In the landmark book Israel and the Bomb, scholar Avner Cohen observes that Israel's nuclear policy has been an enduring success because it has enabled the country to maintain a nuclear monopoly in the Middle East while avoiding the political liabilities associated with overt possession of nuclear weapons. According to former Prime Minister Shimon Peres, Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity has "managed to create sufficient suspicion for there to be a deterrent without having gotten to a status of clarity which would behoove sanctions against us."¹

Hence, despite the South Asian nuclear tests and concerns about the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by other states in the Middle East, the current nuclear posture review is unlikely to lead to major change in Israel's posture of nuclear ambiguity.

The Persian Gulf and the Middle East, though nominally separate geographic identities, are linked fundamentally as one broad political-military region. The dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and Israel's relative military superiority, invariably affect the thinking of all the Arab/Persian communities in the region, not to mention inter-Arab rivalries. The Iran-Iraq war was a powerful formative experience for both countries and their concepts of national security and deterrence. Likewise, Israel's long history of conflict with its neighbors, its innate sense of vulnerability, and the hostility it faces from the Gulf States continue to drive its own elusive search for security. 

Israel's nuclear weapons are an outgrowth of its sense of siege and the corresponding doctrine that arises from this psychology. Israeli military strategy has long focused on preemptive conventional capabilities and the ability to carry the battle away from Israeli territory and population centers. Although this doesn’t seem to be the case today, statistics still indicates that more Arabs are killed by military action in Palestinian “ruled” areas than in Israeli territories. Thus, as the analyst Geoffrey Kemp notes, any threat that undermines the superiority of the air force also calls into question the Israeli concept of deterrence. Arab advances in missile technology, air defenses, and chemical weapons seem to offer just such a threat. Thus, nuclear weapons are seen as a hedge against conventional attack as well as a deterrent against weapons of mass destruction. 

Israel's nuclear weapons program dates back to the late 1950s and the construction of the nuclear facility at Dimona, in the Negev. There, with French and later South African assistance, the Israelis embarked upon a nuclear weapons program that, according to U.S. Intelligence estimates, is thought to have yielded between 75 and 130 devices. Some reports indicate that Israel instituted a nuclear alert during the 1973 Yom Kippur War and again in 1991 during the Gulf conflict. Information about the Israeli weapons program is somewhat conjectural. The Israeli government does not admit to possessing nuclear weapons and is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Dimona remains a closed site not subject to international inspections or safeguards. There exists no official mention of how nuclear weapons fit into Israeli strategic thinking, and their role in the Israeli Defense Force's doctrine is therefore a matter of guesswork. 

The states arrayed against Israel hold that it is their right to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent to the Israeli arsenal. They believe that Washington maintains a double standard by ignoring Israel's acquisition of weapons of mass destruction while opposing the transfer of even peaceful nuclear technologies to others. Both Iraq and Iran have sought nuclear capability as a strategic equalizer. In the case of Iraq, however, nuclear weapons serve an ambition greater than the acquisition of a relative deterrent. Saddam's search for regional hegemony means that he must both overcome Iran's strategic superiority and stake a claim to leadership of the Arab world. In Saddam's eyes, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in general, and nuclear weapons specifically, serve both purposes. They counter Iran's strategic depth and demographic superiority. They are also seen to threaten and confront Israel. Thus they play to broader inter-Arab themes. 

Israel is understandably averse to seeing its nuclear advantage eroded. Indeed, as its air strike on the Osiraq reactor in Iraq in 1981 demonstrated, Israel is ready to maintain a nuclear monopoly in the region through the use of force. That the world was a safer place following the destruction of the Iraqi reactor is undoubted. And it is noteworthy that Iraq possessed a relatively advanced military program despite its membership in the NPT. However, in the long run, the tactical success of the air raid may prove to be counterproductive. It certainly underscored the Arab belief that their defenses could only be marginally effective against Israel in the absence of a credible nuclear deterrent. Additionally, Arab governments reacted with a mixture of indignation and suspicion at Israel's de facto claim to a monopoly. Applying the logic of the East-West balance of power convinced some in the region of the stability that nuclear proliferation might impart. This logic may be dubious, but it nevertheless provides a powerful incentive for countries seeking a nuclear weapons capability. 

These dynamics tend to reinforce themselves. Iraq's weapons programs may have been intended to confront Israel, but it was the Iranians who suffered from Saddam's obsession with chemical weapons, as the world, including the United States, looked on in silence during their eight-year war. This instilled in Tehran the powerful lesson that it must be responsible for its own defense. US acquiescence to the Israeli nuclear program further erodes Tehran's faith in the equal application of international arms control regimes. They hesitate to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), despite their own doubts as to the utility of these weapons. Iranian attempts to hedge against perceived threats, couched as they often are in incendiary rhetoric aimed at Israel, simply reinforces Iran's image as a proliferator. 

Iran has posited the creation of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East, but this approach is disingenuous. The idea links Israel's nuclear weapons capability to an eventual political settlement that Iran actively opposes. Such a strategy seeks to place the burden of proof on Israel's intention to forgo its nuclear deterrent. Tel Aviv will not address the nuclear question without a prior, far-reaching political settlement and several years of confidence building measures. Thus the mechanics for a regional nuclear arms race are, for the time being, locked into place. 

The Israeli nuclear arsenal will continue to drive Iranian and Iraqi WMD acquisition efforts for the foreseeable future. In turn, these ambitions are likely to underscore Israel's sense of vulnerability. Furthermore, the perception that nuclear weapons connote independence, equality, and prestige will likely survive any regime change in Baghdad, further perpetuating proliferation in the region as a whole. Strategies of containment and technology denial may slow the process, but they offer no permanent solutions. 

Beginning the long process of integrating Iran fully into the world community as a responsible member could provide a keystone upon which to build a broader settlement. Rejection of Israel and the United States are not necessarily popular or static characteristics of traditional Iranian foreign policy. Ironically, there exists in Iran a far greater popular consensus for engagement than seems to exist in either the United States or Israel. Engaging Iran has its share of pitfalls. But talk of an "axis of evil" or bombing the Bushehr reactor sites can only retard progress along the path towards controlling nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. 

There is no doubt that the arms race and dominance of force in the Middle East remains at the forefront of Israel’s policy of securing themselves against the potential threat of the Arab world. Israel’s occupation of Palestine, the blanket support given to it by its main ally the USA, its political ploys of maintaining dominance over the Arab region, its fundamentalist Zionist affiliates, supportive of its right to exist regardless of the price, and above all its ambiguous nuclear facilities offer no calm to the region. Israel will continue to be the sole reason for other countries in the region to maintain nuclear facilities. From the time of the creation of the “state of Israel,” the issue of weapons of mass destruction continues to point the Middle East in one direction. The opinion that most hold that the biggest threat emanates from Iraq or Iran is a fallacy. Israel has committed more crimes than any Arab Country, and today still keeps hidden its potentially disastrous nuclear weapons program. As such, there remains no quick-fix solution to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. 

Ebrahim Mohamed is head of the Institute for Arabic and Islamic Research in South Africa where he hosted the “Is Israel set up for destruction?” symposium between Sheikh Ahmed Deedat and Paul Findley. He is mainly interested in the Palestinian issue and the role of South Africa in the Middle East. He resides in Cape Town, South Africa. You can reach him at ebrahim@rosmead.co.za

The articles posted on this page reflect solely the opinions of the authors. Views Archive Advanced Search Views & Analyses

Related Links