MEAJ: The term Islamic fundamentalism is loosely applied to all religiously-inspired political parties in the Middle Eastern and Islamic worlds. How accurate is the reference and what distinction, if any, should be made among the various parties, such as Jamaat-e Islami of Pakistan; the Muslim Brotherhoods of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and others; the Iranian model; and the Sudan?
Zartman:There are real, national differences among fundamentalist parties and movements in various Muslim countries. The countries I know best are those of North Africa. It is practically impossible for a movement to emerge from the democratic tradition which dominated Tunisian politics, and not be quite different from a similar movement emerging from the revolutionary experience that has dominated Algerian politics. I would think that the same kind of distinctions would hold for other Muslim countries. The fundamentalist parties are the product, not only of a common religion, but also of a different political tradition in each country. The homogenous internationalist character of ideological movements is usually very strongly over-estimated.
Cantori: Without commenting on the various groups mentioned in the question, it can be said that they vary in terms of the degree to which they are committed to democracy and the degree to which they have thought through the challenges of modernity. For example, prominent among the latter is the role of women. Islam can be said to spiritually liberate men and women. But more thought needs to be directed towards how Islam liberates women and permits them to use talents and creativity which are equal to men within an Islamic framework.
MEAJ: What repercussions surround the violent suppression of Islamic groups in the Middle East by existing regimes?
Zartman:The violence and suppression of Islamic groups in the Middle East is a subject made up of many ingredients. It has first to do with the activities of the groups themselves, and their own use of violence. Second, it has to do with the challenge and response nature of the interaction between opposition groups and the government. It is well-known that the government generally has a choice between recognition of the group and clear observation of its activities in the open, and suppression of the group forcing it into the hands of a more militant, often minority, leadership. On the other had, if the group is already in the hands of a militant leadership, as appeared to be the case in Algeria, moderates are simply front-men, to be swept aside at a later moment. Unfortunately perhaps, the state, as in Weber's characterization, has the legitimate monopoly of force; and it is responsible for providing law and order, and for the wise use of the police, necessarily against its own citizens. Any such power runs the danger of abuse; but the danger of abuse is not a reason for the elimination of such power. A lot of this argument then goes back to the debate in the first question.
Cantori: The regimes in the Arab world that see Islamism as a threat are those regimes that are authoritarian and out of touch with their own populations. Where their response is one of total repression, as in Algeria and Tunisia, the situation is explosive. On the other hand, there are signs of regime accommodation and compromise. Examples include the use of elections for Islamists to gain ascendancy in Egyptian professional syndicates and, even more impressively, the democratic dynamic in Jordan, where Islamists have gained electoral prominence.
MEAJ: The rise of Islamic-oriented political parties has been attributed to economic woes, disaffection with despotic regimes, low voter turnout and so on. What facts legitimize such assertions and what degree of support do such groups actually enjoy?
Zartman: It is incontrovertible that the Islamic movements rise and ability to take hold of large portions of the body politic has to do with poor economic conditions, the failure of modernization in secularist terms and the desperation of the population to grab onto some other promise of a better life. Middle East populations have been prepared ideologically over the past decade; this illusion with a leftist secularist ideology makes them ready to turn to a religious ideology as an answer to their problems. The alienation from the regime itself is less important than the collapse of the modernist model for development. To document this assertion one need only go to economic analyses of the various Middle Eastern countries, often by Western writers not particularly sympathetic to a fundamentalist response. It hard to tell the degree of support that these groups enjoy. That depends on the kind of situation where people are called on to testify their commitment. People will express personal sympathy where they may not take political action, and they will take political action where they might not engage in direct violent confrontation. Nonetheless, the fundamentalist movements of all kinds have a basic well of sympathy of some dimension on which to draw.
Cantori: It is important to understand that Islamism represents a political ideological sea change from the Arab socialism, Arab unity and anti-imperialism of the 1960s. Islamism is now the operative political ideological climate within which economic and political conflicts will be played out. Therefore, there is little doubt that those who suffer economic iniquity are seeking justice within an Islamic setting. The challenge to Muslim leaders is to interpret Islam in such a way as to be responsive to economic and political injustice within a democratic framework.
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