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The tension that characterized the years of Khatami's presidency led to a stalemate on both the economic and political levels.
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Civil society has been one of the most prominent concepts in the study of political science for the last 20 years. As part of the interest in the third wave of democracy that flooded Eastern Europe and — in later years — the Middle East, political scientists, observers, and analysts have been writing extensively on the subject. Yet most of these writings and research studies have reached the same conclusion: Civil society is either weak or nonexistent in the areas of concern.
This conclusion was based on the assumption that civil society is a group of well-structured, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that work in the buffer zone between society and the government. Membership in these organizations should be voluntarily. Thus, while excluding family, tribe, and other organizations based on primary ties, these organizations include syndicates, trade unions, political parties, and interest groups.
With the historical development of countries in the Middle East taken into consideration, a search for well-structured organizations is almost like chasing ghosts. Institutions and political organizations in those countries suffer from structural deficits and social liabilities that hinder their development and their ability to serve an active part of civil society. An alternative definition looks at the core of the phenomenon: the tools and mechanisms that connect the government to society.
The forms of these mechanisms and tools may differ from one society to another according to social, economic, political, cultural, and even historical and geographical settings. This definition claims to be more openly oriented towards a study of the phenomenon in its different forms and different situations. This approach tends to deal with civil society as a recent Western phenomenon rather than a concept.
A Western Phenomenon?
| Iranian intellectuals have exerted extensive effort to relate the distant, Western concept of civil society to Iranian domestic settings. |
In other words, though it has taken different forms throughout history, civil society is a characteristic of human societies; however, the interest in it is a recent phenomenon that has developed lately in Western societies. Therefore, it is necessary to recognize the Western contribution to the study of the concept, not as a guideline for the development of the phenomenon, but rather as a human experience beneficial for others.
The study of civil society in a given country should be performed at two levels, the first of which is intellectual and academic. An interest in the concept and civil society activities on the academic and intellectual level would lead to a creation of a more positive and encouraging environment that eventually leads to strengthening civil society regardless of the definition adopted for it.
The second level deals with the field study of the mechanisms and tools developed within the context of a given society.
The following is an analysis of the Iranian intellectual perception of the concept and a quick look at the recent developments that took place after the 1979 Iranian revolution.
According to Mehran Kamrava, an analysis of Iranian civil society on the intellectual level would reveal three main features of civil society in Iran.
First, Iranian intellectuals have exerted extensive effort to relate the distant, Western concept of civil society to Iranian domestic settings through connecting it to more rooted concepts — mainly religion and culture.
Second, as part of this indigenization process and as a result of it, Iranian intellectuals and politicians emphasize the role of the state in promoting civil society. According to them, the rule of law is an essential condition for the existence of civil society. The rule of law is the state in which all citizens — irrespective of their gender, age, class and political and religious affiliations — abide by laws, which cannot be achieved without the help of the state. Yet they urge for the abstention of the state from interfering in citizens' everyday life.
Third, by and large Iranian intellectuals, even those with secular background[1], are unable to ignore the role played by religion in the Iranian experience throughout its history.
The writings of Abdolkarim Soroush[2] stand as a good example in this regard. Soroush, whose ideas helped fuel the revolutionary zeal during the early days of the revolution, reexamined the role played by religion in Iranian society. He believed that religion and religious texts are sacred, yet our understanding of them is not. Thus, we should maintain a space for human interpretation and understanding of religious instructions, accommodating to variant circumstances.
Indigenizing the Concept
| Under Rafsanjani, there was a great emphasis on the role of society, in general, and the individual, in particular, in the reconstruction efforts. |
Though Iranian intellectuals and politicians stressed the importance of indigenizing the concept, they still sought to establish institutions and organizations based on Western standards. A thorough examination of Iranian civil society in the years following the revolution makes it clear that the development of institution- and organization-building can be divided into three phases.
The first phase included the years of the war with Iraq (1980-1988) during which the Iranian regime adopted a policy of mass and united society behind the political leadership. At that time, there was no room for Western-style organizations, given the hostility directed towards the forces of the mustakbreen (those who are arrogant) and their culture. The Iranian constitution gave room for the establishment of political parties whose programs did not contradict with the main values adopted by the Islamic political system.
The new political elite formed what was known as the Islamic Republic Political Party (IRP), which was the main political force and forefront of the religious establishment. However, political players other than the IRP, which suffered from major structural problems, were not tolerated by the political establishment; it was the case especially with those who were politically active before the revolution.
Accusations of collaborating with the West and working against the Islamic revolution and the faqih (scholar of Islamic jurisprudence) were ready to be thrown at all political organizations, including those that contributed to the success of the revolution. Many people known for their hard defense of freedom, justice, and democracy were banned from working in politics or running for public offices. Only those who were willing to declare their full and unconditioned commitment to the new political system were allowed to function within the new framework.
The second phase was marked by the attempts of President Rafsanjani, who served as President from 1989 to 1997, to rebuild the Iranian economy after the prolonged war with Iraq, which consumed the Iranian resources. Under President Rafsanjani, a new trend flourished within Iranian society: There was a great emphasis on the role of society, in general, and the individual, in particular, in the reconstruction efforts. The process of reconstruction required a high level of cooperation between the government and the society at large, which marked the beginning of creating a real civil society, particularly on the level of printed media.
Daily and monthly publications, such as Zan and Jame`eh, with their new approach of discussing domestic issues, were widely read by Iranian youth, which gave them a big advantage over the more radical and revolution-oriented publications such as Jumhuri-Eslami.
From Rafsanjani to Khatami
On the political level, President Rafsanjani called for the formation of a political front under the name of Servants of Reconstruction. Acting as an umbrella for the activities of the supporters of Rafsanjani's economic and social policies, Servants of Reconstruction contained the first seeds of what later became known as the Reformers' Camp.
The increasing and overwhelming zeal of Iranian youth marked the beginning of the third phase, which started with the election of President Muhammad Khatami, who became a symbol of civil society. Throughout his years in office, the interest in civil society was increasing, given the emphasis he put on the concept during his two electoral campaigns of 1997 and 2001. The boom in the number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) attempting to push the limits of social and political freedoms further provoked a harsh reaction from the conservative camp, whose members believed that they were the true defenders of the Islamic revolution and its values.
A large number of journalists, intellectuals, human right activists, and opposition leaders were subjected to harassment, persecution, jail, and in some cases death. The tension that characterized the years of Khatami's presidency led to a stalemate on both the economic and political levels. Civil society organizations were the main victims of such a crackdown.
Thus, Khatami's failure to fulfill his promises of a better life at the economic, social, and political levels led to a backlash against what was believed to be forces of democratization and openness within the Iranian regime.
The election of President Ahmadinejad in 2005 marked a new phase of development in Iranian civil society. The new president came to power with political rhetoric that reemphasized revolutionary slogans, resorting to mass society ideology rather than promoting a more diversified one[3].
The limited social freedoms acquired during Muhammad Khatami's presidency are now diminishing as part of a new cycle of harassment of human rights activists and reformists. Ahmadinejad is adopting a new political discourse that addresses the economic grievances of the masses rather than their political aspirations.
With the increasing probability of a confrontation between Iran and the Western world, particularly the United States, over Iran's nuclear program, the issue of civil society has become less important as Iranian society and regime are facing an external threat that might jeopardize the whole experience.
Civil Society Culture
| Intellectuals should work with the people to strengthen the culture and values of civility instead of working on the level of institutions and organizations. |
Though the experience of Iranian civil society had a start point different from those of other Middle Eastern countries, all of them have reached the same end: a weak, inactive, paralyzed, and ineffective civil society from a Western perspective. Nevertheless, in order to reexamine this conclusion, let us start from the very beginning.
Defining civil society as a group of institutions and organizations was the weapon that defeated it because, as mentioned earlier, organizations and institutions in the region suffer from structural and functional deformations. Among other reasons, such deformations are the results of colonial experiences and unsuitability of imported forms to social and political conditions in the region.
Furthermore, civil society is dealt with from a top-bottom approach, that is, from government to society. Such an approach will always color civil society with a governmental touch and will negatively affect the trust of the people in it and alienate both the concept and the organizations related to it.
It is possible, however, to suggest a different approach based on the successful experience of the religious institution in Iran prior to the 1979 revolution? The historical development of the religious institution in prerevolutionary Iran reveals a large degree of independence from the government. The religious institution was able to secure its financial and hierarchal independence from the state, and on the other hand it worked as a protector of the people against the tyranny of the state.
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the religious institution, along with the bazaar merchants, had been strengthening and collaborating with each other, which benefited society in general. The problem began with the 1979 revolution, which gradually transformed the independence of the religious institution into reliance on the state and — in later phases — identification with the ruling elite, especially with the Supreme Leader, who occupies the highest position in the system.
The effort exerted by Khatami in support of civil society did not help much. Being part of the religious establishment, he with his civil society rhetoric emphasized the role of the state and portrayed any challenge to state authority as a source of destabilization for the whole system; hence it could not be tolerated. In such a context, the attacks against civil society organizations could easily be justified.
Recent developments in the Iranian political arena do not bring about any hope for further progress on the level of institution-building within the realm of civil society. Therefore, at this point, it seems more appropriate to focus on the importance of civil society culture rather than civil society organizations. Intellectuals and policy makers, thus, should work with the people to strengthen the culture and values of civility instead of working on the level of institutions and organizations.
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[1] The definition of secular intellectuals does not correspond to Western criteria. Secular intellectuals in the Middle East, in general, and Iran, in particular, do not or can not accept the total separation of religion and state. According to secular Iranian intellectuals, there can be a level of cooperation between religion and state, yet they attempt to keep it to a minimum.
[2] The writings of Soroush are not the only example; rather, there is a number of other intellectuals who try to address the relationship between religion and politics in a different perspective than the one adopted by the political regime, to name few examples Mohsen Kadivar, Shabestri, Abollah Nouri and many others.
[3] Ahmadinejad made several statements about the redistribution of oil revenue to the poor and promised to reduce the cost of electricity and facilities. However, there are doubts about his ability to fulfill his promises, given the economic conditions in Iran.
Source:
Kamrava, Mehran. "The Civil Society Discourse in Iran." British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 28.2 (2001): 165–185.
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