Iran’s sudden desire to cooperate with the Arab states is also understood to be an effort to seek an improvement in its relations with the neighboring Arab bloc – crucial in the current situation Iran finds itself in, under mounting pressure from the US and under the international spotlight for its alleged nuclear weapons program. Improved relations with the Arab regimes would give Iran a badly needed new strategic depth, thereby complicating US policy geared towards containing the Islamic Republic.

Both al-Zayat and al-Sirri also suggest a more obscure ideological motivation for Iran’s cooperation, in the sense that conservative religious elements within the Iranian regime are pushing for better access to Egypt in particular, in efforts to gain a better foothold for the Jaa’fari School of jurisprudence, for which Egypt is historically significant.

Egypt has been specifically identified by diplomatic sources as one state actively engaged in negotiations with Iran for the extradition of its nationals, along with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Egypt had earlier responded to allegations that it was conducting talks with Iran for the possible extradition of Egyptian detainees with – predictably - strenuous denial. Reuters had in early July quoted an official Egyptian source as categorically denying that any form of discussions pertaining to the extradition of Egyptian nationals in Iran were taking place.

However, London-based Egyptian lawyer and activist Dr. Hani al-Sebai reported to AFP Tuesday August 5 that a delegation from Egypt’s Interior Ministry had been dispatched to Iran to identify the prisoners, as a necessary step preceding negotiations for their return.

Such cooperation is to Iran’s benefit, in that al-Qaeda members are notoriously difficult to identify, owing, among other factors, to their being trained in counter-interrogation techniques. As such, al-Zayat says, Iran needs some sort of access to Arab security apparatuses to allow it to identify the detainees - and consequently assess their relative worth as bargaining chips, no doubt.

In addition, such a step would not be unprecedented in Egyptian-Iranian relations, as “Iran has already extradited eight Egyptians back to Egypt in 2002,” according to al-Sirri.

Dr. Omar Abdul Rahman’s extradition from the US was not sought by Egypt partly from fear of reprisal attacks by his followers.

Egypt’s history in this respect is a mixed bag. While it generally seeks the extradition of its nationals complicit in terror, it was generally unsuccessful in the past – until 1998. The US embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya spurred the US into backing Egypt’s extradition requests, according to al-Sirri. Subsequent to those bombings, Egypt was able to secure the extradition of its nationals from a number of countries, perhaps most notably Albania and Azerbaijan. Al-Sirri stresses that the extraditions were not so much diplomatic successes for Egypt as they were a reflection of a new, more aggressive US policy in combating terrorism, as US intelligence services realized they stood to benefit from the interrogations of militants conducted by the Egyptian government.

Indeed, the extradition of the Iranian detainees to their countries of origin may prove to be the most practical solution as far as the US is concerned; a December 26 2002 report published in the Washington Post detailed a US policy of legally questionable “extraordinary renditions,” through which al-Qaeda suspects are handed over to states with a record of brutality to facilitate the interrogation process, free from judicial or other constraints that might hamper questioning in the US. Egypt is one particularly favored state in this regard, having even interrogated Saudi suspects when the US feared the Saudi government might not be forthcoming with potentially embarrassing confessions.