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Refugees who fled the conflict in Sudan's western Darfur walk during a dust storm at Djabal camp near Gos Beida in eastern Chad June 19, 2008. Reuters/Finbarr O'Reilly (CHAD) |
After decades of marginalization, environmental degradation, and manipulation of ethnic and tribal identities, a conflict broke out in 2003 in Sudan's western province of Darfur between the mainly "African" rebels and the Sudanese government and their proxy militias.
It is estimated that about 200,000 people have died in Darfur from fighting, disease, and starvation. The United Nations and aid agencies estimate that over two million Darfurians, out of a population of about six million, are living in refugee camps in Darfur and neighboring countries. Even though the majority of deaths have occurred in 2003 and 2004, the conflict is nowhere near the end.
After years of fighting, the government of Sudan and one faction of the rebel Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006, while the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and another faction of the SLM refused to sign it.
The DPA, instead of bringing peace, only intensified the fighting and deteriorated the humanitarian situation in the region. In the aftermath of the agreement, the Darfur rebels fragmented along ethnic and tribal lines into over twenty factions.
| What was once a rebellion by two rebel movements and the government’s counter-insurgency in Darfur has become a "free-for-all" conflict in 2008. |
JEM’s Attack on Khartoum
What was once a rebellion by two rebel movements and the government’s counter-insurgency in Darfur has become a "free-for-all" conflict in 2008. Analysts say that many new rebel factions are nothing but armed gangs that are terrorizing civilians and humanitarian workers alongside the pro-government militias known as the Janjaweed.
Further complication of the conflict has been the emergence of the Darfur "Arab" groups that are opposing the government of Sudan. Many members of the "Arab" tribes, who until now remained neutral in the conflict, are shifting toward the rebels. Others are forming their own rebel groups in order to fight against the government forces and militias.
General Martin Agwai, the commander of the UN/AU peacekeeping forces in Darfur (UNAMID), claims that the Darfur conflict is "no longer simply African against Arab but colored by infighting between Africans, Arabs, and rival signatories of past peace accords."
Sam Ibok, one of the leading African Union mediators working on the Darfur conflict, said that the Darfur peace process has not gone anywhere in 2008. Ibok added that all parties have "lost confidence in the peace process and remain unable to overcome their mutual distrust."
UNAMID Failed to Set Up
The international community, apart from strong words and humanitarian aid, has done little in 2008 to end the conflict or help the UNAMID. An example of the unwillingness to do anything significant in Darfur is the lack of helicopters for the Darfur peacekeeping mission.
Since July 2007, the representatives of the United Nations, African Union, and aid groups have numerous times asked the world powers to provide the UNAMID with six attack helicopters and eighteen transport helicopters so they can start protecting civilians in Darfur. Helicopters are essential for any success of the mission in the vast and remote region the size of France. As of December 2008, no country has supplied even one helicopter.
Adding to this the fact that only a half of the 26,000 peacekeepers have been deployed to Darfur, it is easy to see that the UNAMID was unable to do much, if anything, to protect the civilians in Darfur without troops and equipment. US President George Bush, many times expressed readiness of his government to provide airlift for UNAMID forces only to fail transforming words into actions.
In the beginning of May 2008, the JEM forces mounted an attack on the Sudanese capital, the first attack by a Darfur rebel group outside the province. The attack failed, but showed the JEM's determination to change the Sudanese regime. After the Darfur Peace Agreement failed to bring peace and the government failed to deliver any of the provisions it pledged to implement, such as disarmament of the Janjaweed militias, protection of civilians, and ceasefire, the JEM's main aim became regime change.
Many analysts emphasize "the psychological importance of the attack on the capital," adding that this is the first time since independence that the fighting has reached Khartoum. Even though the JEM's attack did not succeed, it has exposed the vulnerability of the regime.
ICC’s Case Against Sudan’s President
In July 2008, after the UN Security Council requested from the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate the crimes committed in Darfur, the ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, filed ten charges against Omar al Bashir, Sudan's president—three counts of genocide, five of crimes against humanity, and two of murder.
The ICC accuses al-Bashir of orchestrating a counter-insurgency campaign in Darfur since 2003 that has killed 35,000 people, while at least 100,000 died through starvation and disease and 2.5 million people were forced to flee their homes. The ICC prosecutor also requested arrest warrants for three Darfur rebel commanders who are accused for war crimes and attacks on peacekeepers.
Many analysts and conflict management experts argue that the ICC's case against Bashir could be counter-productive in achieving peace in Darfur. Nick Grono from the International Crisis Group wrote in the Boston Globe that the goal of the ICC prosecutor is not to "advance the interests of peace; his official role is to act in the interests of justice, to end impunity for those believed guilty of atrocity crimes." This could backlash and "lead the regime to lash out, with the potential to increase the suffering of large numbers of people."
Alex de Waal, a Harvard fellow and member of Justice Africa, notes that, if al-Bashir "believes that the end result will be that he shares the same fate as Saddam Hussein, no amount of pressure will make him yield."
While justice is very important, the aim of the international community should be to first end the conflict in Darfur and then punish the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Darfur Peace Process
| Given the complexity of the conflict and the number of parties involved, Darfur may need a miracle in 2009—a much needed miracle |
The Arab League finally showed interest in the Darfur conflict in August 2008 and promised to organize new Darfur peace talks in Qatar in the beginning of 2009. The main rebel groups have downplayed the initiative, saying "the move [by the Arab world] came five years too late." The analysts and the rebel leaders believe this is just a "desperate attempt to save the Sudanese president from international justice," happening at the same time as the move by the ICC to charge president al-Bashir for the crimes committed against civilians in Darfur.
Khalil Ibrahim, the JEM leader, says "the Arab League is not eligible for mediation" due to its support for the Khartoum government and the lack of interest for the Darfur conflict in over five years. Abdel Wahid al Nur, the leader of one faction of the SLM, refuses to join the talks before safety, security, and a ceasefire are established and fully implemented in Darfur.
In October 2008, the Sudanese president launched the Darfur Peace Initiative aimed at finding a solution to the Darfur conflict. While the initiative was attended by some Sudanese political parties and civic organizations, the Darfur rebel groups, without whom there cannot be peace in Darfur, refused to take part.
President al-Bashir announced on Nov.11, 2008, an unconditional ceasefire as recommended by the Darfur Peace Initiative. In addition, al-Bashir said his government "confirms the commitment of negotiations to reach peaceful solutions that guarantee the eradication of disputes."
However, the Darfur rebel movements dismissed the ceasefire, saying that "President al-Bashir cannot be trusted" and they would not accept the ceasefire "until pro-government militias are disarmed." A few days after the ceasefire announcement, the government forces clashed with the rebels in Darfur and many analysts saw this as a clear breach of the unconditional ceasefire by the government. Analysts remind that president Bashir "has announced several ceasefires during the nearly six-year conflict, all of which failed."
Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN peacekeeping chief, argues that the Darfur conflict has "grown infinitely more complex [over the years], and prospects for peace seem more remote." He claims that the parties in the conflict are not "demonstrating the political will to abandon the military option, engage in negotiations, or fully cooperate with the UNAMID and the humanitarian community."
The Qatar talks, planned for the beginning of 2009 and backed by the international community, are the only promising Darfur peace process on the horizon. If planned properly, attended by the parties, and given enough time to solve the burning issues, the talks may eventually yield positive results. The alternative is too bleak to even contemplate.
Given the complexity of the conflict and the number of parties involved, Darfur may need a miracle in 2009—a much needed miracle—in order to end the deep-rooted and protracted conflict and bring long-lasting peace.
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