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The Future
Having briefly looked at some of the models which exist of relations between Islamist groups and the state, where do we go from here? Obviously the future of Islamist groups will differ enormously according to each individual case. It is not going to evolve in the same way in Yemen or Jordan, where these groups work within the existing system, as in Egypt or Tunisia, where they are excluded, or in the large number of states where there is no open political system in which to participate. I. Groups that are in power
Revolutions do not end when the palace falls, but often revolutionaries are not certain what to do once they achieve power. Running a state - paying payrolls, picking up the trash, making the trains run on time - requires a different set of talents from organizing an underground movement. Islamist groups which have succeeded in taking control of a state apparatus have, at best, a mixed performance so far. On the other hand, at least in the Middle East, no Islamist group has taken over full control of a state through an electoral process. The Iranian regime was the result of a revolution, the Sudanese was produced by a military coup against an elected regime. In both cases there have been clearly visible divisions within the leadership over how to proceed. In Afghanistan, though the various factions have proclaimed an Islamic state, the state itself has essentially come apart. Many Islamist groups working against secularist regimes have used the old Muslim Brotherhood solution al-Islam huwa al-Hal, "Islam is the Solution." It is a powerful and, to the believer, true maxim; but it is not in itself a blueprint for running a state apparatus. The Islamic experience is too varied, and the original Muslim ummah too remote in time, to provide obvious answers to running a modern nation-state. This is not to say there cannot be a genuinely Islamic state today, merely that even the most sincere Islamists may differ about how to bring it about. In the Algerian case, it is worth remembering that FIS had controlled almost all of the municipalities for about a year before the cancellation of the parliamentary elections. During that time, the results appear to have been mixed. In some municipalities FIS was able to rally broad popular support, even bringing people into the streets to help collect garbage, while in others local councils spent more time putting up slogans and taking down symbols of the FLN than they did running the town. This sort of mixed result is natural, and perhaps better than the old regime could have accomplished; but it is a reminder that once in power, the challenges are different. And here we come to a crucial question, one which secularists invariably raise against the idea of an Islamist party in power. If an Islamist party comes to power through democratic elections, as FIS nearly did, will it in turn yield power if it does not deliver what the people expect and they vote it out of office? Since, in the Middle East, Islamist parties have not taken control of any central government through elections, there is insufficient evidence. (Examples such as Malaysian state governments are too far afield culturally and in other ways to depend upon). Western democracies have long relied on the old axiom vox populi, vox die - the voice of the people is the voice of God. But some Islamists have openly said that Western democracy is not Islamic, and that while the Islamic concept of shura guarantees the people a voice in affairs, ultimately they cannot overrule the laws of God. Does this mean that an Islamist government, once in power, would refuse to accept a vote to oust it? No, it does not. Certainly many Islamist leaders are sincere when they say they will play by the rules of democracy. But the uncertainties are sufficient to make many secularists believe that for many Islamists the slogan is "one man, one vote, one time," and that the Islamist party would never yield power, on the grounds that it is implementing God's law. II. Parties Working Within Existing Parliamentary Systems
Islamist parties already working within existing systems must convince their secular partners that they will play by the rules if they win power, and yield it if they lose the next elections. In Jordan, the Islamic Action Front has moved fairly smoothly from being a member of the government in 1991 to being the leading opposition bloc. Its opposition to the peace treaty with Israel has created new frictions with the King, but so far it seems to still be playing a functional role within the system. The role of the Yemeni Reform Grouping in Yemen has been enhanced by the victory of the ruling coalition against the southern secessionists last year, a civil war in which the Yemen Socialist Party (the southerners) tried to brand the northern government as "Islamic fundamentalists" in order to win Western support, without success. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood's role as the main opposition grouping is being rapidly chipped away by government arrests of Brotherhood leaders and pressure on Brotherhood organs of opinion. In Kuwait, the Islamists play a prominent, though not dominant, role in the Parliament. For all of these groups, the challenge for the future will be to maintain their position and, if possible, enhance it. Any attempt to consolidate power without going through proper electoral channels would alienate the secularists and, possibly, lead to a Tunisian-style decision to stop tolerating Islamist participation. On the other hand, so long as these groups can continue to function within existing systems, and demonstrate that Islamist parties can be part of a democratization process (in Yemen and Jordan; the Egyptian and Kuwaiti models are at best pseudo-democratic), they may provide a model for persuading other regimes to tolerate a growing role for Islamist participation in the system. 
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