli military presence. The border is sealed almost all the time, forcing Gazans to dig tunnels which now represent the only lifeline that keeps Gaza's malnourished population, more or less, alive.
On a recent visit to Cairo, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who will be leading the center-right Kadima party in Israel's February elections, promised to end the Hamas rule in Gaza. "Enough is enough" she replied to an Egyptian request to use "restraint" in dealing with the impoverished Strip. Israel didn't heed Egypt's call for "restraint" as it carried out a massive onslaught that turned the open-air prison into a massive graveyard. Prior to the attack, Egypt reportedly tightened its border security, fearing that desperate Gazans might flee for their lives to the Sinai desert.
More, the Palestinian government in Ramallah too joined the chorus of Arab condemnations that followed the attack on Gaza, but some officials blamed Hamas for the slaughter, providing Israel with the political cover needed to justify the unprecedented bloodletting.
Arab Fiery Rhetoric, Intangible Action
| There are little indications that hungry and grief-stricken Gaza will alter this reality even if Gazans continue to march carrying the flags of all Arab and Muslim countries, from Mauritania to Kazakhstan. |
These however, are mere examples of the lack of decisiveness, if any, in the way some Arab governments approach the conflict with Israel in general and the siege and the war on Gaza in particular. If the sixty-year legacy of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict carries a relevant lesson, it is that the fiery rhetoric emanating from many Arab capitals hardly translates into any tangible action.
Needless to stay, Hamas' grand strategy of thrusting Palestine back into Arab and Muslim consciousness is falling apart. Hamas' early betting on Palestine's "strategic depth" in the Arab and Muslim worlds is now facing the harsh reality, that peoples who are politically oppressed are incapable of affectively helping another oppressed people. If ordinary Arabs are given the chance to come to Gaza's aid, one can only imagine the outcome of their initiatives. That, however, will not happen any time soon.
But, as far as some Arab governments are concerned, the Palestinian struggle, as in the case of the Gaza crisis, today has always been a solely political issue, teetering between rhetoric and inaction. There are little indications that hungry and grief-stricken Gaza will alter this reality even if Gazans continue to march carrying the flags of all Arab and Muslim countries, from Mauritania to Kazakhstan.
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