The United States currently finds itself – a lone superpower that lacks true power, a world leader nobody follows and few respect, and a nation drifting dangerously amidst a global chaos it cannot control.¹

Immanuel Wallerstein

The importance of September 11 and its repercussions on international relations stems not from the casualties incurred, but rather from the symbolism it invoked: the bruising of the military and economic symbols of the world’s largest superpower by “members of a non-state force, with a high degree of determination, some money, a band of dedicated followers, and a strong base in one weak state.”²

Had the attacks of September 11 happened elsewhere in the world, it is very unlikely that they would have had the same repercussions. In fact, the tragic deaths of hundreds of thousands of Muslims in different parts of the world went largely unnoticed. The wholesale slaughter of innocent civilians in Palestine, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Lebanon, Algeria, Chechnya and Kashmir, did not raise much alarm anywhere in the world, nor was it met by an international coalition of states aiming to punish the perpetrators of such atrocities.

While images of planes crashing into the World Trade Center and American casualties continue to be magnified in international media, the killing of at least 3,767 Afghan civilians in only eight and half weeks of American bombing was cast aside amidst international silence.³ Hence, the importance of the event itself stems from the fact that the attacks took place on US soil and were directed against the global hegemon – the world’s agenda setter.

Conceptual Changes

The concept of national security, traditionally, meant defense from an external attack by another state. It tended to focus on material capabilities and the use and control of military forces by other states.⁴ The security dilemma – an increase in one state’s security meant an automatic decrease in the other’s – was the basis upon which superpower policy was based.

When it came to protecting the US homeland prior to September 11, Washington's singular preoccupation was national missile defense. That urgency about guarding the United States from a potential missile attack from Russia, China, or North Korea, now stands in stark contrast to the government's current focus on protecting America's transportation networks and land and sea borders – the “enemy” now lies within.⁵

Traditionally, foreign policy experts associated domestic aspects of national security with Third World conditions, such as the cases of ethnic conflicts where states face a threat from within (Somalia, Sudan, etc). Now, the “domestication” of national security threats has reached the US itself.⁶ As a result, the US has withdrawn into “homeland defense,” and this has meant a restructuring of its foreign policy with a focus on its so-called “war against terrorism” internally and externally, and preemptive action against states deemed possible future threats.⁷

The Arab/Islamic World – The Pervasiveness of Insecurity

Another important conceptual change that quickly emerged after September 11 is the increasing polarization of the world along cultural lines, and the coming of Islam to the forefront of the global agenda. Traditionally, national security concerns were defined in materialistic terms. However, after September 11, issues of “culture,” “identity” and “norms” tend to dominate the agenda.

Decision-makers on both sides of the conflict invoked Islam to justify competing claims, and had to address their respective audiences in Islamic terms. President Bush quickly distanced what he called “terrorists” from Islam: “These acts of violence against innocents violate the fundamental tenets of the Islamic faith… The face of terror is not the true faith of Islam. That’s not what Islam is about. Islam is peace. These terrorists don’t represent peace. They represent evil and war. When we think of Islam we think of a faith that brings comfort to a billion people around the world.”⁸

On the other hand, Osama bin Laden’s statement on October 7, 2001, offers a crucial window onto his conceptual world and warrants careful attention. In it, he states, “Hypocrisy stood behind the leader of global idolatry, behind the Hubal [chief idol of the Meccan pagans prior to Islam] of the age -- namely, America and its supporters.”⁹ In fact, his attack was designed to force Arab governments to choose: You are either with the idol-worshiping enemies of God or you are with the true believers.¹⁰

The conflict was cast in apocalyptic, messianic terms by both sides. Note President Bush’s “light & dark” characterization of the conflict:

Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. This is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America's freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all who believe in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.¹¹

Also note that bin Laden portrayed the struggle as one between “faith and infidelity/hypocrisy.” Bin Laden applauded the WTC attacks, saying: “But when the sword fell upon America after 80 years… hypocrisy raised its head up high bemoaning those killers who toyed with the blood, honor and sanctities of Muslims.”¹²

On the popular level, most Arabs publicly condemned the attacks on the US when they happened, but expressed outrage at consequent US attacks on Afghanistan. Bin Laden’s charismatic appearance in several videotaped messages aired around the world touched a sensitive cord among Muslims, as they were cast in purely Islamic terms set to remind them of the glories of the early days of Islam. A Washington Post report summarized Arab/Islamic sentiment:

Many people speak with almost a single voice about the US-British airstrikes on Afghanistan. They talk of saddened disapproval at the military operations, quiet admiration for Osama bin Laden as a protector of Islam and, most of all, profound identification with the Palestinians they see under attack constantly on their television screens.”¹³

The attacks on the US and the subsequent US attacks on Afghanistan posed a considerable challenge to the foreign policies of Arab states struggling within a complex geopolitical situation – one already made difficult by the ongoing Palestinian Intifadah fueled by Israeli aggression. Arab regimes were faced with a challenge that manifested itself in the necessity to strike a delicate balance between public anti-US sentiments and the increasing threat Islamic militancy posed to their regimes, on one hand, and mounting US pressure on Arab regimes to not only verbally support its onslaught against Afghanistan but also to provide explicit material evidence of this support, on the other.¹⁴

In other words, Arab governments seemed caught between the hammer of US demands for support and the anvil of an increasingly anti-US public, with militant Islamists threatening their grip on power. However, Arab regimes’ support for the US could not go all the way, and it varied from one country to another depending on the degree of Islamist threat to their regimes, and what regimes hoped to gain in return for their cooperation.

Official Palestinian and Omani positions were the closest to that of the United States. For the first time since the then yearlong Intifada began, Palestinian policemen shot down their own people with live ammunition. The confrontation started when Palestinians rallied in the thousands to support Osama bin Laden and denounce the US attacks on Afghanistan. Yasir Arafat, fearing he would lose the sympathy of President George W. Bush, ordered a crackdown. Three Palestinians were killed, and more than 50 were injured in clashes.¹⁵

The United States flew reconnaissance, transport and refueling aircraft from Omani bases, which, in turn, became staging grounds for attacks on Afghanistan. Despite their reservations, Saudi Arabia and Egypt were both indispensable pillars in America’s “anti-terrorism” strategy by providing considerable logistical and intelligence-gathering support to the US. American and British troops were among 10 armies cooperating in joint military maneuvers in the Northern Sahara near Mubarak’s Military City, in what is known as “Bright Star 2001.”¹⁶

Nevertheless, US attacks on Afghanistan and the Arab foreign policy response illustrated, once again, the legitimacy crisis of Arab governments, ad-hoc decision-making, the dichotomy between regime and societal interests, the transnational appeal of Islam, and the lack of a unified Arab/Islamic plan of action.

US Domestic Changes & Foreign Policy Repercussions

The domestic result of the crisis was to empower unilateralist and authoritarian forces in American political society that had grown in influence in recent years but had been held in check by the overall balance of institutional and popular power in the country.¹⁷

The utopianism, ethnocentrism and radical messianism in the conceptual mindset of US leaders, was exposed by their reaction to the attacks. This was manifested in the belief that American domination of international society is history’s natural conclusion.¹⁸ As President Bush said: “America is the single surviving model of human progress.”¹⁹

This is “their version of American Manifest Destiny,” a “tougher version of Wilsonianism, created in the higher interest of all.”²⁰ Today, this hawkish position has three expressions: “the military assault in Afghanistan, the de facto support for the Israeli attempt to liquidate the Palestinian Authority [and, by extension, the “Palestinian issue” itself], and the invasion of Iraq, which is reportedly in the military preparation stage.”²¹

US behavior in the post-September period failed to make any distinction between al-Qa’eda and other Islamic groups and organizations. As a result, Muslim civil society and governments were put under extreme pressure. Some 600 relatives of September 11 victims filed a lawsuit seeking more than $100 trillion from the Saudi government and affiliated banks and charities, charging they financed Osama bin Laden's network and the attacks on America. The complaint names more than seven dozen defendants, including the government of Saudi Arabia, seven banks, eight Islamic foundations and three Saudi princes.²² In addition, more than $70 million dollars in assets belonging to Islamic banks and charities have been frozen worldwide since the attacks on the US.²³ Money from most of those banks and charities goes to relief efforts in Kosovo, Chechnya and Palestine.

Despite the fact that Palestinians have been under siege since the beginning of the Intifadah, President Bush blocked the accounts of two Palestinian Banks (Beit Al-Mal Holdings and Al Aqsa Islamic Bank) on alleged links to Hamas – an organization which he called: “one of the deadliest terrorist organizations in the world today.”²⁴

Even Islamic education was declared an enemy. CIA Director George Tenet declared: “The greatest long-term impact on any society is its educational system. Primary and secondary education in parts of the Muslim world is often dominated by an interpretation of Islam that teaches intolerance and hatred. The graduates of these schools – ‘madrasas’ - provide the foot soldiers for many of the Islamic militant groups that operate throughout the Muslim world.”²⁵ Such a biased approach by the US government has caused outrage amongst many in the Islamic world, and led many to believe that this is, in fact, a war against Islam.

Globalization

The September 11 attacks had serious repercussions for the future of globalization. The attacks illustrated that the very same system that was destined to bring about a “global village” ended up making people in different parts of the world polarized and more resentful of each other. In addition, the very same system that fueled the 1990s – the openness of the US economy, which helped spawn unparalleled growth – also increased America’s vulnerability.

For years, US policymakers, trade negotiators, and business leaders have operated on the assumption that there was no downside to building frictionless global networks of international trade and travel. Policing the flows of people and goods passing through those networks was seen as a barrier to competitiveness that should be marginalized or eliminated wherever possible. After September 11, security became paramount, and barriers to travel and trade were erected everywhere. Hence, “nineteen men wielding box-cutters ended up accomplishing what no adversary of the world’s sole superpower could ever have aspired to: a successful blockade of the US economy.”²⁶

Conclusions

The US-led globalization process, while enriching the world’s most prosperous nations, has contributed to the marginalization and disenfranchisement of over a third of the world’s population. In addition, the sense of hopelessness and powerlessness that has spread throughout the Muslim world is one of the major causes of the attacks on the US. Nevertheless, one must acknowledge that the West's battle against what it calls “terrorism” is not merely a battle against poverty as a root cause of anti-Westernism, but a battle to win the hearts and minds of billions of people who have very little to lose and everything to gain by opposing the West.²⁷ In other words, it involves a “war of ideas.” If the United States remains unwilling to change its arrogant policies, many more in the Muslim world will join the 95% of educated Saudis, aged 25 to 41, who support bin Laden’s cause.²⁸ In the end, they will have nothing to lose but their chains. 

Kareem M. Kamel is an Egyptian freelance writer based in Cairo, Egypt. He has an MA in International Relations and is specialized in security studies, decision-making, nuclear politics, Middle East politics and the politics of Islam. He is currently assistant to the Political Science Department at the American University in Cairo.

1- Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Eagle Has Crash Landed,” Foreign Policy July/August 2002.

2- Ibid.

3- Marc W. Herold, “A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States’ Aerial Bombing of Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Accounting,” The author examined only documented cases of civilian casualties that were reported by news media. The real estimate of civilian casualties is believed to exceed 5,000.

4- Peter Katzenstein, ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms & Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 9. 

5- Stephen E. Flynn, “America the Vulnerable,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2002).

6- Bahgat Korany, “Decoding Bloody Tuesday Events: From the End of the End of History to the End of American Exceptionalism,” from The Attacks on the United States: What Next?: Papers from a Political Science Panel November 24^th, 2001.

7- William Pfaff, “Geopolitics Have Changed for the Worse,” International Herald Tribune September 11^th, 2002.

8- Mark B. Salter, “American Post-post-Cold War Foreign Policy Discourse: A Double Reading of the War on Terror,” from The Attacks on the United States: What Next?: Papers from a Political Science Panel November 24^th, 2001.

9- Michael Scott Doran, “Somebody Else’s Civil War,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2002).

10- Ibid.

11-  “Text: Bush Address to Congress,” BBC World September 21, 2001.

12-  John Kifner, “Time of Trial For Muslim Friends of the US,” New York Times October 10, 2001.

13- Ibid.

14-  Fennell Tom, et al. “Walking a Fine Line,” Maclean’s October 22, 2001: 36-38.

15-  “Clash of Palestinians, Police Turns Fatal,” The Arizona Republic October 9, 2001: A7.

16-  Ron Franscell, “Nations Work at Fighting Together,” Denver Post October 23, 2001.

17- William Pfaff, “Geopolitics Have Changed for the Worse,” International Herald Tribune September 11^th, 2002.

18- Ibid.

19- Ibid.

20- Ibid.

21- Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Eagle Has Crash Landed,” Foreign Policy July/August 2002.

22- Laurie Kellman, “More than 600 September 11 Victims’ Families Sue Saudi Princes, Banks,” The Associated Press August 15^th, 2002. 

23- Kurt Eichenwald, “A Nation Challenged: Money Trails,” The New York Times January 10^th, 2002.

24- Jodi Edna and Ken Moritsugo, “US War on Terrorism Widened by Bush’s Freezing of Hamas Assets,” Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service December 5^th, 2001.

25- George J. Tenet, “Converging Dangers in a Post-9/11 World,” Delivered to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington D.C on February 6^th, 2002. Vital Speeches of the Day March 1^st, 2002.

26- Stephen E. Flynn, “America the Vulnerable,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2002).

27- Daniel Wagner, “The Battle Against Terrorism: A Battle for Stomachs, Hearts and Minds,” International Risk Management Institute March 2002.

28- Ibid.

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