Varied responses by existing regimes have created very different approaches by the movements. In addition to certain countries where Islamist movements are in control of the government - Iran, Sudan and (arguably) Afghanistan - there are other nations where they participate along with secular parties. The role of the Yemeni Reform Rally in the Yemeni government is an example; and that party itself is an alliance between traditional tribal groupings and urban Islamists. The role of the Islamic Action Front in Jordan is another case in point: in the past it has held cabinet posts, though today it leads the opposition. Islamists make up one of the major blocs in Kuwait's parliament. Even in Egypt, where the state is engaged in open war with radical Islamists and is increasingly pressuring the Muslim Brotherhood, the Brotherhood still has its role in civil society: in the newspaper al-Sha'ab, its alliance with the Labor Party, and in most of the professional syndicates. Until it boycotted the last elections, it was the largest opposition force in Parliament.
Then there are a number of countries where the major Islamist groups have always been illegal or, as in the case of Tunisia, have been made so in response to challenges to the state. The Tunisian case is particularly interesting. The al-Nahda party did participate (though not as a party) in the 1989 elections and out-polled all the secular opposition parties. But Sheikh Rashid Ghannouchi left the country soon after and in the months that followed al-Nahda and the government became more and more polarized. The government accused al-Nahda of maintaining a parallel secret organization (like that of the original Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's al-jihaz al-sirri) and crushed its internal leadership. Some violent incidents did occur and one of al-Nahda's leaders, 'Abdelfattah Mourou, quit the party. The government cracked down hard, and today, though al-Nahda is visible and vocal abroad, it has been suppressed rather effectively inside Tunisia. We seem to have here a case of a movement which, though it did better in the elections than other opposition groups, decided that it would seek to use other tactics and moved prematurely.
Of course, the model of a democratization process that failed is Algeria. The Algerian tragedy is still unfolding; but with tens of thousands dead already and the country in a virtual civil war. Had the elections not been voided, there is no doubt that FIS would have controlled the new government. Unlike other countries where Islamist groups have not had a chance to prove their strength, in Algeria the strength was demonstrated at the polls. It was an invitation to disaster, and disaster ensued. Even today efforts continue to find a formula for restoring some kind of democratic structure, including FIS; but hard-line resistance within the government (and radical resistance on the part of GIA to any FIS deals with the secularists) have frustrated any breakthroughs. There are many different ways in which states can deal with Islamist groups, but one thing is unarguable: the Algerian approach was a disastrous failure. Some secularists argue that the mistake lay in allowing FIS to run candidates in the first place, while Islamists obviously argue that the mistake was in voiding the elections.
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