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Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis, president of U.S.I.P since 1987, presented opening remarks, paving the way to a diverse, often debatable, spectrum of views on various socio-political issues within the Islamic, Arab world.
Michael Lund, Director of the Jennings Randolph Program at U.S.I.P, chaired the first session on religion and politics.
David Little, Senior Scholar at U.S.I.P, spoke first on religious movements, dealing with the controversial terminology and concept surrounding the "fundamentalist syndrome," the negativism surrounding religion, the inaccurate understanding of the word fundamentalist and the Christian background from which it evolved. The term itself arose in the 1920s as a reference to the militant, anti-modern, evangelical Protestants, as opposed to the liberalism sweeping the United States at the time. The militants espoused adherence to certain fundamentals of Christianity, e.g. the virgin birth. These White Anglo-Saxon Protestants denounced the lax attitude towards communism, socialism, foreign immigrants and so on. This belligerent attitude established the North American concept of fundamentalists, which was eventually attributed to Islamic movements without sufficient understanding of related ideologies. Little highlighted the need to look at religion with regard to its diversity, rather than placing groups into blocks, labeling them "fundamentalists." In order to study the complex relationship between religion and politics, a prerequisite exists to shed general prejudices and look open-mindedly at an important subject. "Democracy, Peace and Prosperity in the Contemporary World" was the topic approached by Robert Rothstein, a Peace Fellow at U.S.I.P. According to Rothstein, the accountability of elections through voting applies to a social structure and political platform that supports democracy. The idea of democracy can be exported. However, the enabling conditions imperative for success must come from within. Islamic culture, Rothstein asserted, is an obstacle to democracy, thereby eliminating the viability of a democratic, Islamic state. Detailing the impact of democracy on socioeconomic performance, Rothstein observed that Third World citizens associate prosperity, rather than the right to vote, with democracy. The relationship between financial betterment and political freedom is not one that goes hand in hand, the speaker stressed. The dominance of political, rather than economic logic, is what Rothstein believes has led to the relative stability of established Third World democracies. He cited as examples several Latin American nations and Israel (stressing its position as the only democracy in the Middle East), among others. These nations have survived for more than 40 years because of their "direction towards democracy and social peace." Rothstein's arguments are highly debatable and controversial, bringing into question his familiarity with the topic at hand. His resume includes positions with the Organization of Economic and Community Development and the UN Conference on Trade and Development, which may enhance his authority regarding general Third World topics; yet the supposition of Islamic incongruence with democracy did not reflect adequate research to support his claims. Furthermore, the assumption that 40 years of existence creates verification of a stable democracy reflects a lack of comparative analysis, considering that Soviet communism survived for 70 years before crumbling. The views of John Esposito of the College of the Holy Cross, whose lecture followed Rothstein's, also contradict some of the assertions made by the preceding speaker. Esposito, addressing "Democratization and Islamic Movements in the Middle East," challenged the idea that Islamic movements are undemocratic, adding that the colonial legacy and monarchism in the Middle East are far from harbingers of democracy. Those rulers that seized power or were placed upon their thrones by Europe increase the popularity of Islam as a solution. In fact, Esposito extrapolated that most Islamic movements have emphasized change not through violence, but rather via the electoral process. The political doctrines adhered to by these parties range from those who prefer multi-party rule to believers in the single-party system. The Islamization of democracy is based on the principles of shura (consultation), ijma (consensus), and ijtihad (reasoning). Popular sovereignty, therefore, is subject to divine law. Esposito tackled the existing governmental institutions' policies regarding the Islamic movements and the attempts to discredit them. Historically, human rights violations against Muslim activists has been profound. The religious groups were chastised for not getting involved in their nations' respective political processes; yet once they entered that sphere, they were shunned. A bias exists, according to Esposito, towards the authoritarian state, i.e. although the state is totalitarian, a concept exists that it is justified when suppressing Islamic groups. This ideological strain is inherent in the "creation of self-fulfilling prophecy," whereby governments accuse Muslim groups of being extremists, and when are faced with a willingness to assimilate into the electoral process, the ruling power suppresses the Islamists. Whereupon, when the religious leadership radicalizes, the government is in the position to adopt a "we told you so" attitude. This method is among other tools that Arab governments utilize to fan the fears of a rise in fundamentalism, in order to justify their harsh tactics in suppressing political Islamic revival. Islam, Esposito noted, will increase rather than diminish on the socio-political level. Furthermore, if Western powers remain silent about the suppression of democratization in the Middle East, the danger run is that of being viewed as an evil empire. He concluded that the myth surrounding the socio-economic realities, i.e. Islamic resurgence is a reaction to poverty, is untrue. If the economies of the Middle Fast were stable, Esposito stated, Islam would not go away as a political entity. 
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