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Iranian women write the names of their favourite candidates for Iran's parliamentary election. (Reuters Photo) |
Today, Iranians head towards the polls to elect 290 representatives out of around 4400 candidates for their Islamic Shura Council or Majlis (parliament), with an average competition rate of 16 candidates per seat.
The Iranian political life is characterized by its endless succession of elections, with short intervals, which urged some observers to argue that Iranians spend three months of each year on elections.
Therefore, the timings of elections have been synchronized recently, with two types of elections being held at the same time. Thus, today witnesses both parliamentary elections, and the mid-term renewal elections of the Assembly of Experts.
This synchronization of elections’ dates has somewhat limited the chances of political bargaining between parties, given that it has become the norm in Iranian politics that by the end of each electoral process, disagreements are settled, and new coalitions are formed based on the course of the relationship between the different parties since the previous election.
In this context, the more authority a political force has, the more influential its decisions become on its allies who contributed to its success; therefore, we witness more shifts of alliances among Conservatives compared to Reformists.
Despite their ideological unity and their involvement in bodies characterized by authoritarianism, Conservatives have failed to unify their camp due to the character and performance of president Ahmadinejad.
Ahmadinejad's Failure
| After his victory, Ahmadinejad turned his back on prominent Conservative figures. |
When Ahmadinejad ascended to power in 2006, he had not had a long political history – only some popularity he gained because of his success as the mayor of Tehran. The absence of a strong, competitive candidate from the Reformist camp, and him not being linked in the Iranians’ psyche to the mistakes of the Conservatives, and him being supported by the Supreme leader paved the way for Ahmadinejad to assume presidency.
After his victory, Ahmadinejad should have established a solid base of support inside the Conservative camp, but he did not do so. Rather, Ahmadinejad turned his back on prominent Conservative figures, such as Habibullah Askar Awlady – head of the Islamic Coalition party.
Also, the cabinet he formed was met by strong opposition from the Shura Council, with its Conservative majority; many of his candidates – such as the oil minister – failed to secure the approval of the Shura Council several times, an unprecedented incident that did not occur even when the president belonged to the opposition.
During his presidency, which did not exceed 30 months so far, Ahmadinjad made successive, unjustified changes to the make-up of his cabinet after exerting much effort to secure the Shura Council’s approval.
Consequently, he dismissed many senior managers of governmental institutions and their economic affiliates in what was considered an administrative coup, a move that Hashemi Shahroudy, the head of judiciary, strongly objected, which led to a direct clash between the two.
All this led to the defeat of the electoral list supported by Ahmadinejad in the Assembly of Experts’ elections. The list included Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi – who hardly managed to enter the Assembly, and Ayyatollah Hussein Qarawi – the head of Ahmadinejad’s coalition in Khorasan, who failed to enter the Assembly. It is important to note that this happened against the backdrop of the shift in Ahmadinejad’s relationship with the Supreme Leader, Ali khamenei.
Afterwards, Ahmadinejad was relatively defeated in the municipal elections by the formation of the Rafsanjani-Khatami-Kurubi group, which won 18 percent of the seats, and by the success of the Conservative Qalibaf offshoot in Tehran’s electoral districe.
In addition to all the above-mentioned animosities, Ahmadinejad made a new enemy: Ali Larijani, the adviser of the Iranian National Security Council, whom he dismissed after achieving relative success in negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program.
The Conservative Bloc
| The Effectivists and Progressive Fundamentalists is a political group that consisted originally of veterans of the Iran-Iraq war. |
As a result, Conservatives are divided in the current elections into a number of groups.
First, the United Front of Fundamentalists (UFF) [1], the group supporting Ahmadinejad, consists of three main factions: (1) the government’s supporters, including the Sweet Scent of Service faction headed by Muhammad Ali Rameen – one of Ahmadinejad’s advisers, Pervin Ahmadinejad – the president’s daughter, and Mahrdad Bezarbash – who was appointed by Ahmadinejad as the head of Pars Khodro company, which has a monopoly on the car industry in Iran.
(2) The Effectivists and Progressive Fundamentalists, a political group that consisted originally of veterans of the Iran-Iraq war (it has broadened its popular support base afterwards), and it is headed now by Hussein Feday.
(3) The Front of the Followers of the Imam’s and the Leadership’s Line, one of the experienced political groups, and it is led by Badamchian.
The UFF forms a political coalition that is called “5 + 6 group”. The coalition includes six representatives of the Front – two from each major faction. The representatives are Mahsooly and Muslihi form the pro-government groups, Badamchian and Sadr from the Front of the Followers of the Imam’s and the Leadership’s Line, Hussein Feday and Zakati from the Effectivists and Progressive Fundamentalists, in addition to five independent fundamentalists spearheaded by Ali Akbar Wilayati.
The behavior of the Sweet Scent of Service faction shows that Ahmadinejad’s nature as an ex-intelligence officer has not changed. He will be working alone away from his allies – the same way he has been acting as a president, which can endanger the unity of the Front and limit the chances of its success.
Second, there is the Broad Popular Coalition of Fundamentalists (BPF), which includes both Qalibaf and Mohsen Rezai, the secretary of the Expediency Council and the former commander of the Revolutionary Guards. Also, the BPF includes Ali Larijani, who withdrew from the UFF’s electoral list and changed his electoral district from Tehran to Qom because of the advices of Qom’s religious scholars, a move that can also be attributed to a desire to set the scene for Ghulam-Ali Haddad Adel, who is on the BPF’s list for Tehran.
The electoral list of the BPF includes 11 members of the seventh Shura Council, two former ministers in Hossein Mousavi’s reputable cabinet, and the minister of social security, Kadhemi, who was deposed by Ahmadinejad.
Third, the Justice and Development Party is another major Conservative group that is headed by Reza Talai Naik. The party has 240 candidates, 24 of which are running in Tehran’s electoral district. It has a pro-UFF orientation, and it has declared its support for Mahdavi Kunni in the mid-term renewal elections of the Assembly of Experts.
Fourth, Ali Fallahian, the ex-Minister of Intelligence, formed a separate group, after his name was taken out of the UFF’s list. The removal of his name can probably be attributed to the international sanctions imposed on him by the European Union countries on grounds of his involvement in the Mikunus case and a number of assassinations. Fallahian has formed an independent list, whose activities are basically confined to the Khorasan province and its capital Mashhad.
This in addition to offshoots of the United Front of Fundamentalists, such as the Sweet Scent of Service faction.
The Reformists in the Elections
| Among the disqualified candidates are figures who have a long history of serving the Revolution and the regime. |
Unlike the Conservatives, the Reformists have managed to present unified lists in most electoral districts despite their divisions and differences.
The reformists have been widely excluded by the electoral executive committees, which was followed by another wave of exclusions by the Council of Guardians, which supervises the electoral process.
Strangely enough, among the names of disqualified candidates were those of figures who have a long history of serving the Revolution and the regime (some of them were members of parliament for consecutive terms), and former ministers.
The Council of Guardians even expressed explicitly its rejection of all Reformist candidates who were members of the sixth Shura Council. As a response, Reformist MPs staged a strike inside the Council’s building, and handed in their resignations as a sign of protest.
Even the Reformist National Trust Party led by Mahdi Karrubi – which enjoys the trust of the Council of Guardians – witnessed a number of exclusion cases.
However, as a result of some political bargaining between the Reformist leaders, like Khatami, Karrubi, and their Conservative counterparts, Reformist candidates were allowed to run for the elections, but only in limited numbers. The number of Reformist candidates is very small to an extent that urged Abdelwahed Mousavi Lari, head of the electoral committee of the Reformist coalition and ex-Minister of Interior under Khatami, to say that the results of the competition on 190 of the parliament seats are already foretold.
Some observers wonder why the Reformists did not abstain from running for the elections.
Khatami insisted on the Reformists’ participation in the elections, and so did Karrubi who met with Khamenei. Also, Muhammad Reza Aref, head of the Reformist Coalition, said that he would take part in the elections despite him being wronged.
The reason behind the Reformists’ decision not to withdraw from the electoral process might be the fear of being subjected to collective, or individual punishment on the political level. Such punishment can range from deprivation of practicing political activity – e.g. Abdullah Nouri’s case, to detention – e.g. Aghajari’s case. Other forms of punishment include assassination – e.g. Saeed Hijarian’s case.
Besides, withdrawal from elections is a move that the Iranian political system has never witnessed except in partial cases, no matter how far the threat of doing it goes.
Significantly, the Reformists have already used the withdrawal bargaining chip when the Chief of the Revolutionary Guards declared his support for the Fundamentalist bloc; consequently, the Reformists threatened to withdraw from parliamentary elections. Also, members of Khomeini’s family, spearheaded by Khomeini’s grandson, protested against the interference of the military institution in politics. In light of the above-mentioned clash, the late Imam’s grandson was accused of financial corruption by the Conservatives.
Afterwards, nevertheless, a state of calm has settled on the political scene, and the electoral process will continue, with only a few parties boycotting the elections: the United Front of Students, the Democratic Front, The Nation of Iran Party, the National Iranian Front, and the National Religious Council.
The Reformists Divided
| The Reformists presented a big number of moderately famous candidates to avoid linking them to the early failures. |
The Reformists are represented in the elections by four main groups.
First, there is the Reformist Coalition backed by Khatami and headed by Muhammed Reza Aref. The Coalition includes most of the Reformist parties, including the Participation Party led by Mustafa Taj Zadeh, the Cadres of Building and Construction Party led by Hussein Marashi, and a coalition that consists of a big number of elitist and professional groups.
Second, the Etemad Melli (National Trust) Party – led by Mahdi Karroubi – is another major Reformist group. Karrubi founded the party after the last presidential elections, given the surprising number of votes he won, which made him very close to presidency. The party adopts Reformist principles, with total commitment to the principles of the Islamic Revolution.
Third, the Popular Coalition for Reforms is another Reformist group that was established shortly before submitting candidacy applications. Interestingly, its establishment might be a Reformist political maneuver as there are no major differences between it and the Reformist coalition. It includes 15 Reformist factions, the most famous of which are the Reconciliation Party, the Solidarity Party, and Iran of Tomorrow Party.
Fourth, the Coalition of Freedom Front and Call For Equality is the extremist Reformist faction allowed to operate under the Iranian regime, and its support base consists mainly of student groups.
Generally speaking, the Reformists presented a big number of moderately famous candidates to avoid linking them to the Reformists’ early failures.
Prospects of Victory
Some observers suggest that the Reformists can win many seats in Tehran’s electoral district, in particular, if the number of voters exceeds three millions, whereas they will probably lose if the turnout is less than two millions. Yet, if the turnout is between two and three million, according to this line of reasoning, the Reformists will probably be part of a coalition in Tehran only.
This can be attributed to the fact that the Conservative vote is guaranteed because pro-Conservative voters belong to groups characterized by authoritarianism, which facilitates dictating choices. Those groups include the Basij Students’ Organization, the committees affiliated with the revolutionary institutions.
Yet, the Reformist vote comes mainly from the silent majority of middle-class citizens, who need to be persuaded to cast their votes.
Thus, the higher the turnout is, the more likely a Reformist victory is in Tehran, and perhaps in a number of other major cities.
However, result of the electoral battle is almost foreseeable because of the disqualification of a big number of Reformists. Yet, the Iranian electoral system allows for a second round in many districts, which has rendered the elections a competition only between the Reformist Coalition and the Broad Popular Coalition of Fundamentalists.
[1] The word “fundamentalist” is used in the Iranian context to describe a principled person, rather than a salafi one, who refuses modernist thought.
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