[Islam-Online- Politics]

It is actually harder for an outsider to judge the future of Islamist groups that are excluded from, and working against, the existing regimes. The committed and convinced will, of course, believe that their victory is inevitable. But in fact few things are inevitable. Other groups that tend to see the march of Islamist politics as inexorable are those who strongly oppose political Islam: Israel, some of its friends, and the allies of some secular regimes are the most likely to subscribe to a "domino" theory of Islamism, i.e., a success in one country will lead to the "fall" of others.
On the other hand, the basic elements which have led to the rise of Islamist movements will not go away. While improved economic conditions may strengthen the existing regimes, as the Tunisian economic boom has helped reinforce the government's successful crackdown on al-Nahda, economic problems generally fuel social discontent. The broader demographic problems, including rapid population increases in Egypt, Iran, and North Africa, add to social dislocation and discontent with existing regimes. These elements are likely to get worse in the new century. An Islamic state may not bring genuine social justice, but, to many, Islam's traditional emphasis on justice offers a promise of hope.
Democratization has made some inroads in the Middle East. If it moves apace in other countries of the region, the role of Islamist parties will be increasingly debated. Where fairly genuine democratic experiments have been tried, as in Jordan and Yemen, they have given influence to Islamist blocs, but not control. The one case where an Islamist party was poised to win outright control, Algeria, led of course to a military move to abort not only the elections but the entire democratic process. Any assessment of the future of those movements which have been excluded by the state therefore must begin with Algeria.
It is clear that there will be no peace in Algeria without Islamist participation in government. But the situation has grown so bad, that a collapse of civil society and a fragmentation of the country could occur as easily as an Islamist success. Signs of struggle between FIS and GIA are not good news as the result could be an Afghan situation, with local areas controlled by their own warlords. The polarization in Algeria today between the secularists and the Islamists is probably greater than in any other country. Whatever happens in Algeria will be used by secularists, Islamists, and others elsewhere as an object lesson for why one should, or should not, pursue particular policies.
The Egyptian situation is more complex. The present government is seen as corrupt and unpopular, but so have most Egyptian governments. Secularist Egyptian society has a breadth and depth which differs from the Algerian case both in its strength and in its Egyptianness: the Algerian elite model themselves on France, while Egypt's secularists are clearly Egyptian. The security services have effectively ended serious Islamist attacks in Cairo and most of the Delta, while the ongoing violence in Upper Egypt appears to have turned into a regionally limited exchange of vendettas. The Egyptian regime seems secure for now, though the lack of a successor to Mubarak could be an Achilles heel.
Tunisia does not now have any visible internal Islamist resistance to the state and is enjoying one of the highest economic growth rates in the Arab world. It's 1990-91 crackdown appears to have succeeded in eliminating al-Nahda as a serious challenge for now. There are certainly plenty of Islamists in the country, but they are not an organized threat. An economic downturn or other significant change could, of course, revive the Islamist appeal.
The Gulf states are harder to judge because of the lack of political representation or an open press, with the limited exception of Kuwait, where Islamists work within the system and do not generally constitute a major threat to the present social structure. The recent troubles in Bahrain have a sectarian element which makes them a poor model for comparison. There is certainly a growing Islamist critique of the state in Saudi Arabia, but it is hard to be sure that its echoes in the country are as loud as its noise making abroad. Islamist movements in Syria and Libya, long suppressed by the regimes, are hard to detect or describe. In Morocco, both the Islamists and other potential opposition groups appear to be biding their time, emphasizing social and labor issues rather than political ones, recognizing that change is unlikely while King Hasan reigns, but may be inevitable after him.
For Islamist groups challenging these regimes there are many tactical issues to be addressed. Do they seek allies from secular or other groups which are similarly excluded from power? After all, the Iranian revolution succeeded because the Shah managed to alienate a broad range of critics, from the left to the right, from the clergy to the Communists, and including the Bazaar. Or do Islamist groups seek to maintain their doctrinal purity by refusing to compromise in order to forge alliances against existing regimes? Do they demand the right to participate in the political system, or do they seek to overthrow and dismantle the political system in order to establish one they consider more Islamic? As with every other issue I have raised here, responses will vary. Each movement must debate these questions and others.
I have not addressed the question of how these movements relate to the West in any detail, because it is only rarely a major issue with them, something the West often ignores. While opposing Western sexual and other moral lassitude, they are only occasionally extremely hostile to the West politically, and then when the West is perceived as being hostile to Islam or to their own movement. When movements achieve power, however, they must make choices about their international relationships.
Political Islam is neither monolithic in organization nor of one mind about what it seeks to achieve. Perhaps all believe al-Islam huwa al-Hal, but how Islam brings the solution about is seen differently from case to case. As these movements differ from each other, and the regimes they challenge also differ, so the future will see both success and failure for various movements. Islamists may take over by revolutionary effort, negotiation, or through elections. Some movements will fail because they do not provide the answers sought by their own specific society, or because they employed radical rhetoric, tactics, or violence which alienates many who might otherwise support them.
It has sometimes been said that if the Islamic revival could produce a single charismatic leader, with both the religious reputation and the public persona to lead - a sort of Lenin of the Islamic Revolution - then it might become a genuine international movement. But no such figure has emerged. Khomeini was too Shi'ite, and too Iranian. Hasan al-Turabi is clearly a brilliant man and someone who can eloquently state his case in English and French as well as in good classical Arabic; but Sudan is on the periphery of the Middle East, and while he has influence elsewhere he has not been able to forge a genuine international following. One can not predict the emergence of charismatic leadership, but experience so far suggests that no such leader is likely to emerge, except perhaps in local areas.
Islamist politics - or political Islam - will be a major feature in the Islamic world for years to come, and it will continue to help force the debate about democratization, legitimacy of existing regimes, and the future of Islamic societies. That debate will proceed whether individual movements succeed, fail, or forge alliances with secular groups to win power. Future patterns are likely to parallel the past in one sense: the results will be as varied as the nations and societies involved, and as different as the Islamist groups themselves.

Politic Back