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The Strategist and the
Philosopher*
The Masterminds of America’s Foreign Policy
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By
Alain Frachon and Daniel Vernet
Translated for IslamOnline by Norman Madarasz
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09/10/2003
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Who are the neo-conservatives
playing a vital role in the US president’s choices by the side
of Christian fundamentalists? And who were their master
thinkers, Albert Wohlstetter and Leo Strauss?
“Best
Brains”
It
was said in the tone of sincere praise: “You are some of our
country’s best brains.” So good, added George W. Bush,
“that my government employs around twenty of you.” The
president was addressing the American Enterprise Institute in
Washington DC on February 23 (quote from an article published in
Le Monde, March 20, 2003). He was paying homage to a
think tank that is one of the bastions of the American
neo-conservative movement. He was saluting a school of thought
that has marked his presidency, avowing everything he owes to an
intellectual stream whose influence is now predominant. He was
also acknowledging the fact of being surrounded by
neo-conservatives, and giving them credit for the vital role
they play in his political choices.
At
the outset of the 1960s, John F. Kennedy recruited professors
from the center-left, from Harvard University especially. They
were chosen among the “best and the brightest,” in the words
of the essayist David Halberstam who coined the phrase. As for
President George W. Bush, he would go on to govern with
precisely those who, since the Sixties, began to rebel against
the then-dominant center consensus colored as it was with a hue
of social democracy.
Who
are they and what is their history? Who were their master
thinkers? Where do the intellectual origins of Bushian
neo-conservatism lie?
Opposites
Attracted Under Bush
Neo-conservatives
must not be confused with Christian fundamentalists. |
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Neo-conservatives
must not be confused with Christian fundamentalists who are also
found in George W. Bush’s entourage. They have nothing to do
with the renaissance of protestant fundamentalism begun in the
southern Bible Belt states, which is one of the rising powers in
today’s Republican Party. Neo-conservatism is from the East
Coast, and a little Californian as well. Those who have inspired
them have an “intellectual” profile. Often they are New
Yorkers, often Jewish, having their beginnings “on the
Left.” Some still call themselves Democrats. They have their
hands on literary or political reviews, not the Bible. They wear
tweed blazers, not the navy blue double-breasted suits of
Southern TV-evangelists. Most of the time, they profess liberal
ideas on questions related to society and social trends. Their
objective is neither to prohibit abortion nor to make school
prayer obligatory. Their ambition lies elsewhere.
The
peculiarity of the Bush administration, as Pierre Hassner
explains, is to have ensured the junction of these two streams.
George W. Bush has brought the neo-conservatives and Christian
fundamentalists to coexist. The latter are represented in
government by a man like John Ashcroft, the Attorney General.
The former have one of their stars in the position of Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz. George W. Bush, who led
his campaign on the center-right without any very specific
political anchorage, has performed a stunning and explosive
ideological cocktail. It weds Wolfowitz and Ashcroft,
neo-conservatives and born-again Christians, planets
diametrically opposed.
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John Ashcroft (L) and Paul Wolfowitz, planets diametrically opposed. |
Ashcroft
has taught at Bob-Jones University in South Carolina, an
academically unknown college, though a stronghold of Protestant
fundamentalism. The kind of talk one overhears there verges on
anti-Semitism. Jewish and from a family of teachers, Wolfowitz
is for his part a brilliant product of East Coast universities.
He has studied with two of the most eminent professors of the
1960s. Allan Bloom, the disciple of the German-Jewish
philosopher, Leo Strauss, and Albert Wohlstetter, professor of
mathematics and a specialist in military strategy. These two
names would end up counting. The neo-conservatives have placed
themselves under the tutelary shadow of the strategist and the
philosopher.
“Neo-conservative”
is a misnomer. They have nothing in common with those striving
to guarantee the established order. They reject just about all
the attributes of political conservatism as it is understood in
Europe. One of them, Francis Fukuyama, who became famous from
his book on The End of History and the Last Man, insists:
“In no way do the neo-conservatives want to defend the order
of things such as they are, i.e. founded on hierarchy, tradition
and a pessimistic view of human nature” (Wall Street
Journal, December 24, 2002).
George
W. Bush has brought the neo-conservatives and Christian
fundamentalists to coexist. |
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As
idealist-optimists convinced of the universal value of the
American democratic model, they want to bring the status quo and
soft consensus to an end. They believe in the power of politics
to change things. On the domestic front, they have worked out
the critique of the welfare state created by Democratic and
Republican presidencies (Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon,
respectively), which has belabored to resolve social problems.
On foreign policy, they denounced 1970s Détente, which, they
claimed, had benefited the USSR more than the West. As critics
of the Sixties’ balance sheet who are opposed to Henry
Kissinger’s diplomatic realism, they are anti-establishment.
Irving Kristol and Norman Podhoretz, the founders of Commentary
and two of neo-conservatism’s New York godfathers, come
from the Left. And it was from the Left that they formulated
their condemnation of Soviet communism.
In
Ni Marx, Ni Jesus [Neither Marx nor Jesus] (Robert
Laffont, 1970), Jean-François Revel described the USA plunged
in the turmoil of the 1960s social revolution. More recently, he
has explained neo-conservatism as a backlash, above all on the
domestic front. The neo-conservatives criticize the cultural and
moral relativism of the Sixties in the wake of Leo Strauss. In
their view, relativism culminated in the “politically
correct” movement of the 1980s.
“The failure of culture has become culture.”
- Allan Bloom |
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Another
high-ranking intellectual wages the battle at this point. Allan
Bloom from the University of Chicago was depicted by his friend
Saul Bellow in the novel Ravelstein (Which Books, 2000).
In 1987 in The Closing of the American Mind, Bloom
assails the university community for having given everything
equal merit: “Everything has become culture,” he wrote,
“Drug culture, Rock culture, Street Gang culture and so on
without the least discrimination. The failure of culture has
become culture.”
For
Bloom, who was an important interpreter of the classic works of
literature, very much in the image of his mentor Strauss, a part
of the legacy of the 1960s “ends up as contempt of Western
civilization for itself,” explains Jean-François Revel. “In
the name of political correctness, all cultures are of equal
merit. Bloom questioned the students and professors who were
perfectly disposed to accept non-European cultures that often
stood against liberty, while at the same time protesting with
extreme harshness against Western culture to such a point as to
refuse any acknowledgement of it as superior in any respect.”
While
political correctness gave the impression of holding the high
ground, neo-conservatives were making headway. Bloom’s book
was a major bestseller. Within US foreign policy, a true
neo-conservative school was taking shape. Networks were set up.
In the 1970s, the Democratic senator from Washington State,
Henry Jackson (d. 1983) criticized the major treaties on nuclear
disarmament. Bloom helped shape a generation of young lions with
a keen interest in strategy, in which one finds Richard Perle
and William Kristol. The latter had attended Allan Bloom’s
lectures.
Wohlstetter:
The Strategist
Wohlstetter
was for more US technological creativity. |
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From
within the administration and from without, Richard Perle would
meet up with Paul Wolfowitz while they both worked for Kenneth
Adelman, another contrarian of Détente policies, or Charles
Fairbanks, Under-Secretary of State. In strategic matters, their
guru was Albert Wohlstetter. A researcher at the Rand
Corporation, Pentagon advisor and a gastronomy connoisseur
nevertheless, Wohlstetter (d. 1997) was one of the fathers of
the American nuclear doctrine.
Wohlstetter
engaged in the early attempts to reformulate the traditional
doctrine that had been the basis for nuclear deterrence: the
so-called MAD or “Mutual Assured Destruction.” The theory
holds that as both blocs had the capacity to inflict irreparable
damage onto each other, their leaders would think twice before
unleashing a nuclear attack. For Wohlstetter and his students,
MAD was both immoral – due to the destruction it would inflict
on civilian populations – and ineffective: it would end up in
a mutual neutralization of nuclear arsenals. No sane head of
state, or at any rate no American president, would decide on
“reciprocal suicide.” Instead, Wohlstetter proposed
“staggered deterrence,” i.e. accepting limited wars that
would eventually use tactical nuclear weapons with precision
“smart” bombs capable of striking at the enemy’s military
apparatus.
Wohlstetter
criticized the Russian-US joint nuclear weapons control policy,
which he considered amounted to bridling US technological
creativity in order to maintain an artificial balance with the
USSR.
Ronald
Reagan heard him out, and launched the Strategic Defense
Initiative (SDI), baptized “Star Wars.” It is the antecedent
of the Antimissile Defense System currently pursued by
Wohlstetter’s students. They were the partisans most welcoming
of the idea of a unilateral renunciation of the ABM Treaty,
which in their view prevented the US from developing other
defense systems. And they managed to convince George W. Bush.
In
Perle and Wolfowitz’s tracks, one meets Elliott Abrams,
currently in charge of the Middle East at the National Security
Council, and Douglas Feith, an Under-Secretary of Defense. They
all share unconditional support for the policies of the State of
Israel, whatever government sits in Jerusalem. This unwavering
support explains why they have stoically sided with Ariel
Sharon. President Ronald Reagan’s two mandates (1981 and 1985)
gave many of them the opportunity to exercise their first
responsibilities in office.
By
Name, By Place
Neo-conservatives
have marginalized intellectuals from the Democratic
center and center-left. |
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In
Washington DC, the neo-conservatives have woven their web.
Creativity is on their side. Throughout the years, they have
marginalized intellectuals from the Democratic center and
center-left to hold a preponderant place where the ideas that
dominate the political scene are forged. Among their fora are
reviews such as the National Review, Commentary, the New
Republic, headed for a time by the young “Straussian”
Andrew Sullivan; the Weekly Standard, once under the
ownership of the Murdoch group, whose Fox News television
network takes care of broadcasting the vulgarized version of
neo-conservative thought. Under Robert Bartley’s charge, the
editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal have also
fallen into neo-conservatist activism without qualms.
The
neo-conservative hunting grounds are also research institutes
and think tanks, such as the Hudson Institute, the Heritage
Foundation, or the American Enterprise Institute. Families play
a role as well: Irving Kristol’s son, the very urbane William
Kristol runs the Weekly Standard; one of Norman
Podhoretz’s sons worked for the Reagan administration; the son
of Richard Pipes – a Polish Jew who emigrated to the US in
1939 to become a Harvard University professor and one of the
major critics of Soviet communism – Daniel Pipes has denounced
Islamism as a new totalitarianism threatening the West.
These
men are not isolationists, on the contrary. They are usually
very well educated, with vast knowledge of foreign countries and
often a mastery of their languages. They share nothing with
Patrick Buchanan’s reactionary populism, which espouses a US
retreat in favor of dealing with its domestic problems.
Neo-conservatism
is not the simple caprice of a few Hawks. |
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The
neo-conservatives are internationalists, partisans of a resolute
US international activism. Their ways do not resemble those of
the Grand Old Republican party (Nixon, George Bush Sr.),
trusting in the merits of Realpolitik and caring little
about the nature of the regimes the US was doing business with
to defend their interests. Someone like Kissinger, for example,
is an anti-model for them. Yet they are not internationalists in
the Wilsonian democratic tradition (in reference to president
Woodrow Wilson, the unfortunate father of the League of
Nations), that of Jimmy Carter or Bill Clinton. The latter are
deemed naive or angelic for counting on international
institutions to spread democracy.
After
the Strategist comes the introduction of the Philosopher. There
are no direct links between Albert Wohlstetter and Leo Strauss
(d. 1973) prior to the official emergence of neo-conservatism.
But within the neo-conservative network, some have spawned
bridges between the teachings of these two men, despite the
fundamental differences separating their fields of research.
They
are not isolationists; they are strong advocates of US
international activism. |
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Either
by filiation or capillary action (Allan Bloom, Paul Wolfowitz,
William Kristol and so on), Strauss’s philosophy has served as
neo-conservatism’s theoretical substratum. Strauss hardly ever
wrote on current political affairs or international relations.
He was read and recognized for his immense erudition of the
classical Greek texts and Christian, Jewish and Islamic
scriptures. He was feted for the power of his interpretive
method. “He grafted classical philosophy to German profundity
in a country lacking a great philosophical tradition,”
explains Jean-Claude Casanova, who was sent to study in the US
by Raymond Aron, his mentor. Aron greatly admired Strauss, whom
he had met in Berlin before the war. He advised many of his
students, like Pierre Hassner and Pierre Manent a few years
later, to turn toward him.
Strauss:
The Philosopher
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Leo
Strauss |
Leo
Strauss was born 1899 in Kirchain, Hesse, and left Germany on
the eve of Hitler’s rise to power. After a short stint in
Paris and then in England, he left for New York, where he taught
at the New School for Social Research before founding the
Committee on Social Thought in Chicago, which would become the
“Straussian” crucible.
It
would be simplistic and reductionist to trace the principles of
George Bush’s neo-conservative entourage back to Strauss’s
teachings. After all, neo-conservatism has its roots in
traditions other than the Straussian school. But the reference
to Strauss forms a pertinent background to the neo-conservatism
currently at work in Washington. It allows one to understand how
neo-conservatism is not the simple caprice of a few Hawks. It is
built on theoretical bases that are perhaps debatable, but
hardly mediocre. Neo-conservatism sits at the crossroads of two
thoughts present in Strauss’ thinking.
Democracy
had no chance of being maintained without the use of
force. |
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The
first is linked to his personal experience. As a young man,
Strauss lived through the decay of the Weimar Republic, under
the converging thrusts of Communists and Nazis.
From this experience, he concluded that democracy had no chance
of being maintained were it to remain weak, even if that meant
refusing to bolster itself against tyranny. Expansionist by
nature, tyranny might have to be confronted by resorting to the
use of force: “The Weimar Republic was weak. It had only one
moment of strength if not greatness: its violent reaction to the
assassination of the Jewish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Walther
Rathenau, in 1922,” wrote Strauss in a foreword to Spinoza’s
Critique of Religion (1966, trans. 1980). “All in all,
Weimar showed the spectacle of justice without force, or of a
justice incapable of resorting to force.”
The
second thought results from his frequentation of the ancients.
What is most fundamental for them, as it is for us, is the kind
of political regime that ends up shaping the character of
people. Why had the 20th century engendered two totalitarian
regimes or “tyrannies,” as Strauss called them in reference
to Aristotle’s terminology? To this question that has not
ceased provoking contemporary intellectuals, Strauss answered:
Because modernity caused a rejection of moral values, of the
virtue that is the basis for democracies, and a rejection of the
European values of Reason and Civilization.
Strauss
argued that this rejection had its roots in the Enlightenment.
The latter produced historicism and relativism as
quasi-necessities, which meant a refusal to admit the existence
of a Higher Good reflected in concrete, immediate and contingent
goods, yet irreducible to them. This Good was an unattainable
Good that is the measure for real good.
Good
regimes have the right – even duty – to defend
themselves against evil ones. |
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Translated
into the terms of political philosophy, the extreme consequence
of this relativism was the USA-USSR convergence theory, very
much in vogue during the 1960s and 1970s. It amounted to
eventually acknowledging a moral equivalence between American
democracy and Soviet communism. Admittedly for Leo Strauss,
there exist good and bad regimes. Political thought must not be
deprived of casting value judgments. Good regimes have the right
– even duty – to defend themselves against evil ones. It
would be simplistic to immediately transpose this idea with the
“Axis of Evil” denounced by George W. Bush. But it is very
clear, indeed, that it proceeds from the same source.
The
Straussians, who developed an interest in the Constitutional
history of the United States, developed this central notion of
regime as political philosophy’s matrix. Strauss himself –
also an admirer of the British Empire and Winston Churchill as
an example of the will-driven statesman – was inclined to
think that American democracy was the least-worst case of
political systems. Nothing better had been found for the
flourishing of mankind, even if there was a tendency for special
interests to replace virtue as the regime’s foundations.
Where
Religion Fits
His
students, Walter Bens, Hearvey Mansfield and Harry Jaffa, filled
the ranks of the American Constitutionalist School. In the
institutions of the United States they saw much more than the
mere application of the thought of the US’ Founding Fathers.
They saw the living performance of higher principles, or indeed,
for a man like Harry Jaffa, of Biblical teachings. In any case,
religion, eventually civil religion, must serve as the cement to
bind institutions and society. This call to religion was not
foreign to Strauss. But the atheist Jew “enjoyed covering his
tracks,” in Georges Balandier’s words. He considered
religion useful in maintaining illusions for the many, without
which order could not be maintained. By contrast, the
philosopher must conserve a critical spirit to address the few
in a coded language, interpreted by and intelligible to a
meritocracy founded on virtue.
Advocating
a return to the ancients against the trappings of modernity and
illusions of progress, Strauss nonetheless defended liberal
democracy as the Enlightenment’s daughter – and American
democracy as its quintessence. A contradiction? Doubtless, but a
contradiction he tackles in the tradition of other liberal
thinkers (Montesquieu, Tocqueville). For the critique of
liberalism, which runs the risk of losing itself in relativism
– schematically speaking, the search for Truth loses value –
is indispensable for its survival. For Strauss, the relativism
of the Good results in an inability to react against tyranny.
The
nature of political regimes is more important than the
institutions and international arrangements that
maintain world peace. |
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This
active defense of democracy and liberalism reappears in the
political vulgate as one of the neo-conservatives’ favorite
themes. The nature of political regimes is much more important
than all of the institutions and international arrangements that
maintain world peace. The greatest threat comes from states that
do not share the values of (American) democracy. Changing these
regimes and working for the progress of democratic values are
the surest ways of reinforcing security (of the US) and peace.
The
importance of political regimes, praise for militant democracy,
quasi-religious exaltation of American values and firm
opposition to tyranny: any number of these themes, which are the
stock in trade of the neo-conservatives populating the Bush
administration, may be drawn from Strauss’s teachings. At
times, they are reviewed and corrected by second-generation “Straussians.”
Yet one thing separates them from their putative mentor: the
Messianic-tainted optimism the neo-conservatives unfold to bring
freedoms to the world (to the Middle East tomorrow, to Germany
and Japan yesterday), as though political voluntarism could
change human nature. This is yet another illusion that is
perhaps good enough to spread to the masses, but by which the
philosopher must not be fooled.
Threat
comes from states that do not share American values of
democracy. Changing them is the surest way to reinforce
security. |
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Still,
a riddle remains: How does “Straussism,” which was first
founded on an oral transmission largely tributary of the master
thinker’s charisma and expressed in austere books, texts on
texts, come to seat its influence in a presidential
administration? Pierre Manent, who directs the Raymond-Aron
Research Center in Paris, puts forward the idea that the
ostracism to which Leo Strauss’s pupils were subject in the
American university milieu propelled them toward public service,
think tanks and the press. They are relatively over-represented
in all of these domains.
Another
– complementary – explanation points to the intellectual
void that followed the Cold War, which the “Straussians,”
and in their wake the neo-conservatives, seemed best prepared to
fill. The fall of the Berlin Wall showed they were right insofar
as Reagan’s strong-armed policies with respect to the USSR
triggered its downfall. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
confirmed their thesis on the vulnerability of democracies faced
with tyranny’s diverse forms. From the war on Iraq, the
neocons will be tempted to draw the conclusion that toppling
“evil” regimes is possible and desirable. Faced with this
temptation, calls to international law may claim moral
legitimacy. What is lacking however, as things stand today, are
the powers of conviction and constraint.
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Published in Le Monde, April 15, 2003. Subtitles added by
IslamOnline.
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