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The flag of Bahrain |
When the present ruler of Bahrain, the small island state in the Persian Gulf, Sheikh Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa decided to break away from the recent past of his country, he was certainly taking a serious gamble that would alter the course of his future reign.
At 50, Sheikh Hamad became one of the "younger generation" of rulers governing the six countries comprising the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). But Bahrain is perhaps the least well off of all the Gulf countries.
The prosperity of the oil boom had ended sometime ago, and the region was reeling itself back in from the sour experience of the second Gulf War. But Bahrain had an additional disadvantage; a troubled history of political upheavals the last of which was a comprehensive revolution by all standards.
The popular uprising that erupted in December 1994 was accompanied by moderate demands: The reinstatement of the 1973 Constitution suspended in 1975, the release of political prisoners, the return of the exiles and the repeal of the State Security Law and Court.
Upon assuming his role as the successive ruler following the demise of his father, Sheikh Isa, in March 1999, Sheikh Hamad had two choices. He could either find a way out of the quagmire and pull the country out of years of political instability, thereby securing a more stable reign for himself, or continue the policies of the previous quarter of a century that had led to chaos and instability. The Amir chose to take up the challenge of reform. However, the shape, extent and seriousness of these reforms are yet to be established.
Until a year ago, the Amir, who had already been in power for two years, remained silent, shrouding his moves in secrecy. When it was announced last year that the Amir would present a National Charter to the people for referendum, it was clear to some that the ruler had decided to change the tactics adopted by his uncle, the prime minister, and adopt less provocative policies.
In order for the Charter to be endorsed by the people, the Amir had to convince them of his seriousness. The first indications of his intention to embark on a reform program was the announcement in early February 2001 that the political prisoners would be released and the exiles would be allowed to return. The Charter was put to referendum on February 14. It was shrouded in confusion and deception. The implications of its articles were beyond the comprehension of the voters. The ceremonial atmosphere surrounding the stage-managed presentations was meant to reduce tension and convince the public of the Amir's seriousness. Despite the calls by the opposition to conduct the referendum under international observation, the government rushed the Charter through the ballot boxes, ensuring a large percentage approval.
Some opposition figures have always viewed the reform program with skepticism. "If it is serious and sincere, why did the Amir have to go around the central demand of the reinstatement of the Constitution?" they asked. They viewed the National Charter as an "unnecessary complication that serves no purpose." They also felt that there was nothing new in the Charter and that all of their concerns and rights were addressed in the Constitution. The Constitution, they argue, is far more advanced than the Charter.
The introduction of a bi-cameral legislative body was intended to deprive the people's elected representatives from the power to legislate freely while ensuring that the government will always be able to veto unwanted legislation. Today, the complications arising from this phenomenon have started to appear. The Amir is about to announce that the new Constitution, tailor-made to suit the requirements of the ruling Al Khalifa family, would be presented soon. The opposition views these changes as null and void.
They have been introduced from the top without consultation, and in clear violation of article 104a of the Constitution: "Notwithstanding the provision of Article (35) of this Constitution, for an amendment to be made to any provision of this Constitution, it is stipulated that it shall be passed by a majority vote of two-thirds of the members constituting the Assembly and ratified by the Amir."
A constitutional crisis in the country has started, a development that will undermine the reform process.
To add to the confusion, the Bahraini government has handed the United States government a list of Bahrainis who they say may be linked to groups that are on U.S. terrorism lists. Last week, the governor of Manama, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Attiyatt Allah Al Khalifa - a former member of the notorious security service team created by Ian Henderson, summoned ten senior figures of the Shia Islamic movement and told them that they were on the U.S. terrorist list. The American Embassy in Manama swiftly denied the allegations, saying that no Bahrainis are on their list of terrorists or terrorist organisations. It was a fiasco for the Bahraini government and was immediately interpreted as an attempt to frighten these figures into submission to what the government is doing to the Constitution.
The people of Bahrain also viewed with cynicism the linkage between some financial bonuses afforded to the people by the Amir and the constitutional changes. In his Army Day speech last week, the Amir dropped 50% of the mortgage liabilities of citizens, a step that has, naturally, been welcomed by the beneficiaries. The reference to the constitutional changes then followed. Few days earlier, there had been an Amiri decree offering Bahraini citizenship to thousands of National Guards personnel, a controversial step, viewed as part of a central governmental policy to change the demographic structure of the country.
It is unfortunate that earlier optimism may now prove immature as the situation becomes clearer. The country is being run by Amiri decrees, while the rule of law is still a mirage. The goodwill gestures and charitable acts from the top cannot achieve modern statehood. The rationale of nurtured reforms is beyond comprehension; the logic obscure, and the method is highly controversial.
For the high hopes in the Amir's program to be sustained, a policy of transparency must be adopted at the top. Furthermore, respect for the country's 1973 constitution must take is the source of legitimacy of the ruling family, is self-defeating. Exploiting the chaotic situation in the aftermath of 11 September tragic events will not help any noble cause.
The hope is that the Amir of Bahrain will retain faith in the people, re-instate the Constitution and call for parliamentary elections. This will lead to stability and will be a strong confidence-building endeavor. |
