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of the Islamic Movement By Robert G. Neumann Introduction
I have read with great interest and admiration the analyses of political Islam which scholars like Dr. John L. Esposito have written. These studies, while different in emphasis and scope, deserve great credit for inveighing against presentations and policy recommendations which take a monolithic view of "Islamicism" or radical Islam or whatever expression one might prefer.
Islamicism is not uniform, not a "world conspiracy" directed by some sort of international, Islamic leadership, not a kind of "Islamoform" of "Islamintern." Nor is "Islamism" a new phenomenon suddenly thrust upon the world. It has developed since the 1920s as a debate on how to organize the Umma, the Islamic World, following disputes over the consequences of the dissolution of the Caliphate.
In addition, Islam - or Islamism - does not represent a new world enemy taking the place of the "evil empire" of Communism. Among those who would regard Islam or "Islamism" as the new enemy, there are also those who see in such a concept an opportunity to identify our interests in such a way that our principal ally would be Israel. Yet this is not a uniform idea in Israel or among Israel's supporters in this country. However, in opposing the idea that Islamism, as manifested today, is not the new enemy, the connotation that Islamism is necessarily benign is unacceptable. It is also difficult to handle the idea that only time will tell whether the Islamist call for democracy is only a means toward political participation or simply a means to power. By the time the situation is clear, it is usually too late to do anything about it, and important national interests may have been damaged. Furthermore, revolutionary movements, such as political or radical Islam, grow and change as the result of the support and resistance they encounter. Hence American, and generally Western, diplomacy affect Islamism as Western diplomacy and interests are affected in turn. It is certainly acceptable for scholarship to argue "that only time will tell" how future Islamic regimes will act; but that cannot be the prescription for diplomacy which must try to devise a policy, a strategy to shape our action now, when the outcome of the inevitable struggle between moderates (pragmatists) and dogmatists is decided - if it ever is. A significant part of our diplomacy must also be not only to analyze how our diplomacy might affect the struggle between pragmatists and dogmatists, but also, where possible, to shape our policy in such a way that the pragmatists, if we believe they exist, and are sufficiently powerful and may prevail and the dogmatists may not. But one must also realize that the dogmatists are not or do not remain dogmatic on all issues; and the moderates can be quite dogmatic on some issues. Furthermore, in an existing Islamic regime, such as Iran, an active power struggle between the two groups goes on as both are affected in their political organization by the way they are viewed. How this plays out in a country like Iran, where Islamism has been in power for several years and has a track record, is different from Algeria where the Islamists are still fighting for supremacy, using methods which America and the West find difficult to accept. The task of formulating American diplomacy in the face of such differences is further complicated by the rules of the political process in America (and France and other European countries) and also, prominently, by the electoral struggle in America. President Clinton who, as of this writing, does not face serious competition for his re-nomination by the Democratic party, is trying quite skillfully to reposition himself as a decisive leader, an impression which his stewardship after his election has not supported. The cause of this evolution is his belated leadership in the Bosnian crisis. However, the argument occasionally heard both here and in Europe-that the fate of the Bosnian Muslims could enhance Islamic fundamentalism in Europe-has not received much credence in America, not even in pro-Israel circles. While his Republican opponents will certainly make presidential leadership an issue in the election, it is difficult to see how the alleged dangers of Islamism would play much of an electoral role one way or another. For the Republican opposition there is not much meat in the issue either. That could change if excessive permissiveness toward "Islamic fundamentalism" could be charged. But even extreme pro-Israeli circles would find it difficult to make this much of an issue. I mention it at all only because it underlines the need for both Democrats and Republicans to treat this issue with restraint. And that means that an overt, visible, pro-Islamic turn of American foreign policy, or even much greater flexibility, could be politically risky until the outcome of the Presidential election has been decided.
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