In Islamic tradition there is no theology as such. Instead, there is kalam (disputation or discussion), which was developed in the early Islamic centuries to analyze rationally, using Greek philosophical principles, certain Qur'anic descriptions of God and to demystify the Qur'an by figuratively interpreting some of its statements about God. The preeminent formulator of kalam, al Ash'ari (d. 935), stated that God is beyond human comprehension and that only God's effects are knowable. He asserted that there is no natural causality (there are only occasions for God to cause things, which God does with great regularity so that it looks, for example, like putting a flame to cotton makes the cotton burn when, in reality, it is God's direct action that makes the cotton burn). He also asserted that things are not inherently good or evil and that humans cannot figure out what is good and evil except through revelation. This strain of thought is criticized severely by many contemporary Muslim reformers as having led to a decline in intellectual and spiritual vitality that in turn paved the way for the colonial domination whose effects most of the Muslim world are still struggling to overcome.
Whether or not kalam was the culprit in Islam's decline remains an open question, but it never played the central role in Islamic thought that theology played in Christianity. Muslim scholars never accepted the classical Greek division of sciences into practical and speculative, upon which Christian theology is based. One effect of this division is the separation of ethics (practical) from theology (speculative). Such a separation is unworkable in the Islamic paradigm, because ethical behavior ideally is viewed as a response to recognition of divinity. In Islam, ethics proceeds from thinking about God.
There are other examples of this emphasis on ethical behavior as response to God. One is Islam's insistence on "bearing witness" rather than simply "believing." In the Christian tradition, according to authoritative Church councils, one is identified as a true Christian on the basis of what one believes. The Nicene Creed, formulated at the Council of Nicea in 325 as the litmus test of Christian identity, is still recited daily in Catholic Masses around the world. By contrast, the first pillar of Islam, the shahadah -the statement by which Muslims identify themselves-derives from the verb meaning "to bear witness," which has no adequate translation in English. It does not mean "to say" (give verbal assent) or "to believe" (give intellectual assent); rather, declaring the shahadah means (ideally) to vow to demonstrate (in one's behavior) that one recognizes that "there is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Messenger of God."
This emphasis on the inseparability of belief and action is also symbolized in the origin of the Islamic calendar in 622, the year the Prophet and his followers emigrated from Makkah to Madinah. In Makkah, the Prophet was preaching and gaining followers, but they were being persecuted by the city's leaders. In Madinah, he and his followers were welcomed and, in fact, the local tribes agreed to abide by his leadership. This event, therefore, signifies the transition of the Prophet's mission from simply preaching submission (islam) to God's will to actually creating a just society and institutions that ensure social justice. Had they remained in Makkah and been wiped out, the community's beliefs would have been correct but unrealized and ineffectual. Thus, many scholars believe that this event symbolizes the uniquely Islamic emphasis on action within the monotheistic tradition. Earlier prophets had taught the same truths confirmed in the Prophet's teaching: Muhammad was the "seal of the prophets" (meaning that no more prophets would be necessary) because he made it clear, once and for all, that correct belief is not enough to fulfill the covenant. True belief must be "witnessed" in social action and ethical behavior.
What is important here is that Islam's emphasis on belief-in-action is reflected in the fact that the controlling and unifying role played by theology in Christianity is played by law in Islam. But law in Islam is not simply a list of rules and regulations. As Fazlur Rahman puts it, Islamic law "is not strictly speaking law [in the Western sense], since much of it embodies moral and quasi-moral precepts not enforceable in any court." "[O]n closer examination," he continues, it is "a body of legal opinions or, as Santillana put it, 'an endless discussion of the duties of a Muslim,' rather than a neatly formulated code or codes."
2 That is why we must look to Islamic legal thought, rather than to theology, for ideas about politics as a medium for religious activity.
