The Americans then presented a list of demands that Libya would have to meet if it wanted the sanctions removed, including the “retirement” of 40 Libyan intelligence agents the US accused of co-coordinating “terrorist” attacks. At the end of the meeting the Libyans were told that there was one final pre-condition for the end of the sanctions regime imposed on Tripoli - Libya must finally revoke all ambitions for weapons of mass destruction⁸.

While both explanations provide useful insights, they fail to address the fundamental issue of the timing of the decision. If sanctions and international isolation were the dominant factors, then why did Libya take such a decision now? Even if sanctions hurt the Libyan economy overall, other indicators suggest that in recent years Libya was able to stabilize its economy, increase oil income and boost foreign investment, and that its GDP was up 6.5% in 2000⁹. Hence, the specter of economic collapse does not seem to have been a pressing factor for Libya.

Even if Libya’s decision was part of a comprehensive deal, as the second argument seems to suggest, then what factors might have prompted Gaddafi to accept it? After all, the deal involved critical concessions on almost every issue and did not guarantee an immediate reciprocal US response. Indeed, recent history demonstrates that even when Libya complied with international demands and extradited the Lockerbie bombing suspects, UN sanctions were only suspended, as the US blocked efforts to have them completely lifted. United Nations’ sanctions were permanently lifted only when Libya agreed, in September 2003, to compensate the families of the Lockerbie victims and to renounce “terrorism.” Even then, US sanctions remained in place.

Given that the overriding goal of most Arab leaders is political survival, rather than the economic or political advancement of their people, the most likely reason for Gaddafi’s behavior is his fear of being a future US target. In other words, after the capture of Saddam, Libya decided to move preemptively to ward off any US efforts towards a future Libyan regime change. In fact, Gaddafi’s son Seif al-Islam told CNN that the recent deal was reached following assurances that the US would not seek to oust the colonel.¹⁰

Libya’s decision will also provide US President George W. Bush with an easy political victory for his election campaign, portraying him as a masterful politician who succeeded in making Libya comply with US demands through the threat of force, despite years of intransigence and refusal.

Patterns in Libya’s Decision-Making

Images of Gaddafi loom over Libya’s people

Over the decades, Libya’s foreign policy has exhibited erratic, fickle and often contradictory policies that became increasingly difficult to fathom as a part of a coherent, systematic pattern of policymaking. In fact, Libyan decision-making under Gaddafi exhibits many of the same structural deficiencies and compounded problems that plague the official Arab system - ad-hoc policymaking, internal fragility, lack of a strategic doctrine, and the total absence of an institutionalized decision-making process.

Despite Gaddafi’s constant references to freedom, egalitarianism and what he calls “Islamic socialism,” political repression is widespread in Libya, and the law prohibits the formation of political parties or criticism of the political system. Moreover, there are no independent human rights organizations or nongovernmental organizations of any kind, and the government maintains strict control of the press. There are hundreds of political prisoners, torture in detention is common, and outspoken opponents of the government have been murdered, both at home and abroad¹¹. This has left official Libyan decisions subject to the whims and idiosyncrasies of its leader, with no system of checks and balances. In fact, the decision-making structure in Libya, like that of most Arab states, involves an authoritative decision-maker who can act alone, with little or no consultation with other people or institutions except for a small group of subordinate advisors who are entirely dependent on the decision-maker for the continuance of their present position. Moreover, these advisors have no independent power base and no role that permits them regular access to foreign affairs information other than through the decision-maker they serve.¹²

An historical reading of Libya’s decisions reveals a pattern of contradictions and sudden, inexplicable, shifts. For more than two decades after Colonel Gaddafi took power in 1969 the main tenets of his foreign policy were anti-imperialism, the quest for Arab unity, and the elimination of Israel. During the 1970s and 1980s he systematically attacked Western - especially American - interests, as well as conservative African and Arab leaders, whom he routinely described as “lackeys of imperialism.” Libya also provided political and military support for a variety of liberation and secessionist movements, including the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Japanese Red Army, Italy’s Red Brigades and several Islamic movements in the Philippines. In addition, he provided refuge for the Palestinian Abu Nidal and Venezuelan assassin Carlos the Jackal.

In recent years, however, Libya’s foreign policy witnessed an unexpected upheaval when Gaddafi renounced all his previous ambitions and starting working against the same goals that he spent decades fighting for. Gaddafi’s Pan-Arab orientation gave way to a vague form of Pan-Africanism. In March 1999, he proudly proclaimed: “I have no time to lose talking to Arabs… I now talk about Pan-Africanism and African unity.”¹³ Also, after years of providing arms to the IRA, Gaddafi began handing over intelligence to the British. Moreover, he intervened with Abu Sayyaf for the release of several hostages the organization had taken from a Malaysian diving resort.

Concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, Gaddafi sought to disengage from the Palestinian cause on the pretext that the Palestinian leadership itself sought peace and compromise. He also advocated the establishment of a bi-national Israeli-Palestinian state under the name of “Isratine.” Furthermore, in 1999 Libya expelled the Abu Nidal organization from its territory and broke its ties with other Palestinian resistance groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In addition, Libya extradited wanted Islamists to Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan. In the aftermath of September 11, Gaddafi was one of the first leaders to issue a strong statement condemning the attacks and declaring that the US was justified in retaliating.

In the months following September 11, Libyan agents delivered three decades of intelligence they had gathered on al-Qaeda cells and related groups throughout the Muslim world.¹⁴ Over the past two years, Gaddafi adopted a policy of “bailing himself out” of isolation by paying large sums of money to Western states accusing him of “terrorism.” He recently accepted de facto responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing and agreed to pay millions to the families of the victims, even though Libya’s role in the bombing was never conclusively proven. Recently, Libya signed a $170 million compensation deal with families of the victims of the 1989 bombing of a French airliner over Niger, in order to pave the way for the normalization of Franco-Libyan relations.

Libya’s representative marks the settlement with families of the 1989 bombing victims

Gaddafi had for decades claimed that “Palestine will be the graveyard of the Jews,” and once wore white gloves at an Arab summit to display his disgust at Arab leaders who had shaken hands with Israeli leaders. In fact, during the last Arab Summit, which took place only a few days before the US invasion of Iraq, Gaddafi criticized Saudi Arabia for striking up “an alliance with the devil” to defend the Kingdom after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.¹⁵ And yet surprisingly, reports suggest that over the past few weeks, Israel has begun talks with Libya in a first step that could lead to a peace agreement between both states. The Daily Telegraph reports that Ron Prosor, chief advisor to Silvan Shalom, the Israeli foreign minister, met a Libyan representative in Paris to discuss a rapprochement following Gaddafi’s announcement that he would be getting rid of his weapons of mass destruction. The British newspaper adds that there had been informal contacts even before Libya’s surprise announcement, when Ephraim Sneh, a Labor politician, and two Israeli former officials met Saif al-Islam Gaddafi in a European capital in August. The Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Siyasa also reported that senior Israeli and Libyan officials met in Vienna and agreed that an Israeli delegation, including members of the Mossad, would visit Libya during this month.¹⁶

From “Balance of Power” to “Balance of Weakness” - The Arab Predicament

In a state-centric world, the principal goals of every state should be the preservation of territorial integrity and physical security.¹⁷ But in the Arab context, “national security” usually refers to the physical survival of a regime. Initiatives for political reform are not in direct response to popular demands, but rather are part of the ruling regime’s survival strategy, where the head of state determines the pace, direction, and spheres of reform.¹⁸

Given the absence of dispute-solving institutions and the lack of regime legitimacy, the unitary concept of “national interest” itself loses most of its significance in the Arab political lexicon, due to the conflicting dichotomy between regime interests, manifest in the security of tenure of existing authorities, and societal interests, the collective interests of the community.¹⁹

In the Arab context, initiatives for reform are part of the regime’s survival strategy.

The introduction of the US as a virulent and intrusive actor in the regional system following the occupation of Iraq should have prompted a more cohesive, unified Arab response to deal with the threat. Unfortunately, the opposite happened, and a “balance of weakness” emerged, rather than the expected “balance of power,” as Arab regimes vie for the US’ favor in order to stay in power. In the process, regional security is being compromised, and a series of never-ending concessions are being made. From Egypt’s signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979, to Arafat’s acceptance of the Oslo Accords in 1993, and more recently, Libya’s renouncement of WMD, the Arabs have made concession after concession in the hope of currying international favor. The result has been devastating - each Arab concession is praised by the West as “courageous” and “rational,” but interpreted as a sign of weakness, and more demands are then made in expectation of further Arab compliance.

In a twisted world where occupation has become “liberation,” resistance has turned into “terrorism” and concessions into “courage,” one can expect anything. What is striking is that nobody seems to remember an important lesson of history - “selling out” never guarantees security.

Kareem M. Kamel is an Egyptian freelance writer based in Cairo, Egypt. He has an MA in International Relations and is specialized in security studies, decision- making, nuclear politics, Middle East politics and the politics of Islam. He is currently assistant to the Political Science Department at the American University in Cairo. 

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1- Ray Takeyh, “The Rogue Who Came In From the Cold,” Foreign Affairs May/June 2001

2- Gamal Nkrumah, “Return to the Fold?” Al-Ahram Weekly December 25-31, 2003

3- “US Renews Sanctions Against Libya,” Al-Jazeera (English) January 6, 2003

4- Ray Takeyh, “The Rogue Who Came In From the Cold,” Foreign Affairs May/June 2001

5- Simon Romero, “Oil Giants Look Anew At Libya,” New York Times December 22, 2003

6- Roula Khalaf, “Pariah Gaddafi is Recast as ‘Statesmanlike’ Autocrat,” Financial Times December 22, 2003: 8

7- Peter Beaumont, et al. “Deal with Gaddafi: The Meeting that Brought Libya In From the Cold,” Observer December 21, 2003

8- Ibid

9- Ray Takeyh, “Libya After Lockerbie: Internal Dynamics and US policy,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy March 16, 2001

10- Roula Khalaf, “Pariah Gaddafi is Recast as ‘Statesmanlike’ Autocrat,” Financial Times December 22, 2003: 8

11- Stephen Zunes, “Libya: More Balance Needed,” Foreign Policy in Focus 6 (July 2001)

12-Charles F. Hermann, “Decision Structure and Process Influences on Foreign Policy,” in Maurice East, Stephen Salmore, and Charles Hermann, eds. Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Foreign Policy Studies (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978): 80

13- Ray Takeyh, “The Rogue Who Came In From the Cold,” Foreign Affairs May/June 2001

14- Ian Urbina, “Sanctions No Longer Serve US Interests,” The Middle East Research and Information Project

15- Bilal Abdul-Kareem, “Internal Strife and Old Rhetoric at the Arab League’s Summit,” Jihad Unspun March 3, 2003

16- Toby Harnden, “Gaddafi Regime in Secret Talks with Top Israelis,” The Daily Telegraph January 8, 2004: 15

17- Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble, “The Analysis of National Security in the Arab Context: Restating the State of the Art,” in The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993): 9.

18- Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Is the Middle East Democratizing?” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 26 (November 1999): 199-217

19- Ibid

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