Analysis

A More Conservative Iran?

Between Internal Divisions and External Threats

Iran's would-be parliament speaker Ali Larijani (R) speaks with Revolutionary Guards commander Mohammad Ali Jafari during the opening session of Iran's new parliament, in Tehran May 27, 2008. (Reuters Photo)

Conservativeshave secured two thirds of the Shura Council seats (around 200) while Reformists won 50 seats only. Independent candidates – some of whom are considered Reformists – got 40 seats. Yet, it is difficult to specify the independent candidates’ affiliations, and what they share exactly with Reformists.

Thus, the Reformist bloc is almost the same, or slightly larger than that of the previous Council, which is a good result in light of the various limitations that were imposed on Reformist candidates, including the ban on printing electoral fliers, which is an important political campaigning tool because of the Conservative control over the media.

According to theIranian regime, both the high turnout and the results of the elections are indications of the popular support it enjoys, and of the Iranians’ being mistrustful of the West.

During the elections, the Supreme Leader took a favorablestance towards Ahmadinejad’s camp, calling upon Iranians to vote for Candidates rejected by the West and known for their commitment to Islam and justice.

For the United States and the European Union, the electoral process was unfair because the majority of Reformists were excluded from participation.

It is important to note that the significance of the recent election stems from the idea that it reflects a number of internal developments that define the nature of the Iranian of the political arena now and in the near future. There is no doubt that the Conservatives have scored an expected, landslide victory; however, internal divisions have given serious indications; extremism will continue to dominate the internal front, and escalation towards external powers will continue based on accurate political calculations.

Also, the latest elections have highlighted that fact that the lines defining the different political forces inside Iran have become very blurred; the major groups in the next parliament will be Fundamentalist Conservatives, Pragmatic Conservatives, Reformists, and independent members.

The Iranian regime is still adopting hard-line attitudes, and mechanisms that make a confrontation with the West a possible scenario. At the same time, it is enhancing its sources of power and influence, especially on the military and technological levels. Interestingly, the recent elections’ results have given an impetus to this line of reasoning.

Diversity inside the Conservative camp

The legislative elections of 2008 have made it clear that the traditional polarity of conservatives and moderates is not characteristic of the Iranian political arena anymore. Today, the Conservative camp is characterized by political pluralism, which is pushing the Reformists towards the margin of the Iranian political arena, and enhancing the Conservatives’ power, given that their influence has been on the rise since the elections of the seventh Council in 2004.

In an attempt to overcome the state of structural and internal weakness they suffered, twenty-one Reformist parties met in December 2007 – a few months before the elections – to form a coalition, whose central figure was ex-president Muhammad Khatami. The aim of the coalition was increasing their chances of winning the elections as well as facing the serious crisis the country is facing by helping the parliament regain its role in counterbalancing the government’s decisions, and curbing its recklessness.

In this context, ex-President Khatami broke his years-old silence, criticizing Ahmadinejad’s performance in many speeches.

The Reformist coalition included the most important Reformist parties, including the Participation Front, Constructions Executives, Rouhaniun Mobaraz Council, the Organization of the Islamic Revolution Mujahedeen and the National Itimad party led by Karrubi. Yet, despite all the effort, the Reformists achieved a limited victory, and the Conservatives have managed to maintain their control over Iranian politics.

Divisions inside the Conservative camp have turned into a manifestation of political pluralism in Iran. Significantly, the main division within the Conservative camp today is between the pro-Ahmadinejad, hardliner group called Fundamentalist Conservatives, on the one hand, and the group known as Pragmatic Conservatives, on the other.

Pragmatic Conservatives oppose President Ahmadinejad and his policies, and they cannot be considered a weak group, given its relatively deep influence on the political arena and inside the eighth Council. Though supporters of Ahmadinejad have managed to win the majority of parliament seats, his opponents ability to gain a considerable number of seats indicate that the growing discontent with Ahmadinejad’s failure at improving Iran’s economy has reached the Conservative circle.

Yet, it is difficult to distinguish Fundamentalists from Pragmatists, given that some candidates were included in more than one list during the elections. Thus, some observers undermine the seriousness of divisions within the Conservative camp.

Despite the overlapping and flexibility of coalitions inside the Conservative camp, the real post-election test that Ahmadinejad will face is the level of support he will receive from the Conservatives as well as from the eighth Council.

The Diminishing Role of Reformists

During the elections, Ahmadinejad’s allies formed a list called the United Front of Fundamentalists, or the United Front of the Principled, indicating their commitment to the principles of the Islamic Revolution. Their camp included distinguished Conservative figures, such as the speaker of the seventh Council, Ghulam Ali Haddad, and his deputy, Mohamed Reda Bahounar, who is believed to have masterminded Ahmadinejad’s political rise. Members of this group believe that they enjoy the support of the urban low-classes, especially those located outside the capital.

On the other hand, the Pragmatic Conservatives united under an umbrella coalition known as the Popular Coalition of Conservatives, with their discontent with Ahmadinejad’s confrontational foreign policy and his government’s economic performance being their common ground. However, despite the Pragmatists’ dissatisfaction with Ahmadinejad’s policies, some politicians had a dual membership in the two groups, given the common ideological background.

In light of the diminishing role of the Reformists, and the Conservatives’ intention of tightening their grip on them, the real competition in the 2009 presidential elections will take place within the Conservative bloc, and differences between its various factions will determine their results.

Some of the Pragmatists’ leading figures, such as Ahmadinejad’s critic and Teheran’s mayor, Mohamed Baker Qalibaf, and Ali Larijani, Iran’s ex-chief nuclear negotiator, who resigned as a result of his disagreement with the president, will certainly pose a serious challenge to Ahmadinejad. Strange enough, Larijani, who won 76 percent of Qom’s votes, was described by the national TV as a supporter of Ahmadinejad despite him being one of the key figures in the Pragmatic Conservative bloc, who adopt views that are more moderate than those of the President. Also, Mohsen Redaei, former Chief of the Revolutionary Guards, is one of Ahmadinejad’s possible competitors.

The absence of a capable candidate from the Reformist camp (It is unlikely that Mohamed Khatami will run for presidency) supports the idea that the next presidential elections will be a competition between the different Conservative factions, given the increasing power of the Conservatives and the limitations imposed on civil and political rights.

The “Islamic democracy” Model

During the late 1990s, former president Mohamed Khatami aimed for turning Iran into a model of a religious democracy, putting this issue at the center of a heated internal debate in which people participated to interpret it, criticize it, or call for it. Also, the issues of human rights, the role of the civil society, and the importance of civil and political liberties attracted much attention from government, society, and even external powers.

However, Conservatives continued to be in command of the real sources of power, allowing the Reformists only to play the role of the second-powerful political force. Yet, the 2004 elections have introduced major changes to the Iranian political scene, with the Conservatives making a comeback by restoring direct control over the decision-making process. The 2008 elections can be considered not only a continuation of this trend, but also an upsurge in it, with more limitations being imposed on competitors who do not belong to the Conservative bloc, particularly its Fundamentalist faction.

Thus, there are setbacks in some Iranians’ plan for establishing a model of an Islamic democracy in Iran, namely the serious challenges on the ground that hinder any positive steps towards democracy.

The nature of the elections and the way they were moderated indicate that democracy in Iran is witnessing a setback rather than a breakthrough. More restrictions were imposed on the range and level of competition. Also, the disqualification of Reformist candidates reached an unprecedentedly serious level, preventing them from running in many electoral districts. Some observers attribute the rigid qualification rules to the concerns over their social and public appeal.

Four thousand and five hundred candidates competed for 290 seats, given that the Council of Guardians disqualified around 1,700 candidates (90 percent of the Reformist candidates, and 40 percent of all candidates), who were deemed not enough loyal to the Iranian Revolution and to Islam. Twenty of the Reformists’ disqualified candidates were members of the seventh Council, and Ali Ishraqi, grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, was one of them. Consequently, though Reformists candidates ran for most of Tehran’s 30 seats, they competed for 90 only (102 according to other estimates) out of 290 seats.

Therefore, the 2008 parliamentary election was described as a competition between the pro-Ahmadinejad Conservatives (Hard-line Conservatives or Fundamentalists) and the anti-Ahmadinejad Conservatives (Pragmatic Conservatives).

Most of the Reformist camp’s prominent figures, including ex-ministers who served in Khatami’s government, Islamic jurists and MPs, were disqualified by the Council of Guardians for not being loyal enough to the Revolution.

In an attempt to boost his image as an impartial arbitrator between the different political factions, and after a quiet call from the Supreme Leader (unlike 2004), the Council of Guardians allowed 800 of those who were disqualified earlier to run for elections while keeping those who can be serious challengers out of the competition. Though such a review eased the anger towards the government and the Council of Guardians, it introduced no substantial changes to the level of circumscription resulting from the Council of Guardians’ disqualifications.

Significantly, some of those hit by the disqualifications were members of Khomeini’s family, who used to be treated like royalty.

Silencing Critics

Other issues were further sources of grievance to Reformist candidates; having a post-graduate degree as well as a five-year-experience in an executive jobs were two criteria by which candidates was judged, which relatively reduced the number of qualified candidates, and kept well-known figures out of the competition.

In an open letter to the Minister of Interior and the Council of Guardians, Musavi Lara, the Minister of Interior under Khatami and an outstanding Reformist figure, complained that only a quarter of the Reformist monitors were allowed to supervise the elections in Tehran. Also, contrary to electoral norms, the elections’ results were announced after the final counting of votes, which urged Reformists to regard them with suspicion.

Disqualifications also affected some Conservatives who sharply criticized the government’s performance in the seventh Shura Council, such as Akbar Aalami and Shukrollah Aatar Zadeh. Thus, the space for freedom of speech has considerably shrunken, and hard-line Conservatives are determined to silence their critics, even those who belong to the same camp.

In spite of all the restrictions on the electoral process, the Reformists called upon voters to participate in an attempt to limit the Conservatives’ expected victory. Yet, the turnout was higher in cities than in rural areas.

Reformists had to choose between two bitter options: first, asking people to vote and thus giving legitimacy to an election in which they were not allowed to compete fairly; or second, boycotting it, and thus letting the Conservatives have full control over parliament, and risking being charged with treason and collaboration. Hence, they aspired only to secure a minority opposition inside the Shura Council, even if this meant four years of weak presence.

It is important to note that, historically, the higher the turnout was, the better the Reformists’ results were. With a turnout of 51 percent in 2004 parliamentary elections, Conservatives won the majority of seats after the disqualification of a big number of candidates by the Council of Guardians. By contrast, Reformists acheived a landslide victory in 2000 with a turnout of 80 percent.

Given the abovementioned facts, Reformist candidates, who call for democracy and dialogue with the West, were only capable of showing a strong presence in some cities in which they were allowed to run freely, namely in middle-class areas in Central and Western Teheran.

The Relationship of Religious and Military Institutions

The major challenge that democracy in Iran faces today is the development of a strong relationship between the religious and military institutions. President Ahmadinejad’s growing reliance on people with military rather than religious backgrounds has ignited criticism, especially from the side of some Conservatives.

Analyzing the new make-up of the Shura Council reveals that the hard-line Revolutionary Guards members have replaces the Islamic jurists as the most powerful group inside the parliament. Such a shift might be an addition to the Supreme Leader’s various sources of power. With a new, younger generation of strong loyalists to the revolutionary discourse occupying stronger positions in the political system, in general, and the Shura Council, in particular, the Leader’s leverage becomes strong enough to penetrate all levels of the power hierarchy smoothly. Significantly, the rise of this new generation is attributed to the Supreme Leader.

There is a possibility, moreover, that the military’s growing power is one of the mechanisms used by Ahmadinejad’s to stand up to the strength and leverage of Islamic jurists, who incessantly question his religious observance; his aim thus can be to establishing a new base of power, or a new mechanism of control.

Yet, the balance of power is still in favor of the Supreme Leader, given the heterogeneity of the Conservative camp, and the victory of a considerable number of MPs who oppose the president’s policies. Consequently, the new Shura Council might constitute a challenge to Ahmadinejad, urging him to seek political support from the Supreme Leader (in addition to institutional support).

The paradox of the military’s participation in the political scene has given a new dimension to the invisible rivalry between two factions within the Conservative camp, namely leaderships with military backgrounds, such as the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij, on the one hand, and the clergy, on the other.

Such a rivalry was clearly highlighted when General Mohamed Ali Jaafari, Chief of the Revolutionary Guards, stated: “the forces of the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij are entrusted with backing the Fundamentalist camp by God.” Such a statement urged some of Khomeini’s relatives, such as Hassan Khomeini, to sympathize with the Reformists, and to ask the military to stop meddling with politics.

Conversely, Conservative groups, such as the MuatalifaIslamic Party and the Center of the Islamic Revolution’s Documents, defended that stance, arguing that Jaafari’s statement was about protecting the essence of Fundamentalism rather than the political group known as Fundamentalists. However, there are fears that governmental institutions that are supposed to be impartial might take sides in political disputes. What make the situation ever more grave is that those institutions include the military, which is supposed to be characterized by discipline and impartiality.

It can be argued that there are many signs that the military’s political influence is on the rise; many of the former commanders of the Revolutionary Guards have been appointed to key governmental positions, and many of them have won seats in parliament, which has negatively affected the political presence of the Shiite clergymen.

Also, the Revolutionary Guards has become a major actor on both the political and economic scenes, and it was granted billions of dollars worth contracts by the government. It builds dams and highways, and it is the only influential factor in the oil industry.

Strange enough, charging members of Khomeini’s family with financial corruption – i.e. insulting what was considered holy – came as a result of their disapproval of the military’s meddling with politics. Such an incident can be considered an indication of the mounting might of the military establishment and the spread of a public acceptance of its growing political role.

Iran’s Future Agenda

In of the alterations in the internal balance of power, with most of political might concentrating in the Conservative camp, it is likely that points of agreement and disagreement inside the political circle will change as well.  

The Conservatives have capitalized on the strained relations with the outside world to corner the Reformists, who are usually accused of having a suspicious relationship with the West, or simply being the subject of Western sympathy.

For example, electoral campaigns often involved fiery debates on the accusations against Reformist candidates of collaborating with foreign powers. The Conservative Deputy Speaker of the Shura Council, Bahunar, for instance, accused Mohamed Rida Khatami of giving information to foreigners during a meeting with the German ambassador in Tehran. Also, the Intelligence Minister, Ghulam Hussein Muhssini Iji, declared that the ministry would charge the former Deputy Speaker of the Shura Council, Noureddine Bermwazine, with doing an interview for the Farsi Voice of America.

Concerning the effect of the disagreement on foreign policy issues on the Conservative camp, it is likely that it will remain under control. Given that Pragmatic Conservatives advocate adopting a less confrontational rhetoric in foreign policy, differences between the two sides revolve around the method and the tone rather than the policy itself, which is not the case with internal, economic issues.

As to the nuclear issue, just like hard-line Conservatives, Pragmatists believe in their country’s right to enrich uranium, but the later group want to pursue this goal in an environment of well-calculated negotiations with the European Union and the other international parties. In this context, Larijani’s resignation was a manifestation of the two groups’ disagreement on the best of handling the issue.

Regarding other foreign policy issues, such as dialogue with the United States, Iran’s role in Iraq, the confrontation with Israel, there are no noticeable distinctions between the two factions. Yet, the Pragmatists call for a more active diplomacy in issues like the ones abovementioned reflects a more prudent stance.

With the growing political empowerment of Fundamentalists, and thus their increasing self-confidence, the chances for reaching a compromise on Iran’s nuclear program are diminishing, which opens the door to a more confrontational foreign policy rhetoric, especially when it comes to the issue of Iran’s nuclear program. Thus, foreign policy is expected to be less of an issue than internal economic problems.

On the internal level, social and economic issues dominated the electoral programs of the Conservatives, particularly the Pragmatists. The rising rate of unemployment and inflation, fuel shortage, and social inequalities are issues that were brought up frequently. Undoubtedly, the new parliament, which has a Considerable number of Pragmatists, will pose a stiff challenge to Ahmadinejad’s economic policies.

Given that Ahmadinejad’s policies are blamed for the high inflation rates, the depletion of oil revenues during an unprecedented rise in oil prices, and the flight of foreign capital from Iran, the fiercest clash between the Fundamentalists and Pragmatists will probably involve economic issues.

More than 50 economists and MPs sent an open letter to the president, criticizing his economic policy. In February 2008, Ahmadinejad himself admitted that the country’s economy needed “a major surgery”. But, neither Pragmatic Conservatives, nor Reformists believe that Ahmadinejad is the appropriate “surgeion”; rather, they will defy his large scale spending, which they believe to be the reason behind the current inflation. Also, they argue that Ahmadinejad’s policies have negatively affected the private sector, which witnesses a decrease in its economic growth rate.

Ahmadinejad, moreover, has a major weakness point: he was not able to implement his populist program with which he promised the low- and middle-classes. Thus, Pragmatists may capitalize on his populist discourse to defeat him.

Whereas economic issues will certainly dominate the internal scene, it is expected that the debate on political change will be kept to a minimum. The presence of a powerful group of Ahmadinejad’s opponents in the next parliament may escalate the tension between Pragmatists and the president, who will not yield to the Council’s demands, given that members will attempt to introduce laws consistent with their economic views.

The big losers are, undoubtedly, those aspiring to more freedoms and democracy since issues like civil liberties come at the end of the Conservatives’ list or priorities. Unfortunately, even the more liberal, pragmatic wing of Conservatives do not give attention to issues like democracy, women’s rights, and freedom of speech.

Furthermore, the Reformists have become too weak to advocate the abovementioned issues. Thus, internal debates will revolve mainly around economic issues for a long time, an less calls for democracy will be registered. Also, Fundamentalist Conservatives will continue to control foreign policy.

The parliament has lost almost half of its former members (around 154 members) as a result of disqualification or defeat, which may result in a poor performance at least during the first few months, especially in light of the absence of any leading Reformist figures.

It is worth mentioning that the Pragmatists’ mounting influence inside the Council is likely to bring about a change in the relationship between the executive and legislative branches. While the seventh Council was totally subservient to the views of Ahmadinejad, the new one may develop the relationship between the government and the Council, enhancing the power of the former and limiting the influence of the latter.

Pragmatists can pose more of a challenge to Ahmadinejad if they manage to find a common ground with Reformist and Independents MPs, creating a coalition that can stand up to the Fundamentalist Conservatives. A troublesome parliament will likely increase the power of the Supreme Leader since the rivalry between the president and some MPs does not affect the general loyalty towards the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenaei, who will continue to be a major power center and a symbol for belonging to the Islamic system and the Revolution.

Dr. Pakinam al-Sharqawy is an assistant professor at Cairo University. Being an expert on Iran, Dr. al-Sharqawy has written several books and contributed to a big number of publications.