[Islam-Online- Politics]

At the heart of many of the questions which divide Algerian Islamists are the different strategic goals each group has set for itself. Some of the country's Islamists focus their efforts on the creation of an Islamic state which in turn will create an Islamic society. Others believe an Islamic order must begin at the grassroots level and that the Islamic state will be an outgrowth of, rather than a stepping stone to, an Islamic society. This bifurcation between "statist" and "societal" groups is found not only in Algeria, but across the Muslim world and throughout the Islamist movement.
The statist organizations in Algeria, including the FIS and the current crop of insurgent groups, view the state apparatus as a tool to be used in Islamizing the society from the top down. By using legislation, the Islamists will be able to implement the changes in society required to bring it into compliance with the shari'a. The statists' attitudes towards democracy ranges from outright rejection on the grounds that it is kufr to its acceptance as a way to ensure the state's accountability to both Islam and the society. A middle ground is the "Islamic totalitarianism" or "theo-democracy"24 articulated by Mawlana Abul 'Ala Mawdudi, the preeminent theorist of statist Islamism.25 The governments of Iran, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia and, to an extent, Pakistan have all used the state as a means of ordering society to meet the specifications of their interpretation and understanding of Islam.
The statist model eliminates a number of problems which have plagued Islamist movements. By controlling the state, the government's resources, infrastructure and authoritative capacity is at the Islamists' disposal, rather than at their throats. Statist Islamism is easily organized because it relies on a high degree of centralization, with the highest echelons of the movement's leadership coalescing within and around the central state apparatus. It is also an efficient model able to react to changing conditions quickly and capable of rapidly initiating and enforcing policy decisions made by the leadership.
Statist Islamism, however, must pay a price for its increased efficiency. The "top-down" method of change almost always engenders a degree of resentment-the more radical the change, the greater the degree of resentment. While the FIS says it will institute its programs gradually, there will obviously be considerable changes made under a FIS government. Although statist Islamism will motivate some to join the party and the movement's ranks, it will also alienate others; that is the nature of a vanguard party committed to realigning and redefining society.
The Rabita, Hamas and an-Nahdha, on the other hand, belong to the societal camp. This model, articulated and pursued by Muhammad Abduh and the salafiyya and (with a greater emphasis on political activity) Hasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood, envisions a gradual transition to a proper Islamic society. Sahnoun and the Rabita have used education and intellectual effort to effect this change while Hamas and an-Nahdha have also engaged in direct political competition. While Hamas and an-Nahdha emphasize societal change, they also believe that government has a role to play in the implementation of an Islamic order. Societal Islamists' views of democracy have ranged from hesitancy (Sahnoun) to scepticism (Djaballah) to outspoken support (Nahnah). This model's emphasis on persuasion over coercion stems from a desire to create a consensus within the country about the Islamization of society. The societal Islamists seek to mobilize the population at large and ensure both the success and the permanence of their reforms by attempting to create popular support for their platform.
What the societal program gains in durability, however, it loses in efficiency. Because it attempts to reach a large number of people without the use of the state's resources, societal Islamism is much less efficient than the statist approach. It is also unwieldy, relying on a far-flung network of local leaders, teachers and activists who look to the leadership for guidance but simultaneously maintain a high degree of autonomy. The model thus requires a number of intelligent, astute and articulate spokesmen and representatives active around the country in order to educate and involve the population.
Perhaps the societal model's biggest drawback, and one of the principal reasons why leaders like Madani have moved from this school into the statist camp, is the slow rate of change it produces. Persuasion is a more uncertain and slower process than coercion, and while one can measure change under the statist system over a period of months, societal Islamism works over the course of years or decades. Many Islamists are simply not prepared to wait for a change that may never come.
This concern within the movement over the slow progress of the societal model raises the question of sustainability. Can the decentralized network of activists upon which the societal model relies be preserved? It remains to be seen whether the Rabita's prestige and importance will endure the eventual passing of Shaykh Ahmad Sahnoun, who is currently in his early eighties. The theoretical and educational influence of the Rabita is unquestioned, but its organizational continuity, and with it the survival of its brand of "purist" societal Islamism, remains in doubt.

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