Writing
in the Sunday Times newspaper, Yosri Fuda of Al-Jazeera
television also claimed he was told that the fourth target of the
September 11 attacks was supposed to be Capitol Hill in Washington -
and not the White House, as has been presumed.
Fuda’s
revelations were based on two days of interviews he conducted inside
Pakistan in June with two senior aides of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin
Laden - Khaled Sheikh Mohammad and Ramzi bin al-Shaiba.
U.S.
authorities want both men for alleged connections with the September
11 attacks.
News
agencies report Mohammed is one of the highest-ranking al-Qaeda
leaders still at large whom U.S. officials believe is planning further
attacks against U.S. interests. Binalshibh belonged to a Hamburg-based
cell led by Mohammed Atta, an Egyptian suspected of leading the
September 11 hijackers, U.S. officials believe.
Fouda
said he also learned that Atta had been a sleeper operative in Germany
since 1992 and started detailed planning with a 1999 meeting in
Afghanistan with other sleepers, reports news agencies.
Qatar-based
Al-Jazeera, said last Friday, September 6, that the interview
represented "the first direct confession" by al-Qaeda of its
responsibility for the attacks.
The
Sunday Times said the interview would be aired on Thursday,
September 12, with English subtitles, though it added that only voice
recordings - and not images - were available.
Fuda
said he has waited until now to air the interview because he wanted to
include it in a documentary marking the first anniversary of the
September 11 attacks, reports news agencies.
Fuda,
who hosts the Al-Jazeera program “Top Secret,” said he met
Mohammad and Shaiba in an apartment in a Pakistani city - he thinks it
was Karachi - to which he had been driven while blindfolded.
Fuda
quotes Mohammed as saying, “I am the head of the al-Qaeda military
committee and Ramzi [Binalshibh] is the coordinator of the ‘Holy
Tuesday’ operation.” September 11, 2001 fell on a Tuesday.
He
quoted Mohammad as telling him: “The attacks were designed to cause
as many deaths as possible, and havoc, and to be a big slap for
America on American soil.”
U.S.
counter terrorism officials believe many of Mohammed’s purported
statements about the origins of the September 11 attacks are
plausible. However, no information exists to verify those claims.
Fuda
claimed he was told that Al-Qaeda initially thought of striking “a
couple of U.S. nuclear facilities,” but decided against the idea out
of fears that it might “go out of control.”
“You
do not need to know more than that at this stage, and anyway it was
eventually decided to leave our nuclear targets for now,” he quoted
Mohammad as saying.
The
fourth target on September 11 was Capitol Hill, the seat of the U.S.
Senate and House of Representatives, and not the White House as widely
presumed, Fuda said he was told. That attack failed when a United
Airlines plane crashed in Pennsylvania as passengers tried to overcome
its hijackers.
He
claimed he was also told that the decision to carry out “a martyrdom
operation inside America” was made in early 1999 by Al-Qaeda’s
military committee, of which Mohammad - who appears on the FBI’s
most wanted terrorist list - is chief.
Fuda
was also told that Mohammad Atta, who led the September 11 hijackers,
and other participants traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan in mid-1999.
He later communicated with Shaiba by Internet posing as a student in
the United States.
Code
names were given to the targets: the World Trade Center was the
“faculty of town planning,” the Pentagon “the faculty of fine
arts,” and Capitol Hill “the faculty of law.”
Fuda
said that he was informed that Shaiba was supposed to have been the
20th hijacker on September 11, but could not get into the United
States. Fuda said he still keeps “souvenirs” such as Boeing flying
manuals and air charts.
Fuda
said the interview was arranged by a go-between who, shortly after his
arrival in Karachi, told him that Bin Laden was “not dead,” but
who also refused to say where the al-Qaeda leader was.
Fuda
was told not to bring any electronic equipment to the interview, and
utilized equipment provided by the go-betweens.
After
two days with Mohammad and Shaiba, Fuda was told to leave his
videotapes behind so that their faces could be blanked out. In what
Fuda speculated was “some sort of disruption” in al-Qaeda’s
leadership, the videotapes were never returned as promised.
But
he did, however, eventually get audio tracks from the tapes