[Islam-Online- Politics]

The next Islamist leader to form a political party was Shaykh Mahfoud Nahnah. A moderate Islamist activist and scholar, Nahnah was the leader of al-Irshad wal-Islah, the Association of Guidance and Reform, an apolitical organization engaged in educational and social welfare issues. While Nahnah's announcement did attract a variety of local Islamic organizations, Madani and the FIS refused to consider any sort of alliance with the new group. Nahnah formalized his entry into electoral politics by forming his own party, the Movement for an Islamic Society (Hamas), in December of 1990.
Hamas presents itself as a more moderate and gradualist Islamist movement than the FIS. Hamas activists have criticized the FIS for its alleged opportunism and simplistic rhetoric, as well as its more extreme positions. In 1990, Nahnah set forth three points which served as "a veritable repudiation of the local and national politics of the FIS." These were "the consolidation of the Islamic solution...the adoption of moderation and dialogue between citizens and respect for the woman by permitting her to participate in the fulfillment of the global Islamic civilizational project."12 Nahnah's brand of moderate Islamism has attracted a number of professionals and scholars to the party. Hamas members are generally older and better educated than the FIS? rank and file, but the party has been and remains much smaller than the rival Islamic Salvation Front.
Hamas' moderation and Nahnah's outspoken commitment to the multiparty system have won accolades from across the Algerian political spectrum. Because of its leadership's emphasis on dialogue, Hamas has enjoyed a level of contact with the government and opposition parties not accorded to the other Islamist groups.13 Although other minuscule Islamist groupings were later formed, it is an-Nahdha, Hamas and particularly the FIS which have dominated Islamist political activity in Algeria.
Nahnah's and Djaballah's entries onto the political scene were occasioned by the FIS' surprising victory at the polls. In a sense, it was Madani, Belhadj and the FIS who took the real chances and Nahnah and Djaballah who helped reap the benefits. Many in the Islamic Salvation Front saw Hamas in particular as a government attempt to divide the FIS, and referred to Nahnah as "Chadli's man."14 Yet the delay in Hamas' and an-Nahdha's debuts also demonstrates the reluctance of many Islamists to make the transition from a social and educational agenda to outright political activity. In any case, the June 1990 election results were the last to be honored by the Algerian state.
The first signs of trouble came in the weeks before the parliamentary elections scheduled for 27 June 1991. Smarting from the FLN's dismal showing in the 1990 polls, the government amended the electoral rules and realigned voting districts in a blatant attempt to swing the elections away from the FIS.15 The new rules presented the FIS with a stark choice: participate in the prevaricated elections or boycott the voting and risk being left out of the new parliament.
Although Sahnoun attempted to mediate a compromise alliance between Madani, Nahnah and Djaballah in order to meet the government challenge with a united Islamist bloc, Madani decided to go it alone. The FIS leader adopted a tougher tone in his statements and the rhetorical distance between Madani and Belhadj narrowed.

The FIS leadership was divided as the elections came nearer, with the party's Majlis ash-Shura finally advocating participation in the balloting followed by protest demonstrations. Madani and Belhadj, however, took the initiative by calling a series of strikes in late May in an attempt to force the government's hand.
The strikes met with limited success at first, with FIS supporters occupying two major Algiers plazas, Martyrs' Square and the Place ler Mai, but stores, businesses and university classes continued with their regular activities. As the strikes entered their second week, it was clear that Madani and Belhadj had to back down in defeat or raise the level of confrontation. The activists? protest marches grew larger and noisier, and finally the army moved to clear the streets. Tear gas was used and shots were fired on 4 June, with at least 17 police, soldiers and demonstrators killed.16 In the aftermath, Chadli went on television to announce a change of prime ministers and postponement of the elections.
Madani and Belhadj's satisfaction with their victory in the game of political brinksmanship with the government was short-lived. For the first time there was open dissension among the party's leaders, with three senior members, including the FIS' number three man, Hashmi Sahnouni, appearing on television to denounce the group's leaders and label Madani "a danger for the FIS and the Muslims."17
Tensions were heightened by the army's attempt to enforce the state of siege while the FIS tried to maintain its freedom of action. The showdown came on 28 June when FIS supporters defied the military's warning not to congregate at "political mosques" for Friday prayers. Street clashes broke out after Madani called for the army to return to barracks soon or face a call for a jihad against the state. Violence continued into Sunday when the army took Madani and Belhadj into custody. They were later charged with having "fomented, organised, unleashed and led an armed conspiracy against the security of the state, in an attempt to take power," and eventually were sentenced by a military tribunal to 12 years in jail.18 Madani loyalist Muhammad Sa'id led Friday prayers on 5 July, calling for dialogue and the release of the detainees. He was arrested himself two days later as he was about to announce his appointment as the party's temporary spokesman.
The FIS leadership suffered further splits as a number of members laid claim to the vacant office of provisional spokesman. Hashmi Sahnouni now advanced his own name, as did Bashir F'kih, a hard-liner who had labeled Madani an autocrat. Sa'id Guechi, representing FIS moderates, also put forth a claim and called for dialogue with the government. The director of the party's al-Munqidh paper, Benazzouz Zebda, also supported the idea of dialogue.19 These splits were papered over at a 25 July party conference dominated by Madani loyalists. As a compromise, the leadership appointed 'Abd al-Qadir Hachani, a petrochemical engineer and pro-Madani member of the party hierarchy, as provisional spokesman.
The FIS-regime standoff continued through the summer and autumn. While Hamas and an-Nahdha took part in an extraordinary government-opposition conference in August, the FIS only sent individual observers.20 Although the government reversed some of its earlier electoral law changes and freed Muhammad Sa'id on 27 November, Madani and Belhadj remained in jail. Moreover, the FIS was forced to decide whether or not to run candidates as the parliamentary elections, rescheduled for 26 December, drew near. Less than two weeks before the voting, Hachani announced that the FIS would participate, though still protesting the continued incarceration of the party leadership. Hamas and an-Nahdha also fielded candidates.
If some observers thought the FIS' popularity was on the wane, the results from the first round of voting proved them wrong. The FIS took 188 of 430 seats in the parliament, while the Front of Socialist Forces (FFS) won 25 races and the FLN captured only 15 seats.21 Neither Hamas nor an-Nahdha won parliamentary races. FIS needed only 28 of the 199 seats to establish a parliamentary majority. Although the FIS had insisted on early presidential elections, it entered into discreet discussions with Chadli on some sort of power-sharing agreement. Meanwhile, the country prepared for the runoff elections set for 16 January 1992.

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