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Thu. May. 31, 2007

Politics in depth > Asia > Politics & Economy

Opinion

Post-Musharraf Scenarios

Time for Regime Change?

By  Farooq Hassan

Law & Int'l Affairs Professor — Harvard

 
Image

Pakistani journalists chant slogans during a protest against the intimidation of journalists in Islamabad, May 30, 2007. (Reuters Photo)

 Ever since Friday, March 9, Musharraf's assumed departure from the Pakistani political scene gets more and more explicit. His abrupt and seemingly ruthless behavior towards the Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Iftikhar Chaudhry has triggered such a velocity of political agitation against his long and patently dictatorial rule as never seen before in Pakistan. Indeed nowhere in recent history has a Third World country seen such massive uprising by essentially educated, middle classes against the usurpers of state authority as witnessed in this country.

As far as the evolving story of the attempted ouster of the CJP is concerned, it continues to grip the minds and thoughts of most in Pakistan. Abroad as well there is enormous interest in this story, since it epitomizes the inherent struggle between representative values and anti-democratic fascists' thinking that is usually backed by the country's armed forces.

Since my last major writing on this topic, the Supreme Court admitted for hearing my petition that I moved on behalf of several human rights activists and an NGO dedicated to safeguarding the judiciary. In the hearings thus far, some important legal consequences have emerged

First, the Supreme Court has stayed and then confirmed the stay of proceedings against the CJP. Secondly, the Court has started upon hearing of arguments that are likely to take several months before completion. Thirdly, the questions that most want answers to at large revolve around the future of Musharraf and indeed the future of Pakistan, as a result of the widespread disgruntlement witnessed on the streets of Pakistan.

Initially on May 5, the CJP came to Lahore from Islamabad, a five-hour journey that was completed in 26 hours to a welcome never given to anyone in this country's entire political history. Then on May 12, nearly 40 people died in the streets in armed fights between the pro-Musharraf political party Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), which is dominant in Karachi, and those belonging to other walks of life who had come to greet the CJP at the local airport.

The MQM has been sarcastically labeled as Musharraf Quami Movement, depicting the strong mistrust that this party had generated. The most disturbing aspect of this tragedy is that the MQM was given a freehand by the government for 48 hours prior to the arrival of the CJP in which they took over the entire control and command structure of the city to use to its preconceived plans. 

The most disturbing aspect of this tragedy is that the MQM was given a freehand by the government for 48 hours prior to the arrival of the CJP
The NDI in Pakistan

In this state of unprecedented affairs, two relevant events need specific mention as referring to them will assist in answering the two fundamental questions raised above.

The first event is a nine-page report by the influential US-based National Democratic Institute (NDI) dealing with the judiciary, the next coming elections, and other connected matters involving Pakistan's future constitutional development due later this year. It has recommended General Musharraf to separate within the shortest possible time the two top slots in Pakistan, the president's office and the military chief post, he is holding simultaneously.

Holding both posts, the NDI said, blurs the distinction between military and civilian authorities that is fundamental to a democratic system. "A neutral care-taker cabinet in consultation with political parties and civil society should be established, and the law preventing anyone from serving as Prime Minister for more than two terms should be repealed." These recommendations were made by an international delegation, organized by the NDI, that visited Pakistan from May 13 to May 17 and held meetings with leaders of all mainstream political parties and civil society. The NDI delegation assessed the political environment and the framework for the upcoming general elections in late 2007 or early next year and issued a statement on May 18.

However, commenting on Pakistan's current political scenario, the delegation expressed serious concerns. It rightly pointed out that Pakistan stood at a critical juncture and the stakes were very high. Only, if the people consider the upcoming elections credible, they could return the nation to the path toward democracy. The report criticized the role of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and expressed its dissatisfaction over the voters' registration process by the ECP. The delegation included David Collenette (Canada), former Minister of National Defence, and Minister of Veterans Affairs, Peter Manikas (US), NDI Senior Associate and Director of Asia Programs; Tioulong Saumura (Cambodia), member of the National Assembly and member of the Steering Committee of the Sam Rainsy Party; Teresita Schaffer (US), Director of South Asia Programs at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former ambassador to Sri Lanka; and Tony Worthington (UK), former member of parliament from the Labour Party.

The ensuing turmoil can be used to impose emergency laws and to make foreign helpers of the General nervous that without him, Pakistan may well fall to the mullahs! 
Strategy of Mayhem

Among other major matters, the mayhem and chaos that the Musharraf Government is behind created such harassment and intimidation of the pro-democracy elements in the country. The May 12 carnage in Karachi, for instance, was created by the MQM, which was publicly admitted by General Musharraf himself in a TV interview aired on March 18. His thesis was as that overdone by the said political party to impress its opponents of its political "power." It is most unwelcome if the state machinery assumes such terrifying prospects of its public postures. Then on May 15, an Additional Registrar of the Supreme Court itself was murdered by "unknown assailants" in his house in Islamabad. The slain court official was an important witness in the Supreme Court proceedings against the government. Many believe that he was silenced before he could testify.

However, the most sinister aspect of this mayhem strategy is the fear of creating large scale bloodshed in Islamabad itself. Astonishing patience has been shown by the Pakistani state, known to use air and artillery power to combat challenges that the Lal Masjid controversy seems to be creating with apparent impunity. Its electricity, gas, phone lines, website, and even FM radio station are all in tact. The chief negotiator appointed by Musharraf, Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, described the burka brigade kidnappers as "our daughters," with whom negotiations would continue and against whom "no operation could be contemplated."

The fear is that Musharraf can use this matter to his advantage to create a law-and-order problem and then have a crackdown right in the middle of the capital. The ensuing turmoil can be used to impose emergency laws and to make foreign helpers of the General nervous that without him, Pakistan may well fall to the mullahs! However, even a make-believe creation of a political setup arguably upon Musharraf's departure, sooner rather than later, will leave a society being transformed into a Taliban stronghold right in Islamabad and a bitter legacy that may last for generations.

According to the New York Times, the US has been preparing for a post-Musharraf Pakistan for at least a little over a year. 
Post-Musharraf Prospects  

Foreign intellectuals' and specialists' circles maintain Musharraf's own constituency, the military, is beginning to show signs of concern — even his close generals, as reported in the US media, are now privately admitting things have gotten out of hand. There also are indications that the US has begun to gradually move away from the embattled Pakistani leader. Nawaz Sharif, the former  prime minister  is not exaggerating when he says that with each passing day, Musharraf appears to be losing his hold on power. The developing shift in Washington's attitude is notable, considering that the Bush administration has heavily depended on Musharraf being at the helm in Islamabad during the War on Terrorism.

According to the New York Times, the US has been preparing for a post-Musharraf Pakistan for at least a little over a year. In the beginning, however, the US move stemmed from a desire to move beyond reliance on a single individual leader, not because of any threat to Musharraf's hold on power. The US now moves from planning to actually preparing for the time when Musharraf will no longer be Pakistan's main political personality that has to be reckoned with.

But the military establishment dominates Pakistan, and Musharraf being both president and military chief raises the question of who will replace him? It is unlikely that his military successor will hold both positions because the domestic and international situation precludes the possibility of a military takeover of the country. It should be noted that this assumes that Musharraf continues to try and tough it out, in which case the growing unrest and violence in the country could prompt the armed forces to ask him to step down like what happened in Pakistan in the past.

In such a situation, the chairman of the Senate, Muhammad Mian Soomro, would become acting president and an interim prime minister would be appointed to lead a caretaker government. Such a government would then be tasked with holding new parliamentary elections. The interim administration would be based more or less on a consensus between the political forces and the military. Such elections would lead to a coalition federal government, likely composed of at least the two main parties — the Pakistani Muslim League-Nawaz group (PML-N), and the Pakistan People's Party — with the latter being the senior coalition partner. The new parliament and provincial legislatures — that together constitute the Electoral College that elects the president — would install a new head of state who would likely be a consensus candidate of the parties in the coalition government.

Regarding the position of the chief of the army staff, it is likely that the current vice chief of army staff (VCOAS), Gen. Ahsan Saleem Hayat, would succeed Musharraf. This is assuming that, if current trends persist, Musharraf will be unable to hold on to power until October 2007, when Hayat is expected to retire. Hayat has worked extensively with Washington in the past several years, especially since he assumed the post of VCOAS in October 2004.

The current circumstances are such that a political metamorphosis on these lines is already going on, according to the CIA-leaked information to the New York Times. Musharraf's exit will certainly represent a major shift in the Pakistani political scene, but it is one for which the US has been evidently preparing.

 


Farooq Hassan is a Pakistani political expert with several distinguished credentials: DPhil; BA Juris; MA; MLitt (Oxon); DCL (Columbia); DIA (Harvard); Of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister at Law, UK; Attorney at Law, US; Senior Advocate Supreme Court (QC) of Pakistan; David M. Kennedy Visiting Scholar and Professor of International Studies, Kennedy Center; Visiting Professor, Fellow, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. The author has been adviser to four Pakistani prime ministers on foreign affairs and law. He is also the President of the American Institute of South Asian Strategic Studies, Boston. In 2006, he received the London World Islamic International Award.

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