 |
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei casts his ballot in Iran's parliamentary election in Tehran. (Reuters Photo) |
The Conservatives’ victory in the eighth Majlis (parliament) elections has come as no surprise. However, speculation about which Conservative group would win the biggest number of seats as well as the representation level of the Reformists as an opposing minority inside the Majlis was rife.
The elections’ results revealed the triumph of the United Front of Fundamentalists (UFF) and the crushing defeat of the Broad Popular Coalition of Fundamentalists (BPF). The Reformist Coalition and the Etemad Melli (National Trust) Party suffered a limited defeat, given that the final results were in line with the foretold expectations
The elections’ results were finalized in 206 electoral districts, excluding Tehran, by the election of 260 representatives. While the number of winning candidates is 186 (72 percent), the remaining 74 winners (28 percent) will be determined in the second round.
According to the official statistics issued by the institute responsible for supervising the elections , the UFF won 110 seats (59 percent), the independent candidates won 50 seats (27 percent), and the Reformists won 26 seats (14 percent).
However, the estimates issued by the UFF, which assume victory in Tehran’s upcoming election, raise the number to 70 percent.
At the same time, Reformists have counted ten independent winners among their candidates despite them not being included in their electoral lists, raising their representation to 19 percent. Yet, this issue remains uncertain till the first parliamentary session is held, and the real affiliations of independent candidates are manifested.
The Fall of the Broad Popular Coalition
| Qom scholars gave Ahmadinejad a second chance after proving to him that he can be defeated without their support. |
The pre-election predictions foresaw an internal battle between the two Conservative factions, leading to the fragmentation of vote between them, and allowing Reformists to win a bigger number of seats, a number that does not constitute an absolute majority but enables them to form a coalition with the BPF, and defeats Ahmadinejad’s supporters. Yet, none of that happened!
The BPF collapsed shortly before the elections, and the first step towards its downfall was Ali Larijani’s decision to run in Qom district instead of Tehran, a move that was not necessarily directed against the BPF because he still could remain on its lists.
However, before the polling day, Larijani declared his abandonment of the Coalition, and so did Ghulam-Ali Haddad Adel together with four of his supporters, urging Abu Talib, the BPF’s spokesman to call him an opportunist.
What were the reasons behind such unexpected moves?
The answer to this question lies in Qom. Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, Secretary General of the Society of Jame' Rouhaniyat-e-Mobarez (JRM) – one of the two wings of Traditional Conservatives – and 11 members of the UFF held a meeting in which they agreed on the electoral arrangements and the resulting political equations.
The results of those negotiations were not announced; however, it was declared that periodical meetings would be held between the JRM and members of the central committee of the UFF, which consists mainly of Ahmadinejad’s supporters, particularly the Sweet Scent of Service group.
Thus, it can be argued that a deal has been made between the two sides: supporting the UFF for a change in Ahmadinejad’s attitude towards his Conservative allies. The early indications of the deal included Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani and Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi summoning Ali Larijani to Qom and convincing him to run for its electoral district.
What Ahmadinejad still needs to do is appeasing the Islamic Coalition party, which carries much economic weight because of its bazaar merchant members.
Ahmadinejad has already taken steps in that direction by including Asadullah Badamchian to the UFF list, given that neither the seventh Majlis, nor Ahmadinejad’s government included members of the Islamic Coalition party.
Ahmadinejad denied Qalibaf and Mohsen Redai the partisan support they expected. While Qalibaf quickly realized his defeat, Mohsen Rezai, the first Chief of the Revolutionary Guards and the hero Iraq-Iran war, could not comprehend the situation, engaging himself in wrangling with Ali Larijani.
Thus, it can be argued that Qom scholars preferred to give Ahmadinejad a second chance to modify his attitude towards his allies after proving to him the possibility of him being defeated if they do not collaborate with him. By a simple equation, they realized that the result of competing with the Reformists was not certain and would not grant them an absolute majority anyways.
Therefore, taking into consideration the time factor, they chose to give Ahmadinejad a second chance while, at the same time, maintaining the power to play the same game again with him if needed.
The election’s results proved that the electoral programs presented by the different parties were not the criteria according to which voters made their choices, given the fact that the electoral programs of both Conservatives and Reformists were similar, and all of them focused on the economic situation.
The only difference between the various electoral programs was that Reformists attributed the deterioration of the economic situation to the poor performance of Ahmadinejad’s government, whereas Conservatives ascribed it to them being heirs to the Reformists’ economic failures.
Inside each camp, the criteria of difference varied. The criteria of difference among Conservatives was supporting or opposing Ahmadinejad. However, on the Reformist side, ideological divisions erupted. Although Reformists formed a united front that included most Reformist groups, it seems that such a broad coalition opened up deep divisions within the Reformist side, which urged some observers to describe the Reformist Coalition as a union of incompatible groups.
One of the Reformist groups, for instance, promised to give women the freedom to wear hijab or not, whereas other Reformist groups, such as the JRM and the Islamic Participation party, refused such a proposal.
The Reformists’ Failure
| The main reason behind the Reformists’ failure was their inability to mobilize more than 30 percent of voters. |
The main reason behind the Reformists’ failure was their inability to mobilize more than 30 percent of voters. As explained before, a low turnout benefits the Conservatives, especially if the number of voters in Tehran, which is taken as an indicator for the rest of the electoral districts, is less than two million.
The polling day did not have a good turnout; out of 9.7 million illegible voters, only 1.9 million (30.22 percent) casted their votes. It is important to note that the turnout in previous elections was 36.78 percent for the seventh Majlis, 46.88 percent for the sixth Majlis, and 55.74 percent for the fifth Majlis.
The second reason is the presence of several electoral lists, and the fragmentation of votes, a trap that Reformists hoped Conservative would fall into.
A quick comparison between the number of votes took by the most successful Fundamentalist candidates and their Reformist counterparts in a certain district would reveal that a bigger number of people voted for Reformists. Thus, if it was not for the fragmentation of vote, a bigger number of Reformist candidates would have won.
A third reason is the effect of the new electoral law. According to the old law, the candidate who got one-third of the vote in a certain district won the seat, and the other two candidates with the second and third highest vote totals – who did not manage to take one third of the vote – ran for a second round. Thus, the number of candidates running for the second round was double the number of seats.
However, the changes to the electoral law made it possible for a candidate to win the seat only with one-quarter of the vote, which in turn reduced the number of districts where second rounds will be held. Those who benefitted from those amendments were 73 Fundamentalists, 15 independent candidates, and 14 Reformists. Clearly, Fundamentalists are the ones who gained the most from the new law.
The Second Round
| Reformists still hope for becoming a strong opposing minority through the second round of parliamentary elections. |
Reformists tried to justify their defeat by criticizing the electoral system, the barring of a big number of Reformist candidates by the Council of Guardians, and the bias of the state-controlled media. They also highlighted the fact that, separately, Fundamentalist candidates won their seats by limited majorities.
Other Reformist groups, however, expressed different stances; Majid Ansari from the JRM, for instance, explicitly accused the government of “cooking” the election, particularly in Tehran, and so did Rasoul Muntajib Niya from the National Trust party.
On the other hand, Ghulam Hussein Karbaschi, Secretary General of the Executives of Construction Party, rejected the fabrication scenario, calling for expelling extremist groups from the Reformist Coalition because of the deep divisions their stances open up, and for forming a stronger coalition.
Reformists still hope for becoming a strong opposing minority inside the Majlis through the second round of parliamentary elections. They are trying to approach the masses by arguing that the Fundamentalists and Revolutionary Guards “cooked” the election, but they can still form a strong minority from Khatami’s supporters inside the Majlis, using the slogan: “Khatami’s supporters, a persistent minority in the face of tyranny.”
It is important to note, however, that 30 Fundamentalists will be running for the second round, and that they have the same chance to win. A Fundamentalist victory in the second round would tighten the Conservatives’ grip on the Majlis.
The ongoing vote counting process in Tehran indicates the possible victory of 19 candidates in the first round. The possible winners include 14 Fundamentalists and three women, with Haddad Adel taking the highest vote.
The outcome of the current election is expected to have remarkable implications on the political balances inside Iran as it comes as a result of a conditional coalition that is still on trial between the Conservatives, represented by the JRM and the Islamic Coalition party on the one side, and the Fundamentalists, represented by the pro-Ahmadinejad groups spearheaded by the Sweet Scent of Service on the other.
The eighth Majlis elections have decreased the size of the majority supporting Ahmadinejad inside the parliament from two-thirds to only one-quarter, and raised the number of non-Fundamentalist, Conservative MPs. This means that unless Ahmadinejad alter his attitude towards his allies, he would face much more obstinacy from the new parliament than that he faced from the seventh Majlis.
The first test will be the formation of the new cabinet, which should take place after the first parliamentary session is held.
What is currently clear is that the eighth Majlis would be more obedient to the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, with the absence of a large number of extremist Reformists and the presence of a big number of Conservative scholars and businessmen inside the Majlis.
Thus, the Iranian regime is expected to move closer toward the absolute Guardianship of the Jurist theory, and away from the republican nature of the regime, with more interference from the military represented by the Revolutionary Guards in the Iranian political scene.
The distribution of roles between Ali Larijani and Haddad Adel would determine many of the factors of the Iranian political formula.
Larijani, who gained his popularity during the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, is keen to acquire more senior positions, especially after ensuring the support of the JRM, which now calls him the “loyal son of the Hawza (religious institution).”
If Larijani became the speaker of the Majlis, he would be an obstacle in Ahmadinejad’s way. Yet, the political weight of Haddad Adel, the Supreme Leader’s son in law, might not make this possible.
Perhaps as part of the deal between the JRM and Ahmadinejad, one of those two major figures would become the speaker of the Majlis while the other will run for presidential elections next year. And in this case, Haddad Adel might be closer to becoming the next speaker of the Majlis unless political calculations are altered after each side benefitted from the other during the elections.
|
