[Islam-Online- Europe]

Several American observers considered the results of the latest parliamentary elections in Iran as a sign that Iranian-foreign relations in general, and the Iranian-American ones in particular, might improve. The U.S. Administration issued several statements, hailing the Reformist forces that had managed to gain the majority of seats in parliament during the first round at the expense of the hard-line Conservative trend, which calls for maintaining ideological hostility to the "Great Satan."

This clearly shows that the U.S. Administration has great expectations as regards the existence of this Reformist trend in power, hoping that cooperation will be boosted between the two countries. However, there are several remarks that may not make this picture seem optimistic.

Exchange of sporting teams:
The first of these remarks is related to the exchange of sporting teams between the Iranian and American sides, which was considered the first step in breaking the ice between them. However, this progress witnessed a setback anew, as the Iranian side refused to receive an American women's sporting team.

Moreover, the Iranian side denied that this sporting exchange had been made according to efforts exerted by it, and asserted that this exchange had been made due to persistence by the U.S. side. This runs counter to the exchange of sporting teams with Egypt, for instance, which was hailed by the mass media in both countries.

Reformists & Conservatives:
The second remark is related to the degree of change in the structure of the Iranian power following the two rounds of the parliamentary elections and the winning by the Reformists of the majority of the parliamentary seats. Despite this majority, the conflict inside the Iranian ruling elite has not been settled totally in favor of the Reformists. Many sensitive bodies in the Iranian regime are not under the control of the Reformist trend; for example, most of the Religious Institutions, the Men of Religion Tribunal, the Judicial Agency that is directly subjected to the Guide's power, the radio and TV, the Council of Preserving the Constitution, the Exigency Council and the security forces. Besides, there is the Revolution's General Guide, who cannot be considered a Reformist, although he tries to strike a balance between the Reformist and Conservative forces.

In addition to the above-mentioned sensitive bodies, there are several national symbols that cannot be considered Reformists, such as Hashimi Rafsanjani, over whom different trends vied at the beginning of the elections. However, at the end of the elections, he opted for the hard-line trend, something that somehow affected the coherence and power of the Reformist trend.

The harsh defeat, which afflicted the hard-line trend during elections, urged Rafsanjani to resign from parliament, especially as he occupied a late rank in a Teheran constituency vis-à-vis his Reformist rival, Reza Khatami, brother of Iranian President Mohamed Khatami.

As a result of this defeat, the Conservative trend reviewed itself, re-organized its ranks, retrieved its coherence and brought about coordination among the areas of its offensives and topics. The relation with the U.S., or even remote hints that this relation may be improved, was one of the pivots for attacking the Reformist trend. We will deal with this point in detail later.

Splits inside Reformist trend:
The third remark is related to the inner structure of the Reformist trend itself. It suffers from incoherence and splits into different categories. The front of the Second of Khardad (the slogan of the Reformist trend) contains 16 political and partisan organizations, foremost among which are the Participation Front and the League of Struggling Scholars.

Although this split does not reflect a sharp ideological conflict, as most of the symbols of this trend agree on the broad lines of the political movement, it does not enable the trend to form a clear, coherent, political formula as regards the issue of relations with the U.S. Any positive hint in this context will be used as a card of pressure on the Reformist trend by the Conservative one, which considers such hints as sufficient evidence of being an agent of the West and deviant from the Iranian constants. The weight of this pressure cannot be endured by the Reformist trend, especially in light of the U.S. Administration's attitude towards the Iranian regime in its entirety.

Moreover, the Conservative trend tended to interpret the U.S. Administration's official stances (voiced by the U.S. Department of State) or semi-official ones (expressed by the Persian-Oriented Voice of America Radio Station) as being a call for the Reformist trend to cause turmoil and flare up the war of the press that is being witnessed by the two trends at present.

Nature of animosity to the US:
The fourth remark is related to the nature of animosity to the U.S. There has been recurrent talk about the role played by the U.S. in the Iranian political theater as of the 1950s up to 1979, which witnessed the success of the Islamic Revolution. Talk, however, concentrates on the role played by the CIA in nationalizing the Iranian oil at the hands of Dr. Mosadak. It is to be mentioned that U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has apologized for this role recently.

This negative role consolidated the call of Imam Khomeini to consider the U.S. the "Great Satan" that should be fought and resisted till the weak would win. Imam Khomeini's description of the U.S. as the "Great Satan" was significant. The late Imam did not use a term that had a political implication, reflecting the meanings of competition or conflict between the North and the South. Rather, he used a term that had a religious implication. This term made hostility to the U.S. a holy religious duty that should not be relinquished. This call urged the Conservative trend to adopt and defend for ever the line of the Imam and his hostility to the Great Satan, and compelled the Reformist trend, whatever its symbols might be, to cautiously deal with this issue, lest it should be attacked.

U.S. & Iran's internal affairs:
The fifth remark is related to the U.S.'s attitudes towards Iran's internal developments, including President Khatami's announcement that he would contest the presidential elections next year. The U.S. Administration issued several statements about the development of the internal affairs in Iran. Most of these statements voiced support of the Reformist trend and its victory over the Conservative trend.

These statements embarrassed the Reformist side, which was compelled to defend itself against the Conservative trend's accusations that the Reformists were agents of the West and worked against the principles of the Revolution. This came in light of charges leveled against the American side that it worked to break the Islamic system into pieces from within through playing on the strings of differences among all trends. This urged the General Guide, Rafsanjani and others to assert, on more than one occasion, that the unity of internal ranks should be preserved and foreign forces should be allowed to exploit or escalate differences.

It seems, then, that any move from the American side, which will be misunderstood, will be used against the Reformist trend, on the top of which stands President Khatami, who will contest a presidential battle that will be fiercer than that of 1997, during which he achieved an unprecedented success. Hence, the advice that will be of benefit to all parties is that the U.S. Administration should distance itself from Iranian affairs as a whole, so that the Iranians may independently interact together on the internal arena