Muslims In Europe: Germany, France And Great Britain

However, Serbian aggression is only an overt form of European antipathy towards Islam. The much larger problem in terms of scale and social magnitude is the hidden, covert manifestations of this attitude. Although Muslim communities in Germany, France and Great Britain do not encounter Serbian-style mass extermination or anything close to it, they do experience a much more subtler form of "Islamophobia." Although the phenomenon is not truly "subtle" in any genuine sense, when compared with the outright physical slaughter of Muslims committed by Serbian paramilitary and regular troops, one may call what occurs in the rest of Europe "subtle."

The Big Three

For Great Britain and former West Germany, the primary motivation for allowing immigration of non-native people was economic; ie, a need for labor. Both of these countries were experiencing rapid industrial growth in the years after World War II and well into the Cold War. Domestic labor supply could not match the pace of industrial growth, so the need for more labor was paramount. Great Britain's solution was to turn to its former colonies, mainly South Asia, for its needed supply.

The reasoning behind importing labor from former colonies was simple. Former possessions and the people that resided therein had just recently liberated themselves from official colonial status. Their experiences during colonial rule had acculturated them to the British social structure in such a way that they could more easily assimilate and function within "proper" British society than labor imported from other parts of the world, or from within continental Europe itself. After all, by the time of independence in the subcontinent, Great Britain had already become proficient at exporting South Asian labor within the vast reaches of her colonial empire. The sun never set without touching a South Asian. It did not take much more effort to switch the market from other labor-scarce colonial regions to Great Britain proper.

The former West Germany's rapid industrialization occurred within the same period as Great Britain's. However, West Germany had more of a competitive advantage in concentrating its economic growth towards non-military industrialization. This was due, in large part, to the victors of World War II not allowing Germany to maintain an effective offensive military and splitting the state into zones of military command among themselves. By doing this, they effectively allowed non-communist Germany to concentrate its Gross National Product in non-military growth, a great budgetary relief upon any economy.

However, along with this relief, Germany was physically divided, with the West controlling roughly two-thirds of the territory and the Soviet bloc controlling the remainder. In terms of domestic labor manpower for the rapidly growing economy (free of military expenditures), West Germany suffered from an extreme shortage. Unlike Great Britain, Germany had not maintained a sizeable colonial empire, so utilizing that resource was unavailable as an option. However, Germany had continued to maintain relations with its former World War I ally, the Turks (even though the formal state had changed significantly from the Ottoman leaders they were allied with to the state structure created by Ataturk).

In addition, since Germany did not have former colonies as a resource for labor, they had to go into their continental backyard, East Europe. West Germany could accomplish two goals with one immigration policy, importing labor and playing the role of an international moral center by accepting refugees escaping from then-Communist bloc countries.

France, on the other hand, had a vast colonial realm at the end of World War II. However, as opposed to Great Britain and West Germany, France did not have as rapid of an industrialization plan. France needed labor, but not at the same scale as either Great Britain or West Germany. Like her faster growing economic neighbors, France also initiated immigration policies designed to bring in people from her colonies. But the reasoning driving these policies emanated more from political exigencies than economic desires.

At the end of World War II, France, unlike Great Britain, steadfastly and stubbornly desired to maintain her colonial possessions. Among her possessions included the Levant (an area including Lebanon, Syria and parts of Jordan and Iraq) and two regions, aware of France's stubbornness, desired an end to French rule. Both Vietnam and Algeria began to become more than France could handle.

Self-rule in Vietnam, regardless of the nature of its present-day government, was finally settled after France found it economically and politically expensive to manage - and handed the problem over to the United States.

Algeria, on the other hand, after the initiation of French rule in the 1800s and well into the 20th century, remained a much more complex region. One major reason was that France had, through its own policies, become so inseparably entrenched in Algeria that any effort to depart would create enormous political difficulties both within France and Algeria. One major reason exemplifying this entrenchment was that the French considered Algeria a part of France. Nationals of French ethnic and racial descent born in Algeria were considered full-fledged French citizens with all the rights and privileges given to any person born in France. However, indigenous Algerians, although technically nationals of France, had severe limitations on their rights and privileges, including the right to travel (especially to France).

Although minor in the grand scale of occupation, such hypocrisy did not go unnoticed. And when aggregated with other daily indignities, conditions for independence increased. When France finally decided to quit Algeria, the citizenship policies played a large role in confusing who was really "French" and who was Algerian. Due to France's own egotistical grand designs for a larger France and in combination with the citizenship issues, Paris found it increasingly difficult to differentiate between who were really French and who were not. This dilemma, combined with the need to provide a haven for native Algerians who had cooperated and were functionaries in France's colonial state structure, resulted in bringing to France large numbers of Algerians.

The Big Picture

In Great Britain and West Germany, Muslims, like other immigrants, were brought in to do the dirty work. In France, the French political desire to seem equitable towards its former colonies resulted in large numbers of non-ethnic French nationals immigrating to the country. Whatever the initial rationale for "inviting" these people to Europe has largely disappeared. In its place has risen a backlash against these "guests."

With Great Britain's current service-driven economy replacing the industrial need for labor resulting in shortages of available jobs for Anglo-Britons, Britons have been debating the need for its immigrant workers and the non-productive elements they bring with them: families. Now that West and East Germany have become one nation, and Germany has to absorb and provide jobs for native Germans from the former East Germany (their own people), similar debates as those in Great Britain regarding immigrants initially brought for labor are occurring. In France, where jobs were scarce to begin with when large amounts of Algerians came to the country, the situation has only become worse for Muslims residing there.

In all these states, popular movements have risen under nationalist banners proclaiming that pure French, Britons and Germans be given preferential treatment in hiring. They also call for minorities to be excluded from any sort of participation in these societies. The adherents of these movements, utilizing the racist fear of Islamic terrorism, are asking that Muslims be limited in their advancement in the society and restrictions placed on their religious practices, norms and customs. Violent attacks targeting Turks in Germany and popular movements in France endorsed by aging sex symbols exemplify the current trend in these countries.

The problem could be manageable if it were limited to what some European apologists call the "fringe elements" in their societies. But it is not. Contrary to the opinion that these are isolated occurrences committed by the refuse of their societies, the overt participation by instruments of the states themselves contradict such claims. In Great Britain, Germany and France, documented cases of police brutality against Muslims exist, in some cases where outright murder is committed. France has laws limiting the dress (yes, the dress!) of Muslims. Germany's lackluster effort to crack down on extremist nationalist organizations, even though laws exist to ban the glorification or advocacy of its Nazi past, indicates that the German state does not really desire to quell this aspect of their society. These brief examples indicate not only outright state antagonism towards Muslims, but also tacit approval of "fringe" nationalist groups.

To put it bluntly, Muslims in Europe live in a climate of hate. Brought in to fill a void in labor of these societies, Muslim immigrants fruitfully participated in the economic growth of these nations, helping them to become the powers that they are. Rather than receiving acceptance or recognition within these societies for their participation, Muslims are being rewarded with intolerance, hate and violence. If these are the actions and policies of modern, developed and civilized nations - as they vociferously and repeatedly boast themselves to be - then Muslims should ask themselves if this is the path one should follow over one that is straight. In the end, maybe the very fact that Europe repeatedly reminds itself and others that they are "modern, developed and civilized" is because they realize in the depths of their conscious that they are not.