President Bill Clinton announced in early September that he will not make any decision on the future of the Anti-Missile Defense System and will leave that decision to his successor in the Oval Office. This announcement shows that Clinton is apparently insistent on maintaining this project in spite of its successive failures. Rather than actively dealing with this controversial issue he has wriggled out of the responsibility, particularly in the wake of the failure of its last two tests and the rising domestic and external criticism against it. This leads to the recurring questions: What are Washington's motives behind holding on to this program? Are the motives stronger than the justifications for abandoning this project?
Star Wars Junior
It is no secret that the anti-missile defense system was not born yesterday. The United States began its quest for anti-missile protection in the early 1960s, when it succeeded in developing the Nike Zeus missile and successfully test-fired it to intercept Atlas and Titan intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). By 1969, the United States had developed an advanced anti-missile system that was built on Sprint and Spartan missile systems, with the first system designated to intercept ballistic missiles at short range, while the latter could be used for the interception of hostile missiles outside the atmosphere. It must be noted at this juncture that this system was one of the reasons for signing the anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) control treaty in 1972. The idea of establishing an integrated anti-ballistic missile system was crystallized in the era of former American president Ronald Reagan, who announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which later, in 1983, was nicknamed 'Star Wars'. The initiation of the SDI marked a turn in American strategic defense concept, in terms of both the theatre of operations and the means of defense. On the one hand, that initiative was based on moving the anti-ballistic missile battlefield from the ground to space, so as to curb damage. By doing this it increased the probability of hitting hostile missiles as much as possible by attacking them while they were still on their way from the launch site to the target area. On the other hand, it gave top priority to technologically-advanced weapons and other assets, including laser technology, that had achieved so much progress that it encouraged Washington to use it in such a program that primarily depended on the creation of a multi-tiered defense network.
Defense With Offensive
Weapons
The Anti-Missile Defense System project is not different in its content from Star Wars to the extent that it deserves to be called "Star Wars Junior." However, there are two major differences between the two projects. The first is the conditions surrounding each of them and the nature of the international environment in which each of them came into existence. The idea of Star Wars was born during the Cold War era, when the confrontation between the United States and Arab States in one camp and the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries in the other camp was at its zenith. In other words, the justifications for the SDI were clear to everybody at that time. The second difference is related to the means employed in anti-ballistic missile defense. The SDI was mainly based on laser and space technology, as spaceships had become advanced to such an extent that it made space shuttle missions routine, just like aircraft flights. The same applied to satellites, including those used in civilian communications and those employed in spying. The level of control over satellite operations and the technological aspects of them had risen so high that it allowed, among other things, remote control over a satellite's orbit and recovery of a satellite for amendment, or repair of any of its components and re-launch into space. Thus, the idea of strategic defense systems shifted from a defensive concept to an offensive one that was based on conventional dynamic systems. This is measured in terms of the improvement of range and accuracy of surface-to-surface missiles according to a sophisticated technological system different in terms of geographical scope (as it operated from and in space) and operational characteristics (as it used beam and electron technology). But at that time, 17 years ago, the progress of space science and technology had not yet reached a level that would make it easy to practically employ them in developing long-range ICBMs with high velocity and lethality, not to mention high agility and maneuverability, in large numbers. In more simplistic terms, the employment of space technology in anti-missile defense was more feasible theoretically than it was practically. Emulating a Hollywood science-fiction film about war between highly advanced beings from outer space and humans on earth with their modest capabilities was more likely. This was for many reasons, the most important being the astronomical cost, and the decision on that project was postponed indefinitely. Consequently, planners and strategists in Pentagon circles continued to look for a means that would offer protection to American territories against potential threats, particularly when missile systems were developing rapidly. In cooperation with the think-tanks of the military scientific research sector and weapons manufacturers, an idea was formed to create an integrated defense system that would make use of the continuous development of air-defense systems. These included radar detection and reconnaissance, interception and destruction means, and command and control systems. Progress in this field as well was invested in conjunction with the rapid advancement that was already taking place in the missile development area. Even though the development of missile systems at that time was always done within the context of a purely offensive doctrine and the defensive concept was focused more on reconnaissance, detection and early warning systems, it seems that the incentive came from the adage 'the best defense is a good offense.' More accurately, the solution was to draw on the great advancement of missiles and their guidance systems by employing missiles in defensive applications rather than offensive ones. Instead of focusing on developing the maneuverability of missiles, ability to avoid detection and tracking, range and accuracy in hitting designated targets, the focus shifted to accurate guidance and determination of the right interception trajectory, speed, and accuracy of hitting incoming enemy missiles. Again in simplistic terms, the same characteristics that were used in offensive missiles were adjusted to serve the defensive missiles. But does this concept provide real protection? Will Star Wars Junior hold a better chance of success than its aborted predecessor?
Justifications For Shelving
Anti-Missile Defense
The American project has faced, and continues to face, strong opposition inside and outside the United States. There are three main attitudes for this rejection. The first is based on the negative results that the program will produce, and the second on skepticism of the ability of the proposed system to provide the required protection. The third is that the United States does not need such a system in the first place.
The probable negative results
While apprehensions concerning the negative results of the Anti-Missile Defense System come partially from within the United States itself, they come primarily from outside America; namely from Russia, China and some European countries, all of which believe that this program will increase the potential threats against them. More importantly, these countries believe that the project will trigger a new episode in the arms race, as the ballistic missile systems currently available to Russia and China, for instance, will not be able to deter Washington if the proposed system proves to be a success. Consequently, these two countries will be forced to look for a means that will boost their capabilities accordingly. Therefore, criticism has been rising in Moscow because by forging ahead with this program, the Americans will be violating the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty, which restricts the deployment of ballistic missiles and anti-missile defense systems. Russia has already sent 'warning' signals to Washington by deploying the new Topol M strategic missiles, which are reportedly capable of evading the most sophisticated radars and avoiding detection by satellites. Moscow has gone one step further by affirming that the Topol M can be equipped with multiple nuclear warheads. In Europe, the situation is somewhat different. America's full self-reliance in anti-ballistic missile defense will undermine the importance of NATO forces and the role played by Europe as the first line of defense for the United States, which consequently negates Washington's commitment to playing the role of strategic defense umbrella for Europe. As the Europeans have so far failed to reach a security and defense formula that will ensure self-reliance and make Europe independent of the United States, they believe that underlying this American project, every measure of protection provided for the United States will be offset by an equal degree of protection taken away from Europe.
Skepticism on the probability of success
This attitude emerged in the wake of the failure of more than one experiment of the proposed system, where the defending missiles did not hit the incoming missiles they were supposed to intercept. This failure made Pentagon and National Security Council officials wait before announcing their full support of the program, affirming the need to forge ahead with it. Defense Secretary William Cohen was supposed to advise President Clinton of his stand on the project last August. He was expected to give the system his full backing and urge Clinton to make a go-ahead decision on it. However, there are several reasons for its postponement, including Cohen's reluctance to continue to show insistence on the feasibility of this program. Moreover, the progress of offensive missiles worldwide is so dazzlingly rapid that it makes the ability of the proposed Anti-Missile Defense System dubious in terms of providing protection against future missile attacks, including those launched with missile systems whose characteristics are not yet known for certain. Added to this is the stupendous cost of the project, which makes the risk enormous, compared to its limited chances of success.
Motives For American Insistence
Why then is the United States so adamant on implementing this program? It is common knowledge that not only are the decisions of successive US administrations made on the basis of rational and logical calculations centered around high American interests, but several factors come into play when Washington adopts a certain policy or decision, even if it is a strategic one. This applies to US foreign policy in particular, where the chances of disagreement between the different players in the decision-making process are less than they are in making domestic policy. Even if there is controversy over some aspect of foreign policy, it is resolved with relative ease. The current environment in the United States is predominated by the approaching presidential elections and the composition of the American domestic political scene. Hence, electoral campaign managers, weapons manufacturers, interest groups and senior Pentagon officials all play pivotal roles in steering Washington policies on everything that relates to high military strategy or military production, as well as the worldwide American attitude on arms control and restrictions on conventional weapons exports to different countries.
Electoral considerations
As for elections, President Clinton has apparently had a strong desire to score a big achievement at foreign levels. Now that this achievement, namely a peaceful settlement between the Arabs and the Israelis, did not materialize, perhaps the American President was hoping to make another one by appearing as stalwart in reinforcing America's power as former president Reagan had been with his Star Wars project, or SDI. Besides, as the elections approach, the Democrats are becoming more keen on giving their party a more hard-line image to improve the chances of their nominee, Al Gore, winning, and pulling the carpet from under the Republicans' feet, since the Republicans are notorious for their tough policy on defense. Perhaps Clinton's apparent procrastination on making a decision on this project will give the Democrats a respite from Republican pressure.
Who stands to gain from the
Anti-Missile Defense System?
It is natural that weapons companies stand behind any new project or initiative with all that they are worth, so as to provide more jobs to American workers and increase their investments. This is particularly the case as the end of the Cold War has diminished external threats and curbed the need for strategic weapons systems. The same applies to Pentagon officials. The Anti-Missile Defense System project has monopolized the time and efforts of a large number of Pentagon experts and other staff for a long time, which makes its cancellation a waste of much time, effort and money. In addition, the military, of course, have an ever-present interest in increasing their plans and projects that are underway, regardless of the practical need for them. Other parties with axes to grind naturally exist around these two powers, such as the workers of technological industries and other feeder industries. There is also a possibility that the Anti-Missile Defense System program is backed, even if on a limited scale, by the Zionist lobby in Washington that hoisted Reagan's SDI, in which Israel was a participant in its development and operation. This makes it likely that Israel assumes the same role in the new project. Therefore, it can be said that Washington's insistence to forge ahead with the Anti-Missile Defense System program, or at least not concede the justifications for striking it off the board, may not necessarily be connected to calculations of strategic American interests. Nor could this insistence be an adverse reaction to external rejection of the program by Russia and Europe, or even a measure aimed at facing real threats which make it imperative to possess such an expensive system. Like many other matters of this kind, this issue is governed by several considerations, most of which are primarily domestic in nature. It is these considerations that play the leading role in dictating Washington's decision
