[Islam-Online- Politics]

Much of scholarship has centered on the question of Islamic and Islamist beliefs. That has been somewhat successful in countering distortion of Islam and Islamic literature. Similar views are found among the present and former officers of the Near East Bureau of the State Department and their colleagues in other agencies, as well as among most members of the staff of the present National Security Council.
But, in following this realistic and prudent course, the American officials and diplomats realize the danger of concentrating too much on "beliefs" where distortions in both pro-Islamic and anti-Islamic interpretations are sometimes produced by dubious scholarship. Studies of the vast literature of Islamic doctrine can lead to highly theoretical debates in a bottomless barrel. It is more practical for our policy makers and diplomats to concentrate on what Islamists do, rather than on what they believe. What Islamists do is a matter of ascertaining facts; what they believe will be endlessly debated. It is not fruitful, from the standpoint of finding policy guidelines, to argue whether Islam is capable or incapable of accommodating democracy. This is not just a problem for Islam but for all religions since problems of divine and immutable truth cannot easily be subjected to public opinion polls or majority vote. In Islam the question of consensus and its interpretation or evidence are the subject of considerable debate. Nor is this even a purely Islamic question. Was it not relatively recently that Vatican II accepted pluralism - and that, not universally nor unreservedly?1
American foreign policy and diplomacy cannot function successfully unless they have popular and Congressional support. That runs up against the fact that some of the methods which Islamist movements use in their struggle for victory are cruel and arbitrary and cannot be accepted nor condoned by those who formulate American diplomacy. It is true that Iran, where an Islamic regime has now been in power since 1979, has had time to modify some of its doctrines in the light of practicability as the political struggle between moderates and dogmatists continues in its various shadings, and as public opinion, the views of women and other groups are beginning to diminish the rigid demands of orthodoxy. But the evidence of Iranian hands in and support of terrorist activities - whatever the definition thereof, cannot be lightly discarded. Hence the call that American and Western policy should rely on what the Islamists do and not on what they say, does not automatically provide easy answers. And the suggestion that our policy might take too benign an attitude towards petty grim deeds by Islamists may well carry an excessive price for a government trying to win reelection against considerable odds.
It is particularly difficult, for example, to take a benign view of excesses by Algerian Islamists. What makes the Algerian case more difficult for American policy makers is also the fact that the Algerian military government has put itself drastically in the wrong by suppressing a fairly honest election which could almost certainly have brought the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) to power. Still, a diplomacy of a "plague on both your houses" is a moral cop-out and no guide for the policy of a world power which inevitably has sometimes contradictory interests in all parts of the world. The considerable interest in Algeria of our ally, France, is a matter of concern for the US government as we need to work with France in other parts of the world.
During the Mitterand - Balladur regime in France, American and French policies on Algeria came dangerously close to a collision due to the intransigent policies of French Interior Minister Pasqua, who encouraged the extremist "eradicator" wing of the Algerian military regime.
Under former President Jacques Chirac and his prime minister Juppe, the French and American positions came closer.2 If that trend continues, America, whose interests in Algeria are significant but clearly not as extensive as Frances, might be willing to let France take the leading role in quietly pressuring the military regime to move toward a more conciliatory policy following the achievement of the Rome conference under the auspices of the St. Aegidio Circle.3
What policy we conduct in the Algerian crisis has now become even more important because President Mubarak of Egypt, a very important ally of Washington, has now suddenly embarked on a much more repressive policy against his Islamist opposition, including even the relatively moderate and now largely non-violent Muslim Brotherhood.
America is deeply involved with Egypt. Mubarak's sudden turn causes us considerable problems. All American governments, Republican as well as Democratic, have been deeply concerned and determined not to be forced into the appearance of a blanket anti-Islamic policy which would greatly hurt our position among the one-billion-strong Islamic world. We cannot abandon such strong and faithful friends as Mubarak and Egypt. Without their support, the Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli peace processes could never have come about. Nor can the Clinton administration place obvious pressure on Egypt to modify its policies during the election period in America. Such pressure could cause trouble electorally and politically when some important groups could accuse Clinton of being "soft on Islamic radicalism" and "terrorism."
In order to help us put together a viable policy, even in an election period, it is well to suggest here some of the basic principles which might help.

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