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Shamir offered a division into three basic categories of Islam's domination of Egyptian life. The first Islamic wave exists within the public at large. Its presence was described as a "reaction to the malaise of modernization, to the dislocation, to the massive urbanization. It is a reaction of society that found itself uprooted from the traditional, rural background looking for guidance, looking for an orientation, interpretation of the rapidly changing environment." This wave of disenchantment with liberalism is defined by Shamir as a form of fundamentalism. Those who are part of this movement do not place democracy high on their list, yet they are not opposed to it. The second movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, is not viewed as the radical movement it was during the 40s and 50s. There are elements that are reformist and show an acceptance of democracy as a concept that must be accommodated, while other factions are opposed to this train of thought. Shamir categorized the Brotherhood as political Islam. The third category is deemed the antithesis of political Islam. It is the emergence of radical Islam, which espouses the establishment of an Islamic state oriented towards jihad. One of the groups, al-Hijra wal-Takfir (Sin and Atonement), is representative of the mentality that wants to eradicate the political system via denouncing the state and society in order to begin anew. Members of such groups do not wish to integrate with the current system. In addition, they view the West with contempt, believing it to be an instrument of the new Crusaders. According to Shamir, the Egyptian government differentiates between the three categories. It allegedly supports the first group by accommodating its expectations. For example, it accepts usage of sharia when called upon to do so; yet it is a long and tedious process that becomes entangled in bureaucracy. "The Muslim Brethren," Shamir stated. "They have a half legitimate existence in Egyptian life. They publish their organs and they have their meetings. They're even allowed to make alliances with political parties ... [but] they are not allowed to form a party. This would be against the constitution which prohibits the forming of a political party based on religion." The reaction to the radicals was characterized as a form of urban warfare. Shamir stated, "[the government is attempting] to nourish, encourage, initiate a dialogue with the young people who may be under the influence of these radicals by bringing professors ... sheikhs from al-Azhar to argue publicly with the notion suggested by the radicals." Shamir concluded by warning against underestimating the power of the radicals to elicit support and mobilize many of the populace. However, if Egyptians recognize the dangers and battle them, they will be able to overcome the challenges. Don Peretz, a Peace Fellow at U.S.I.P, entitled his presentation, "Islam and the Palestinian Movement." He gave a historical account of the movement. Support for the Islamic resurgence was attributed to several factors, including the high visibility of Christian leaders in Palestinian leadership and strong emphasis on secularism is evident in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Peretz established 1967 as a turning point when Palestinians returned to their Islamic roots, offering allegiance to the Muslim Brotherhood which had had pockets in Palestine since the 40s. He also claimed that Muslim activists thrived on the exaggeration of perceived threats from Jewish zealots, e.g. conspiracies to destroy the Dome of the Rock mosque in Jerusalem. Militant Islam began to appear in the early 80s, in marked contrast to the more complacent Islam of the West Bank that had focused primarily on issues such as community development rather than on politics. Peretz went on to postulate that the first victims of the Muslim activists were not Israelis, but members of the Palestinian community. With the onset of the intifadah, a new phase was added, i.e. rivalries between fundamentalists and secularists. Peretz's evaluation ended with the assertion that the Islamic movement itself was on fragile ground due to internal divisions. Peretz's final statements circled around the notion that the Muslim movements, specifically Hamas (the Arabic acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement), has been able to rally support based on disillusionment rather than concrete conviction. Peretz's questionable views disqualify him as an objective evaluator of the current Islamic trends in the Israeli-occupied territories. The lack of substantive, qualitative data to support his arguments render his assumptions meaningless. Furthermore, the characterization of the movement as an instrument of chaos, as is implied by claiming Islamist targets to be other Palestinians and secularists, is a testament to an elitist path followed by many intellectuals who base their views primarily on a warped marriage of textbook reading and personal bias rather than traditional, objective research. Disregarding the situation between the Israeli occupiers and the Islamic movements attests to Peretz's attempt at delegitimizing the Islamic trend, rather than addressing it as a viable, political entity. Peretz in particular, more than the other speakers, requires scrutiny due to his history as an educator. He authored a textbook called The Middle East, (the cover of which bore an illustration of a camel-riding, rifle-bearing Arab in the midst of an oil-field, a popular stereotype then and now). One of many statements read, "in 624 the Muslims, led by Mohammed, surprised and plundered a rich Meccan caravan, and interpreted their success as a sign of Allah's approval. From this point onward Mohammed's revelations changed. Force was to be used to spread the teachings of Allah" (62). It was at this time, Peretz asserted, that Islam became a militant religion. When one reads the accounts of the Jewish migration, however, to the Middle East, a noticeable alteration in presentation is evident. Jews were described as pioneers. The conflict with the Arabs portrayed as a dilemma faced by two peoples with a right to the land, disregarding the fact that European Jews expropriated Palestinian land via British assistance. Furthermore, Peretz made little or no reference to the displaced Palestinians. The conflict was a case of Jews against a collective Arab nemesis. Finally, one should ask if the textbook was intended to cover the entire Middle East, why then were individual chapters devoted only to Turkey, Egypt and Israel? Neither Peretz's lecture, nor his book, provided a balanced perspective on Middle Eastern issues, particularly Islamic ones. Other lecturers present included: Mohammed Faour, a Peace Fellow at U.S.I.P, who spoke on "Islam and Western Democracy: Opinion and Practice in the Contemporary Middle East;" Ann E. Mayer, an Associate Professor of Legal Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, who presented "Impact on Law, Politics, and Constitutions;" Shaul Bakhash, a Professor of History at George Mason University, who dealt with "Religion and Structural Obstacles to Democracy: The Case of Iran;" and Richard Bulliet, a Professor of History at the Middle East Institute of Columbia University, who acted as a discussant on the final session of the day. The majority of speakers viewed Islam as a tool utilized for political justification and gain. It was referred to often as an outlet of frustration, a path away from humiliation and degradation, and a convenient alternative to the inability of established systems to deliver. Islam was seen as merely another ideology competing with the wide array of political doctrine available to choose from. Some speakers spoke of the Muslim activists with admiration, while others stopped short of spewing forth a diatribe. The major gain to be had from attending this event was less to find out the trends sweeping the Islamic world, and more to understand how secular intellectuals view Islamic revival. 
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