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Lawyers chant slogans against emergency rule inside the premises of Peshawar High Court buildings in Peshawar. (Reuters' photo) |
Prospects for Pakistan's transition to democracy, which looked so positive just a week ago as former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto and President General Pervez Musharraf moved toward some political understanding, now look at best tenuous.
On November 3, 2007, Musharraf declared emergency in Pakistan, suspended the interim constitution, and essentially placed the Supreme Court of Pakistan under military arrest. His move has generated a crisis in the region with serious global implications.
Pakistan to this day remains, along with Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Iran, and Bangladesh, one of the few Muslim states where democratic processes have taken roots over the years. Even when Pakistan is governed by military dictators, as it has been frequently (1958–1970, 1978–1988, 1999–present), it is still able to sustain free press, active political parties, and independent judiciary.
Its ability to retain liberal political institutions even under military dictatorship is an important characteristic that we must keep in mind as we watch the current spiraling sequence of political disasters in Pakistan.
| The declaration of emergency is essentially to pull a coup against the independent judiciary. |
Coup Against Liberalism
Some political theorists talk of illiberal democracies — polities where there are elections but often in the absence of other important democratic concepts, such as free speech, free media, and independent judiciary. Pakistan is in a curious way the opposite of an illiberal democracy: It is a liberal dictatorship.
The declaration of emergency by Musharraf is essentially an attempt to pull a coup against an important liberal dimension of Pakistan — the independent judiciary.
In October 2007, Musharraf won the presidential elections while holding on to the position of the chief of Pakistani military. But according to the current Pakistani constitution, government employees cannot run for elections and therefore Musharraf cannot hold his position as chief of the military and still be eligible to run for political office.
His election was challenged in the Supreme Court and right before the court was to give its decision on the constitutionality of Musharraf's reelection to be president of Pakistan. He has declared emergency, laid siege to the Supreme Court, blocked out independent news media, and detained those who had moved the Supreme Court to test his eligibility and legality for reelection.
This last year has seen Musharraf's move against two institutions: the judiciary and the media, which otherwise have enjoyed much free rein under dictatorship. These moves clearly are indications that Musharraf feels insecure about his grip on power as his popularity declines.
| He is seen by his critics as a Washington tool that does nothing except fighting America's war against terror. |
Musharraf's Declining Utility
In the last year, Musharraf's popularity has diminished both in Pakistan and in Washington. The primary reason is that he has become less and less useful both at home and abroad.
In Pakistan, he has failed to curb the extremist violence, which has taken over 450 lives. The military campaigns in the tribal areas against Taliban supporters and against the Red Mosque and the adjunct seminary in Islamabad have generated unprecedented amounts of resentment and anger against Musharraf.
He is now seen by his critics as primarily an American tool that does nothing except fighting America's war against terror, which most people in Pakistan view as a war against Islam. Musharraf is waging wars against his own people in cities and provinces, and that has made the citizenry as well as the military nervous and unhappy.
Musharraf brought a degree of stability to the society and gave impetus to its declining economy after the coup in 1999. His alliance with the Bush administration after 9/11 also brought billions of dollars worth of military and economic aid to Pakistan. The economy has definitely benefited from this. He has also provided — thanks to the professionalism of the military — both efficient and corruption-free governance.
Pakistan's military is one of the few professional, competent, and stable institutions in the country. It essentially assumed the responsibilities of the state after 1999, and things got better.
The Pakistani people, however, has got used to the positive changes and has forgotten the corruption and chaos under the previous democratic governments from 1988 to 1998. But now the Pakistani people are dissatisfied with the turmoil being brought to Pakistan by Musharraf's desperate efforts to retain power.
Even some of the secular elite who have supported Musharraf's undemocratic ways are becoming wary toward his high-handedness. Musharraf's force was minimally subverting democracy (only at the top) since the rest of Pakistan's local and national governments were elected. Yet, the secular elite appreciated his enlightened approach to Islam and considered that his force has nurtured a degree of secularity and religious freedom necessary to surmount the rising tide of Taliban-style Islamism.
But what they have finally ended up with is more Islamic militancy with extremist violence and a declining democracy.
| General Musharraf has not fully succeeded in suppressing Islamic militancy. |
American Policy and Democracy
Since 9/11, Pakistan has essentially become the frontline state against Al-Qaeda and Taliban and has become America's major ally in the so-called War on Terror. Musharraf's coup in 1999 was described by many analysts as a coup against Washington since the then prime minister Nawaz Sharif was seen as too close to Washington and former president Clinton.
Till 2001, Musharraf was a persona non grata in Western capitals, but since then, he has become the face of enlightened Islam and Muslim cooperation in America's war against Islamic extremism.
Musharraf was seen as the go-to guy in eliminating Al-Qaeda from the Pakistani-Afghan border and as the bulwark that kept the extremist from taking over Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal. In return, the US provided Pakistan with military and economic aid and did not pressure Musharraf to restore democracy in the country.
When two of the four provinces in Pakistan fell to Islamist-leaning parties in state assembly elections, the dangers of instant democracy became easily apparent to Washington.
But lately, there are rumblings in Washington. Musharraf has not fully succeeded in suppressing Islamic militancy. According to the National Intelligence Council, Al-Qaeda has reconstituted itself to pre-9/11 strength and Taliban has continued to wage their war against Western forces in Afghanistan from bases in Pakistan.
Muslims of Pakistani origin are also seen as the main source for recruitment by radical groups in Britain. Pakistan has steadily become the most critical state for the American and Western security. Also, given the fact that Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state, the strategic significance of a state failure or collapse in the country is so much more.
In recent weeks, Washington has been facilitating a rapprochement with Bhutto that could enable Musharraf to make a transition to democracy, remain president (with Bhutto as prime minister), and sustain a secular alliance of power in Islamabad.
The declaration of emergency by Musharraf is his second coup against Washington. Not only does it derail the latest effort to usher in democracy but also it emboldens the Islamist opposition that recognizes that by taking this aggressive step Musharraf himself has brought Pakistan to the tipping point. It remains to be seen if the Islamic opposition can muster the capacity to go the distance.
Washington cannot and will not abandon Musharraf. Indeed his move, which brings Pakistan closer to collapse, basically forces Washington to stand behind him more firmly, albeit unhappily.
In the end, the current crisis can be diffused if an early rapprochement between Musharraf and the Supreme Court can be arranged. It is here that Bhutto can play a role and reestablish herself as a major player, both at home and in the eyes of Washington.
| The Islamists maybe united against Musharraf and the West, but they are far from advancing a shared political vision and agenda. |
Prospects for Democracy
Pakistan's politics have become very complex in the past few years. There has been a growth of Taliban-style Islamism, which is heavy in fervor but very thin in ideas. If these elements come to power, they will have no positive agenda except to implement hudud (prescribed penalties) and to look for new theaters to wage military jihad.
The electoral victories of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), an alliance of Islamist parties, were a result of a unified Islamic front. But now the Islamic parties could split. It is difficult to imagine the Jamaat-e-Islami, which has a systematic and more comprehensive agenda than the others', to maintain a long-term relationship with totalitarian elements.
The Islamists may be united against Musharraf and the West, but they are far from advancing a shared political vision and agenda that would appeal to the majority of Pakistanis whose problems are more developmental than moral.
The moderate Islamist groups that formerly aligned with Sharif and some secular forces have been backing Musharraf. While one may expect the secularists to return to the Bhutto-led Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), one wonders about the direction that the moderate Islamists will take.
It remains to be seen if these groups can come together and form a strong alliance for democracy that can limit the scope and duration of the military dictatorship as well as keep the Islamists at bay.
So far, the army has remained the only force capable of determining political outcomes in Pakistan. Even the judiciary has acted in a reckless manner and overplayed its hand. Ultimately, the future of democracy in Pakistan will depend on the army's willingness to act with wisdom. Can it keep peace, maintain order and integrity, and yet impose democratic limits on its own powers?
Pakistan has remained a schizophrenic state that vacillates between dictatorship and democracy with occasional flirtations with "talk of Shari`ah application." Neither has democracy proved to be durable nor has dictatorship remained enduring.
There is hope for democracy in Pakistan, but first its citizens — including politicians and military leaders — must learn to respect their own laws and constitution. In the long run, they need to develop a consensus toward the role Islam will play in Pakistan's public sphere.
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