Georgia: Dilemmas of a Post-Soviet State

Democracy needs steering… It is not good to have too much democracy. I think this was a mistake.¹ – Eduard Shevardnadze/former Georgian President

Georgians listen to presidential candidate Mikhail Saakashvili at a rally of his National Movement in Tbilisi, Georgia.

The peaceful revolution in Georgia that culminated with the resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze and the swift transition of power to one of the opposition leaders was a monumental event in the politics of Caucasus and Central Asia. Most pundits in the capital were confident that Shevardnadze, the “grey fox” who had kept his job as President of Georgia through civil wars, assassination attempts, and multiple political and economic crises, would survive yet again. However, what happened in Georgia was truly a popular revolution led by committed protestors following the path of non-violent protest and a peaceful course of action.

Since November 2nd, Shevardnadze had faced daily street protests by thousands of Georgians over parliamentary elections, which were denounced as rigged by the opposition and foreign governments. For several weeks, the streets were filled with city-dwellers, villagers, pensioners, students, and individuals of divergent ideological bents.² As the police stood aside, the masses stormed the parliamentary building with flowers in hand and a weakened Shevardnadze was forced out to a waiting car. Nino Burjanadze, opposition leader and outgoing parliamentary chairperson, announced her constitutional responsibility to temporarily assume the presidential post until elections are held on January 4th, 2004. The elections are likely to be won by Georgia’s most popular leader, Mikhail Saakashvili, a 35-year old American-trained lawyer, who served briefly as justice minister.

In many ways, events in Georgia have left the country at an important crossroads in its modern history. There is no doubt that the Georgian revolution sent powerful messages for political change in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Nevertheless, the volatile mixture of ethnic politics, geopolitical rivalries, and superpower competition for energy resources that has often characterized the region leaves Georgia with an uncertain future.

End of an Era

Former President Eduard Shevardnadze had been subject to two assassination attempts.

As Mikhail Gorbachev’s foreign minister, Shevardnadze had been one of the architects of Prestroika and a key player in negotiations with the US over arms reductions. A decade ago, he helped end the Cold War, sparking off the peaceful toppling of leaders across Eastern Europe. In 1992, Shevardnadze became the chairman of Georgia’s Security Council. However, Georgia was faced with increasing problems as it lost wars with separatists in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Against all odds however, Shevardnadze managed to unify whatever remained of the troubled republic and was elected president in 1995. He opened up the economy and drafted a constitution creating a framework for the emergence of a liberal, democratic state along Western lines.³

Despite his efforts, Shevardnadze failed to reform the cumbersome, Soviet-style bureaucracy, and allowed corruption and nepotism to invade his politics.⁴ Crime had quickly spiraled out of control, taxes were not collected, economic reforms stalled, and Shevardnadze himself survived two assassination attempts in 1995 and 1998.

By 2003, the state was nearly bankrupt and Georgia was missing payments on its massive foreign debts.⁵ Western investments were soon to avoid Georgia after a series of kidnappings in which the security services were implicated. Nevertheless, Shevardnadze had allowed enough political reform to enable a free news media to flourish – a feature which enabled the public to monitor election fraud and unified the masses in protest.

Some analysts suggest that despite his shortcomings, Shevardnadze had allowed “too much democracy for his own good” by allowing free press, free association, and a lively civil society to flourish. Eventually, his society became too vibrant and too lively to be held in the grip of one man.⁶ Another reason for the success of the revolution has been Washington’s support. In fact, many US officials spoke out strongly against election fraud and worked to legitimize the pro-Western opposition groups and facilitate a smooth transition of power in Georgia. Shevardnadze, once regarded a “pragmatist” and an ally of the West, eventually became just another post-Soviet leader with little popular or international support.

Regional Implications for Democracy

Despite the fact that the Georgian scenario released democratic shockwaves throughout the region, governments in Central Asia have spared little effort to prevent the recurrence of such a scenario. In fact, the Georgian scenario seemed to heighten government pressure on opposition groups. In Kazakhstan, the government sensed a threat to its unrivalled power in the rising popularity of the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, led by a governor and a former energy minister. Both men were imprisoned and the political party was not allowed to register. In Kyrgyzstan, the president’s main political rival has been in jail since 2000. In Uzbekistan, the government does not allow opposition political parties to exist at all, and in Azerbaijan, the government brought out its troops on election day to prevent peaceful protest from developing into a Georgian-style revolution.

More importantly, these governments have been spared US pressure to democratize because they happen to be new allies of the US, in both its global campaign against “terrorism” and its determination to find alternatives to Middle East energy dependence.⁷ Hence, unlike the situation in Georgia, the US did not send strong signals of support to any of the opposition groups working to bring about democracy in Central Asia.

Ethnic Politics, Oil, and Superpower Intervention

One of the most dangerous features of Central Asia and the Caucasus is that problems in one area tend to easily spillover into neighboring areas, greatly complicating regional politics. The presence of an ethnic kaleidoscope results in cross-national loyalties and a potential for intercommunal violence that escalates tensions between governments.⁸ This is accompanied by incomplete nation building as ethnic groups and national identities constantly have to compete with tribal or clan affiliations. This feature was highlighted in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh – a mountainous enclave in Azerbaijan populated mostly by Armenians. Azerbaijan wanted to give the province some autonomy, while Armenia claimed it as its own territory.

In Georgia, three separatist regions have caused a high degree of instability since the fall of the Soviet Union: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Adzharia. All three regions look to Moscow for support and Russia has a history of using the separatist issue to exert pressure on Georgia and extract certain concessions from it. One only has to note that Abkhazia, on the Black Sea, broke away from Georgia with covert Russian backing in 1993 after a 13-month war in which 10,000 people were killed. South Ossetia has sought to unite with the adjoining Russian republic of North Ossetia, and the former’s president asserts that 60% of its people carry Russian passports. The most restive and potentially active of the leaders of the separatist states is Aslan Abashidze, who recently proclaimed himself president of the third secessionist area of Adzharia.⁹ 

Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge became home to thousands of Chechen refugees.

In turn, Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge became home to thousands of desperate Chechen refugees fleeing Russian persecution during the Chechen War. Last year, Russia claimed that hundreds of Chechen fighters were among the refugees and both Georgia and Russia were on the brink of war when Moscow threatened it might intervene militarily to pursue Chechen rebels. Georgia refused Russia’s permission to launch operations in the Pankisi and retaliated by inviting US military advisers instead to train its own troops for “anti-terrorism” operations. Washington is spending $64 million to train and equip about 2,000 Georgian border guards and a mechanized force.¹⁰ The US and Georgia claimed that their target would be about a dozen Arab “extremists”  hiding in the Pankisi Gorge and, for Russia’s disappointment, not the whole Chechen liberation movement.¹¹

In essence, Georgia’s new leadership has to deal with the threat of fragmentation and the possibilities of Balkanization in the Caucasus. It also has to strike a delicate balance between US and Russian interests in the region and work to secure its own interests. In the post-September 11th world, Georgia became an important battleground for geopolitical influence between the US and Russia. In fact, the US views Georgia as a strategic partner due to its location along a long arc of instability in a region thought to be an important crossroads for Islamist movements.

The presence of US troops in Georgia would also secure US influence over the Caucasus and undermine Russian influence in its own backyard. More importantly, the Russians fear that American military advisors in Georgia would become the nucleus of a permanent military presence in a nation that already has aspirations to join NATO. Russia is already facing a growing Western presence in its former empire, with NATO expanding along its former satellites in Central and Eastern Europe and the US solidifying its military ties and establishing military bases in the Caucasus and Central Asia.¹² In this regard, Georgia is of particular strategic significance because it borders Russia’s separatist region of Chechnya and offers warm water ports on the Black Sea.

Georgia’s great economic hope is the revenue-generating trans-Caucasus pipeline carrying crude oil from Azerbaijan to the Turkish Mediterranean coast. The intended pipeline has also been a source friction between Russia, which seeks to control oil exported from the pipeline, and the US, which sees it as a vital alternative to an unstable Middle East.¹³ Currently, Russia supplies almost all of Georgia’s gas. In the past, Russia has cut off gas supplies in the winter from Georgia, when the latter allowed Chechens to seek refuge in the Pankisi Gorge.¹⁴ However, when the pipeline is established, Georgia will be able to get much of its gas from the pipeline at an extra-cheap rate. Russia is weary about the prospect of a US-controlled pipeline that would undermine Russian control over the region’s energy resources and the political leverage that came with it.

Another cross-border feature of the Caucasus region is the pervasiveness of organized crime. When Shevardnadze took over the reigns of power he had to make expedient alliances with warlords and mafia figures, many of whom have links inside Russia. This resulted in the establishment of many close links between leading criminal figures and members of parliament. Organized crime not only controls motor vehicle construction plants but also manganese mining and ferrous-alloy producing enterprises in Western Georgia. In fact, statistics suggest that the size of the “shadow economy” (black markets and informal economic activities) in Georgia comprises almost 85% of the official GDP.¹⁵

Conclusions

Events in Georgia have illustrated the importance of sustained popular protests and the incredible power of popular will in bringing about political and social change. In fact, the peaceful revolution in Georgia showcased the importance of having a disciplined, organized, unified, and highly determined opposition that is able to influence events and lead the masses.

Despite the success, the future of Georgia seems precarious and, at best, uncertain. Georgia faces a myriad of complexities involving rebellious ethnicities, economic turmoil, and geopolitical rivalry between the Russia and the US over influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Tensions are already high in Georgia after the Russians questioned the legitimacy of the new leadership and denounced America’s backing of the opposition.¹⁶ Russia’s foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, criticized the US role in Georgia when he claimed that “it’s completely evident there was external pressure, interference in internal affairs by certain countries.”¹⁷ In turn, US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, was the first senior administration official to visit Georgia. Rumsfeld said that his visit was meant to “underscore America’s very strong support for stability and security and the territorial integrity here in Georgia.”¹⁸

During the past decade, Eduard Shevardnadze proved himself to be a masterful politician who was able to play both superpowers against each other and further his country’s geopolitical interests amidst great odds. It remains to be seen whether the new leadership would exhibit the same qualities of political astuteness, or would eventually prove to be just another US stooge in the region.

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