“Islamic insurgent movements in southern Thailand, the southern Philippines and Aceh represent arguably, the most visible signs of armed separatism in Southeast Asia today. The roots of ethno-religious unrest in each of these regions stem from the same basic factors: insensitivity to local concerns, regional neglect, military repression and the contemporary force of militant Islam.”¹ (Peter Chalk “Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor”, 2001)

With the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, the Bali bombings in Indonesia, and the series of bombings in the Philippines in October, there has been an increasing focus on Southeast Asia as the new front in Washington’s self-proclaimed “war on terrorism”. The arrests of dozens of alleged al-Qaeda operatives in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines, and the presence of groups such as the Jemaah Islamiah (JI), Abu Sayyaf, Laskar Jihad, and the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM) seemed to the White House to be indicative of a new conglomerate of “terrorists” bent upon the destruction of Western targets. Surprisingly, many recent US policy papers and press reports have dubbed Malaysia a “primary launching pad” for the September 11^th attacks – a charge that has now been dismissed as exaggerated by Western intelligence sources.² Other analysts have described Abu Sayyaf, the rebel group fighting the government in the Southern Philippine islands around Mindanao, as similar to the Taliban, despite the fact that Abu Sayyaf operates in a limited area and lacks a major organizational base.³ Analysts from the National Review and Heritage Foundation have declared Indonesia the next Afghanistan.⁴

Intensifying US involvement in Southeast Asia reflects a somewhat hysterical reaction to and a myopic preoccupation with exaggerated security threats in that part of the world. Moreover, an American, militarized, security-based, approach to “the problem” will be “at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive”,⁵ given the US’ lack of appreciation for the diversity of Islamic movements in the region and its total disregard for the underlying roots of most of the conflicts in which Islam plays a role.

Surprisingly, despite the death of almost 100,000 people and a refugee population numbering over 500,000, the three-decade long civil war in the southern Philippines received very little attention in the international media.⁶ Furthermore, the Philippine government’s military campaign against Abu Sayyaf and other Moro organizations – which had displaced 150,000 people by the end of November 2001 – went largely unnoticed.⁷

In late January 2002, the Bush Administration sent 660 troops to the Philippines, deploying them to the south of the archipelago to assist the government in fighting Abu Sayyaf. For several weeks, the US Navy has been secretly flying P-3 reconnaissance missions over the Sulu archipelago to provide badly needed intelligence to Philippine Army forces battling about 250 Abu Sayyaf rebels hiding in the mountainous jungle.⁸ The struggle between the government of the Philippines and Abu Sayyaf can be regarded as the most recent manifestation of the struggle involving Islam in the Philippines. Nevertheless, it masks multiple layers of historical grievances that have remained unaddressed over the years. Also, certain recent geopolitical concerns and the convergence of interests between the US and the Philippine governments have paved the way for a more aggressive approach towards Islamic movements in the region. Hence, it becomes imperative to outline the historical roots and geopolitics of one of Asia’s most pervasive conflicts: the struggle for Islam in the Philippines.

Eras of Marginalization, Alienation & Subordination of Muslims

The persistence of armed Muslim separatist rebellions in Southeast Asia can be demonstrated by the ongoing rebellion in Mindanao. A strong regional identity infused with Islam has been a binding factor for separatist movements and various jihad organizations in the Philippines.⁹ Moreover, the persistence of those movements demonstrates the failure of the Philippines in achieving legitimacy for its post-independence political structures, the failure to address the grievances of Muslims in the Philippines, and the historical role that intrusive foreign powers have played in the marginalization and alienation of Muslims.

In the southern Philippines, the Muslim Moros are now an anomaly in a country dominated by Catholics and heavily influenced by Spanish and American culture. Nation-building efforts by the Philippine government have often required the subordination of minority Muslims. The Muslims of Mindanao have been a historically autonomous and distinct people who rebelled against the heavy-handed and often insensitive attempts by central authorities to impose upon them “national” values; that is, values of the dominant Catholic majority.¹⁰ This has resulted in resentment and a fear of losing their identity to what they see as an expanding foreign intrusion.

Ever since the Spanish colonization of the Philippines in the mid-1500s, governments in Manila have aimed at both the political domination and religious conversion of Mindanao. An integral part of this effort has been transmigration, where Christians from other parts of the Philippines were encouraged to settle in the south. These programs altered the ethnic and religious balance in Mindanao – from an overall Muslim majority in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago at the end of the 19^th century to less than 17% of the population today¹¹ – and precipitated bitter conflicts over land distribution and ownership. Even in the tiny Basilan Island, where Muslims constitute 71% of the population, Christians own 75% of the land, with ethnic Chinese controlling 75% of local trade.¹²

The Catholic transmigration from the north not only dispossessed Muslims of their ancient and communal land rights, but also reduced the Moro population in Mindanao to a minority in their own homeland.¹³ Moreover, “Catholic Filipinos see Muslims as inferior, and have proceeded, with the assistance of corrupt local officials and the police, to take over vast tracts of land in Mindanao for the purpose of agriculture and plantation activities, thus depriving local minorities of their land, rights, and means of livelihood.”¹⁴ Today, Mindanao remains one of the most underdeveloped areas in the Philippines. Fifteen of the Philippines’ poorest provinces are located in the south, which additionally has the country’s lowest literacy rates (75%) and life expectancy (57 years).¹⁵

The 21^st century Islamic insurgency in the Philippines, in many respects, is continuing a struggle that began in the 15th and 16^th centuries. Islam was introduced in the southern Philippines in the 14^th century by seafaring Muslim traders from Indonesia. By the 16^th century, Islam had spread throughout the islands of the Sulu archipelago into Mindanao, pushing father north. These Islamic communities, constituting the southern Philippines, were based on their own developing concepts of authority, social relationships and sovereignty.¹⁶ These communities collided violently with Spanish explorers seeking to establish colonies based on supposed rich resources, trade routes and a population they tried to convert to Catholicism. The Spanish called the Muslim people they found in the Philippines Moros or Moors, reflecting their old Muslim enemies in Europe and North Africa.¹⁷ Muslims immediately undertook a rebellion to resist the Spanish conquest. Moro resistance continued until 1898, when the United States defeated Spain in the Spanish-American War.  The Philippines were ceded to the United States under the 1898 Treaty of Paris, sparking resistance in the Sunni Muslim south. Moros resented the incorporation of Muslim lands into the Philippine state under US control. As the Moros saw it:

Catholic Spain had been driven by the spirit of the Inquisition, America was inspired by the unholy doctrines of ‘Manifest Destiny’ to bring the ‘blessings’ of western civilization to these ‘barbarians’ in Southeast Asia.¹⁸

Moro resistance against the Americans was fierce and very dedicated. In comparison to American soldiers, Moros were poorly armed. They used old rifles and brass canons, but were very skillful in close combat and the use of the sword. Moro fighters had an extraordinary ability to advance even after being shot multiple times. More interestingly, however, was their use of kamikaze operations against the Americans, reminiscent of recent Palestinian bombings against the Israelis.

The Moro resistance continued from 1902 till the official end of military rule in 1913. Moros then ferociously resisted Japanese occupation during World War II, only to find themselves incorporated into the Republic of the Philippines in 1946. The Filipino government sponsored the migration of Christian Filipinos into traditional Muslim lands in the south, and transferred massive tracts of Muslim land to Christian Filipino ownership, to the extent that some have compared such policies with those “enacted by Israel against the Palestinian people.”¹⁹ Moreover, Moros were unwilling to subscribe to Manila’s secular civil, political, judicial, and penal constitutional system.²⁰ It is against this sociopolitical and economic background that the separatist Islamic insurgency in the southern Philippines has been fought since 1971.

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the largest of the Moro armed organizations, has historically served as the main focus of armed Islamic resistance to Manila in the southern Philippines. The MNLF, founded by Nur Misuari in 1971, has argued that the Moro people constitute a distinct Islamic historical and cultural identity, and have a legitimate right to determine their own future; hence, they have a duty and obligation to wage a jihad against the Philippine State.²¹

Moro Islamic Liberation Front forces

In 1980, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was formed as a splinter movement of the MNLF. This group was critical of the more leftist orientation of the MNLF, and is far more religiously oriented than its parent movement, emphasizing the promotion of Islamic ideals, rather than the broad-based pursuit of nationalist Moro objectives.²² The organization also insists that there can be no permanent solution to the Mindanao problem in the absence of full Islamic independence, something that the MNLF has been willing to compromise on since the mid-1970s.²³ The armed wing of the MILF, the Bangsa-Moro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), has grown tremendously since then, with a standing army of about 35,000, and has eclipsed the MNLF.²⁴

The end of the Soviet-Afghan War was also a major catalyst for the radicalization of Filipino Muslims. Many Afghan veterans came back to the Philippines and, disillusioned with the MNLF’s leniency with Manila and with political and economic conditions in the southern Philippines, either joined the MILF or later participated in the formation of the Abu Sayyaf group (literally “sword bearer”).

The formation of Abu Sayyaf can be traced back to 1991, when the group was founded by Amilhussin Jumaani and Abdurajak Janjalani. The overall objective of the Abu Sayyaf group is the establishment of an independent and exclusive Islamic theocratic state in Mindanao. In terms of tactics, the MILF generally adopts orthodox guerilla tactics and hit-and-run operations against members of the military, whereas Abu Sayyaf also targets the military and all Filipino Catholics and foreigners living in Mindanao and elsewhere. Abu Sayyaf’s overall support base is no more than 1,148, with a regular armed component consisting of approximately 330 fighters.²⁵ The majority of the group’s members are Muslim youths aged between 16 and the early 30s, with many of their older cadres reportedly ex-volunteers of the International Islamic Brigade (IIB) which fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan.²⁶

After the MNLF made peace with the Manila government in 1996, in exchange for the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao and a stake in the Philippine political process, the only two groups now operating militarily in the southern Philippines are the MILF and Abu Sayyaf.

The Game of Geopolitics & Common Interests

Historical reasons for ethnic and religious tensions tend to make any civil war intractable and difficult to manage. Nevertheless, there are also certain modern-day strategic interests that have made the Philippines the subject of US attention. A key incentive for President Arroyo’s alliance with the US is the aid Washington has promised her administration. The economic motive was made clear when she emerged from her meeting with President Bush in Washington last November and boasted to Filipino reporters that “it’s $4.6 billion, and counting.”²⁷ President Arroyo also hopes that her tough stance against Islamic movements in the Philippines will win her a significant bloc of Christian voters in the southern Philippines in the 2004 presidential elections.²⁸ Hence, there is a significant convergence of interests between the Philippine government and the US in their goal of fighting Islamists in the south.

From the US perspective, the Philippines is part of the Southeast Asian security system, and that region derives its geopolitical importance from its location at the crossroads between the concentration of industrial, technological and military power in Northeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and the oil resources of the Middle East and Australia and the Southwest Pacific. In fact, a high proportion of the trade of Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Australia, including much of their oil imports, transits the straits and sea-lanes of Southwest Asia. Shipping transiting the region must pass through one of the three or four chokepoints: the straits of Malacca, Sunda, or Lombok, or possibly the straits of East Timor.²⁹

From a military perspective, these sea-lanes are critical to the movement of US troops from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.³⁰ Hence, establishing a foothold for US troops in the Philippines would definitely facilitate US military activities elsewhere in the world. The desire to contain the Muslim world, the proposed war against Iraq, and the desire to check any future Chinese incursion into Southeast Asia are definite strategic objectives that a US military presence in the Philippines would facilitate.

The collapse of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, a key pillar for US strategy, emboldened Islamic separatist movements throughout the region. In addition to the southern Philippines, many Islamic movements are operative in Aceh, the Moluccas, and southern Thailand. Moreover, the US is worried about the increasing political gains that Islamic parties are making in the region; a case in point is the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS). The presence of US troops in the Philippines would definitely enhance American capabilities to contain a possible “domino effect” in which an Islamic uprising extending from Indonesia to the southern Philippines would radically alter the pro-US balance of power. Once again, rather than trying to address Muslim grievances, the US is adopting a military solution. Once again, Islam is under siege in a different part of the world.

Kareem M. Kamel is an Egyptian freelance writer based in Cairo, Egypt. He has an MA in International Relations and is specialized in security studies, decision-making, nuclear politics, Middle East politics and the politics of Islam. He is currently assistant to the Political Science Department at the American University in Cairo.

1- Peter Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24 (July 2001): 241-269.

2- John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?”  Foreign Affairs (July/August 2002)

3- Ibid.

4- Ibid.

5- Ibid.

6- Andrew Tan, “Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 23 (October-December 2000)

7- John Gershman, “Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?”  Foreign Affairs (July/August 2002)

8- Eric Schmitt, “Muslim Rebels Are Blamed For Bombing in Philippines,” New York Times October 5^th, 2002: A12.

9- Andrew Tan, “Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 23 (October-December 2000)

[10- Ibid.

11- Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia (Washington D.C.: RAND, 2001): 85-86

12- Walden Bello, “A ‘Second Front’ in the Philippines,” Nation March 18^th, 2002.

13- Peter Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24 (July 2001): 247.

14- Andrew Tan, “Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 23 (October-December 2000)

15- Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia (Washington D.C.: RAND, 2001): 85

16- Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. “Bearer of the Sword,” Military Review (March/April 2002): 38.

17- Ibid., 39.

18- Ibid.

19- Ibid., 41-42.

20- Peter Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24 (July 2001): 247.

21- Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia (RAND, 2001): 86.

22- Ibid.

23- Peter Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24 (July 2001): 247.

24- Andrew Tan, “Armed Muslim Separatist Rebellion in Southeast Asia: Persistence, Prospects, and Implications,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 23 (October-December 2000)

25- Peter Chalk, “Separatism and Southeast Asia: The Islamic Factor in Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and Aceh,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24 (July 2001): 248-249.

26- Ibid., 249.

27- Walden Bello, “A ‘Second Front’ in the Philippines,” Nation March 18^th, 2002.

28- Ibid.

29- Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia (RAND, 2001): 1

30- Ibid.

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