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Representatives of armed groups active in various tribal areas announced on December 14, 2007, the formation of the Taliban Movement of Pakistan (TTP). |
On December 14, 2007, representatives of armed groups active in various tribal areas of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan met in Southern Waziristan. Following their meeting, they announced the formation of the Taliban Movement of Pakistan — in Urdu Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan or (TTP) — under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud. The appointed leader told the BBC in a telephone call that about 20 delegates representing militant groups in seven tribal areas, (Northern Waziristan, Southern Waziristan, Karam, Bajour, Orczy, Khyber, and Mohmand) attended the meeting. Representatives of groups active in stable areas of the NWFP (Swat, Kohistan, Benou, Leky Mrout, Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Adam Khail), also took part in the meeting.
•Pakistani Taliban: A Historical Background
•Hierarchical Organization of TTP
• The Objectives
•The Leadership of Pakistani Taliban
•Consequences and Future Prospects
I. Pakistani Taliban: A Historical Background
Pakistani Taliban is intellectually and organically linked to the Afghan Taliban. Notwithstanding its official proclamation in December 2007, Pakistani Taliban has been actually operational in the region under different appellations and forms, and it has been militarily active in many areas of the country. A group from both turbulent tribal areas and stable areas. of the NWFP along with some other groups belonging to the Provinces of Punjab and Sind were serving in the ranks of the Afghan Taliban when they were holding power in Afghanistan. While supporting the Afghan Taliban in their fights against their northern opponents, however, those Pakistani groups were not loyal to any single leadership inside Pakistan.
| When the US offensive against Afghanistan launched, Pakistani groups and religious parties loyal to Taliban became active and started to stage big demonstrations against Pakistan's siding with the US. |
After the attacks of 9/11, the US decided to smash Al-Qaeda whom they held responsible. Thus, the US asked the governments of all countries suspected of providing shelter, financial support, or potential recruits to Al-Qaeda for help to destroy it and hand over its leaderships. The government of Taliban was likewise asked to hand over Al-Qaeda leaders and close down its training camps. But, being the only regime to reject American demands, Taliban argued that Al-Qaeda could neither perpetrate those atrocities nor command such delicate military operations from remote distances and over vast territories. Nonetheless, Taliban made many bids to defuse the crisis; one of which was to set up a tribunal with a jury from three Muslim countries to try the suspects. But the US rejected all their propositions and decided to punish both Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime, which was qualified for its stance as a pro-terrorist regime.
President George W. Bush announced in a speech delivered in California on January 6, 2002, "Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader. Every nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocence, they have become outlaws and murderers themselves. And they will take that lonely path at their own peril." Accordingly, the US decided that what it viewed as pro-terrorist regimes and terrorists themselves must share the same punishment.
The Pakistani government led by President Musharraf was among the regimes that supported the US in its war against Taliban. Pakistan, which had been so far the custodian of the Taliban regime, carried out a U-turn in its policy of support to Taliban. Pakistan started to reverse its pre-9/11 policy not out of a real desire for change or for national interests, but because it was groaning under the American pressure and was yearning for financial aid.
The Pakistani Jang newspaper, quoting the Washington Post, wrote on March 3, 2004, that Colin Powel, then the US secretary of state, phoned President Musharraf to state what America demands from the Pakistani government. Powel urged Musharraf to change and oppose Taliban. He admitted that the Pakistanis did exactly what they were asked to do.
According to well-informed sources, Colin Powel did not believe himself when he heard General Musharraf saying he accepted all of Washington's demands. No sooner was President Bush informed about Musharraf's approval than he asked members of the council he set up to run the war on the so-called terrorism, "Has Pakistan thought well about the consequences of its cooperation with America?" He added, "Pervez Musharraf exposes himself to great dangers."
The reason for Bush's surprise was that the Americans were well-aware of the risks this decision involves for the Pakistani society, which would be exposed to violence and instability.
When the US offensive against Afghanistan launched, Pakistani groups and religious political parties loyal to Taliban became active and started to stage big marches and demonstrations against Pakistan's siding with the US and the support it provides to its troops to strike the Taliban regime. Right then, the Front for the Defense of Afghanistan was formed to mount popular pressure on the Pakistani government to force it to end its backing for the Americans. Sheikh Abderrasheed Ghazi (killed in last year's military operation that targeted Lal Masjid — the Red Mosque — in Islamabad) and other clerics played a leading role in organizing those marches.
Core of Pakistani Taliban
| Following the collapse of Taliban, its members were forced to seek a safe haven in the south-west Afghan and the tribal border belt between Afghanistan and Pakistan where they could prepare for a guerrilla war against the Americans. |
Pro-Taliban groups were also very active on other fronts. They raised funds in Pakistani mosques and sent armed groups to back Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. Sheikh Sufi Mohamed, leader of "The Movement for the Enforcement of the Mohammedan Sharia," one of the most active groups in this front, announced that his Movement mobilized more than 10,000 gunmen from Buneer, Malakend, and Dera regions to participate in the jihad against the American troops in Afghanistan. He affirmed that he would enter the Afghan province of Kawnar on October 17, 2001. Indeed, many of his militants joined Taliban in their fight against the Americans.
However, after two-months of resistance to the American attack that started on October 7, 2001, the Taliban regime succumbed quickly under the savage pounding of the American air war machine (more than 60,000 flights in just one month). Consequently, scores of those Pakistani fighters were killed in the streets and their corpses mutilated, and many more were detained for years in terrible conditions by the Northern Alliance.
The support provided by Musharraf's government to the Americans, which was decisive in overthrowing the Taliban regime, together with the severe losses those fighters suffered, triggered off animosity between those who espouse the Taliban doctrine and Musharraf's government.
Following the collapse of Taliban in December 2001, the remaining members of Taliban and the foreign fighters (including the Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens, Punjabis, residents of Pakistani tribal Areas, and others) were forced to seek a safe haven where they could reorganize and prepare for a guerrilla war against the American troops. Some south-west Afghan provinces and the tribal border belt between Afghanistan and Pakistan which comprise both North and South Waziristan were that safe haven. The fighters who escaped the American bombardment fled to those areas to benefit from the deep-rooted traditions of providing protection (called Jewaar in Urdu) to its seekers by local tribes. Thus, many groups, which were formed in these areas to help Afghan Taliban fight the Americans, became the core of the Taliban Movement of Pakistan (TTP).
When the Afghan Taliban started its guerilla war against the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan, namely in the southern provinces, many of the militant groups took refuge in that border belt where they were supported and given shelter by some tribal communities. The US, viewing this area as a threat to its presence in Afghanistan, asked Pakistan's President Musharraf to crack down on those core groups. Accordingly, the Pakistani army launched its military operations in those areas with the help of the American air strikes that targeted armed groups' commanders and religious schools (madrasahs). However, The larger the military operations were and the more civilians were killed, the more determined the armed groups became. The populations of farther areas sympathized with those victims and felt the necessity of helping them.
| The armed groups proliferated and became engaged in open stand-offs with the Pakistani troops. This was a shift away from their original goal, which was to provide support to the Afghan Taliban in their war against the Americans. |
Hence, the Taliban spread beyond its hotbed in Southern Waziristan to infiltrate all the tribal areas and even gain ground in nearly all stable areas in the NWFP. As the government's determination to get rid of these groups increased shown by the excessive use of force , the armed groups proliferated and became engaged in open standoffs with the Pakistani troops and government. This constituted a shift away from the militant groups' original objective, which was to provide support to the Afghan Taliban in their war against the Americans. The events took a different course as those militants started to destabilize the country with the aim of putting the Pakistani government in an embarrassing situation. Thus, the Taliban groups in the tribal areas have become a thorny issue since then. They mounted assassination acts and suicide attacks and captured scores of Pakistani troops and officers. Also, they increasingly raided army bases and seized military equipments and ammunitions.
The Pakistani army found itself in a full-fledged war. Until recently, the Pakistani army had been forced to temporarily make up with some Taliban groups in one area so as to get rid of other groups in another. Once aware of such tactics and of the dangers besetting their existence, those groups convened for the first time and managed, according to their leaders, to form the Taliban Movement of Pakistan (TTP).
Previous Attempts of Unity
Armed groups in tribal areas had tried to form and join a unified organization, but they had failed for many reasons. Leaders of the different groups engaged in headship rivalries nurtured by the government's buying some leaders' loyalties. That's why late Mullah Dadullah, the prominent commander of Afghan Taliban, visited the area many times to mediate ceasefire agreements between belligerent groups loyal to Taliban. Pervez Musharraf himself admitted that in February 2007.
II. Hierarchical organization of TTP
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| The larger the military operations were and the more people were killed, the more determined the armed groups became. |
Twenty persons representing different armed groups in Pakistani tribal areas loyal to Afghan Taliban took part in the meeting which, after two months of deliberations, announced the formation of TTP. The delegates appointed Bailtullah Mehsud from Southern Waziristan as their Emir (Arabic for: leader), Maulawi Hafeez Jal Bahaadir from Northern Waziristan as First Deputy, Maulawi Fakir Mohamed from the tribal area of Bajour as SecondD, and Maulawi Mohamed Omar as the movement's spokesman.
The convention set up a Shura Council (Arabic for: leadership council) of 40 members representing all of the seven tribal areas and also some stable areas of the NWFP such as Benou, Leky-Mrout, Dera, Souate, Malakend, and Dera Ismail Khan.
III. The Objectives of TMP
The main objective of the armed groups in tribal areas had been to help the Afghan Taliban in their fight against foreign forces in their country. In this respect, Maulawi Mohamed Omar, spokesman of TTP, told the BBC Urdu on December 14, 2007,
"The main objective of TTP is to fight NATO and US forces in Afghanistan. However, due to the wrong policies of the Pakistani government, we were forced to resort to a defensive jihad in our country."
| "The main objective of TTP is to fight NATO and US forces in Afghanistan. However, due to the wrong policies of the Pakistani government, we were forced to resort to a defensive jihad in our country," — TTP spokesman |
Previously, Neyk Mohamed, then Taliban commander in Southern Waziristan was and later killed in a US missile attack in 2004, said,
"The tribes helped Afghanistan against the British occupation, then against the Soviet aggression, and now they are helping them against the American assault. As jihad is a religious duty, we must constantly exert it."
This might sound as the main objective of the Pakistani Taliban, particularly the armed groups in tribal areas. Yet, for some other groups like the "Movement for the Enforcement of the Mohammedan Sharia," formed in 1992 by Sheikh Sufi Mohamed, it may be a way to enforce the Islamic law in Pakistan.
But now, the majority of that Movement's militants have joined the TTP. The group led by Maulawi Abderasheed Ghazi (killed in the Red Mosque attack in 2007) and his brother Maulawi Abdelazeez followed suit. The objectives for the present organization, according to its leaders, are:
- Combating the Pakistani army until the cessation of its military operations in Swat and Northern Waziristan.
- Lifting the checkpoints set by the Pakistani army in all Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
- Releasing all TTP detainees, namely Sheikh Abdelazeez, ex-imam of the Red Mosque.
- Ending the military operations and pulling out the Pakistani troops from the Swat region in no more than 10 days. The deadline was deferred after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.
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Striking no deal with the government or the army individually or on regional basis. Since the government reconciles some groups while fighting others, any agreement must be comprehensive.
IV. The Leadership of Pakistani Taliban
Since the American invasion of Pakistan, a group of leaders have become well-known. One of the first prominent leaders was Commander Neyk Mohammed who was killed in the American missile attack on May 17, 2004, and after him, Abdullah Mehsud, who was also killed in Baluchistan in a skirmish with the Pakistani army in July 2007 after having been detained in Guantanamo for a long time.
a) Baitullah Mehsud
| Mehsud is said to lead almost 10,000 armed militants belonging to his tribe. In cases of necessity, he would be able to mobilize 25,000 militants |
The lately appointed TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud, of Southern Waziristan origins, belongs to Mehsud tribe, a subdivision of the larger Pashtun tribe of Wazir. He is aged between 30 and 35. He never went to school, but he has great leadership skills and long experience in political negotiations and military commandment. He has been active in supporting Afghan Taliban after their collapse in 2001. At that time, a dispute, settled by the intervention of Mullah Dadullah, broke out between him and Taher Yuldashov, leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan who took refuge with his fighters in Waziristan.
Mehsud is said to lead almost 10,000 armed militants belonging to his tribe. In cases of necessity, he would be able to mobilize 25,000 militants and an additional number of militants from Central Asia.
He considers jihad a solution to all existing problems. Imitating Afghan Taliban leader Mohamed Omar, he did not like to be photographed, that is why the media have published only one picture of his taken in 2005 when he was signing an agreement with the Pakistani government, but his face does not show up. He forced the population of the regions he controls to abide by some Islamic laws, including not shaving beards.
He accepted a truce with the government in February 2005. But when the government announced that he surrendered and apologized for his past actions, together with the American rejection of any reconciliation with him, the truce was breached and the belligerents went back to arms. He consequently conducted many large operations against the Pakistani army. In one of them, he captured 250 officers and soldiers and seized many of the army's most fortified posts.
Nevertheless, he often reiterated that he does not seek confrontation with the Pakistani army because it is in the interest of foreign forces stationed in Afghanistan and India, Pakistan's spiteful enemy. He was blamed for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, which he denied claiming that killing her did not rank high in his agenda and is against his tribal traditions that forbid the killing of women. He conversely ascribed her assassination to the government of General Musharraf.
b) Maulawi Hafeez Jal Bahaadir
Maulawi Hafeez Jal Bahaadir was appointed First Deputy of the TTP leader. Of Northern Waziristan origins, he has been very active in the region for so long. He has been member of the local Taliban Shura council since 2005. He was also member of the tripartite delegation, representing Northern Waziristan in talks with the government, which signed an agreement with the government in September 2006. Maulawi Hafeez Jal Bahaadir is a very influential figure in Northern Waziristan.
c) Maulawi Faquir Mohamed
Maulawi Faquir Mohamed, who belongs to the Pashtun Mohmand tribe, is a prominent figure in the TTP. He lives in the village of Damah Dulah in Bajour region. He is about 40. He graduated from the well-known madrasah of Isha'at Attawheed Wa Ssunah located in the village of Fang Feer in the region of Swabi. The disciples of this school are known for combating superstitions and heresies.
| "The heart of all problems is the presence of the American troops in Afghanistan. When they pull out from the region, their troubles and ours and the pressures on Musharraf's government will come to an end" — TTP Deputy Leader |
After graduation, he joined the Mujahedeen who fought the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s. As a prominent cleric in the region, he joined "The Movement for the Enforcement of the Mohammedan Sharia" and became one of its most active members. He was also a key figure in that movement. After the American attack on Afghanistan, Sheikh Faquir Mohamed took part in staging anti-American marches and protests in Bajour region.
He also welcomed and hosted Taliban fighters fleeing Afghanistan. For that, he came under great government pressure and was targeted at many times. In 2005, the US planes bombarded his house. Misinformed that Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Sheikh Faquir Mohamed were in the madrasah of Sheikh Lyakut (a cleric very close to him) the night of January 13, 2006, Americans bombarded the building killing more than 80 students aged between 13 and 17 who were studying the holy Qur'an.
Responding to a question about hosting Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Sheikh Faquir Mohamed said, "That would be a great honor for me, I would be very proud of it, but I haven't met him yet." About hosting the leaders of Taliban, he replied, "Yes, I will. If Mullah Omar, Osama bin Laden, or Doctor Ayman Al-Zawahiri come over here, I will welcome them at my home in accordance with our traditions and customs."
Sheikh Faquir Mohamed claims leading a 1,000-strong militia in his region. He believes in the necessity of engaging in talks with the government to settle the pending issues. In the meanwhile, he affirms that he and his followers will retaliate if they are attacked. They keep the right of self-defense to themselves, and he reiterates that they know how to do it.
In an interview with the BBC, he commented on the American pressures on the Pakistani government about the Arabs and other aliens present in tribal areas, he said, "The Pakistani government is under world and American pressure, and we are under Almighty Allah's pressure. He prescribed jihad upon us in such circumstances. The heart of all problems is the presence of the American troops in Afghanistan. When they pull out from the region, their troubles and ours, and the pressures on Musharraf's government will come to an end. So let them go away and let us alone."
V. Consequences and Future Prospects
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| The emergence of TTP will reduce the army's chances to deliver in tribal areas; i.e. to wipe out pro-Afghan Taliban militant groups. |
It seems that the TTP shuns confrontation with government forces. Being ready to negotiate, its various factions claim that they have been forced to fight inside Pakistan in retaliation to the government forces aggression. TTP views such internal fights as serving neither party.
Likewise, while the Pakistani army wants to stop fighti ng loyal tribesmen it cannot decline the American demands. Analysts comment that the Pakistani army is waging a proxy war for America, killing Pakistanis for the sake of American interests. For America, the presence of these groups in this remote area is a threat to its national security. So, the US demands from the Pakistani army to end that threat to safeguard its vital interests.
After the formation of the TTP as an organization that unifies the various armed groups in the tribal areas and the stable regions of the NWFP, it is predicted that:
The emergence of TTP will reduce the army's chances to deliver in tribal areas; i.e. to wipe out pro-Afghan Taliban militant groups. The army scored some gains when it used to deal separately with each region alone. With the TTP, having a unified decision of war or peace, it would be more difficult for the army to fight all militant groups operating in all tribal areas at the same time.
In that case, the government would probably opt to withdraw its forces from those regions, or at least lift the checkpoints, give up fighting its own people for the sake of America and negotiate with those militant groups. Thus, it could save its economic and human resources and eradicate the reasons of the country's security instability. If national interests rank high, this could be the right decision to take.
If the army continues its war against TTP while allowing American and NATO forces to carry military operations in those areas, tribes will be more resolved to resist in various ways. Suicide attacks (or martyrdom attacks as Taliban like to call them), will rise sharply and consequently jeopardize the security of the Pakistani people and even the existence of Pakistan as a nation.
The third possibility is that the army may abandon the war against TTP leaving the task of uprooting it to the American and NATO troops. This scenario may not be ruled out. But in view of their bumpy nature, the tribal mountainous areas will not be brought under control easily. Conversely, Pakistan may lose its political independence and sovereign decision all over its territory which may encourage separatist movements and destabilize the country.
Analysts and many in Pakistan think that it would be better for the country to end this armed conflict through the withdrawal of the army, ceasing the war against tribesmen who are faithful to their country and avoiding putting Pakistan's national security to risks for the sake of American interests. Unless the government does that, waves of violence are in store for Pakistanis. But if it listens to the voice of reason, it will save the country from many great perils.
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