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 Apparently,
questions of alliance have always been dominating Iranian foreign
policy. Starting with the nineties when Iraq invaded Kuwait
and Iran was expected to take a stand; either to side with Iraq or
with the ‘rest of the world.’ The decision makers in
Iran were aware of the delicacy of the situation that they decided
not to take a stand. This position turned out to be what we
may call a bi-stand; Iran did not participate in the American led
coalition against Iraq, nor did it explicitly side with it.
The Islamic Republic
of Iran was able to maximize its benefits from both sides of the
coalition. It was ready to give up some of its territorial
demands and to claim responsibility for starting the first gulf
war. The West was willing to pay even more; new bridges were
built between the Islamic Republic of Iran and western countries,
especially European countries. Reporters and analysts were
willing to encourage and promote the new image of Iran in the
international media. Iran came out of this crisis as a
winner, and winners were few.
The 11th of September
incidents in the United States posed the same question
again. The Islamic Republic of Iran had to take a stand and
to decide ‘to ally or not to ally,’ but this time the decision
explicitly meant allying with the ‘Great Satan.’
Iran’s initial position was a clear condemnation of the
terrorist attacks against civilians. Khatemi was among other
presidents offering his condolences to the American people.
However, in reaction to Israel’s attempt to equate the Intifadah
with the September attacks, Iran was clear in expressing its stand
against terrorism, but it drew a very clear line between terrorism
and the right to fight occupation.
The early days of the
crisis were very promising to the Iranians. Iran was able to
open new gates with the new administration in the U.S. from a
humanitarian perspective without causing further domestic conflict
with the conservatives. The American administration, in its
attempt to build an international coalition, welcomed Iranian
efforts and considered them a promising gesture.
The situation changed
soon with the accusations against Islam in general and Osama bin
Laden and the Taliban movement in particular. For different
reasons, the U.S. decided to hold bin Laden as ‘the major
suspect’ in the September attacks. Soon after, the U.S.
began to prepare for military retaliation against what it called
the bases of terrorism, and identified Afghanistan as the
target. Iran was openly invited to participate in this
coalition by the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell.
Taking a decision to participate would have secured a new era for
Iranian foreign policy, especially with the U.S., an old enemy.
Iran, however, decided
not to join the military coalition. This decision was taken
based on the following: a) identifying both sides of the crisis,
b) balancing the pros and cons of each position and c) analyzing
the alternatives. This also took into consideration the
nature of the Iranian society and its domestic problems.
It was not surprising
to the Iranians that both sides of the conflict were more or less
old enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Taliban
represented a challenge to the model given by the Iranians on the
ideological level. Iran also had its close ties with the
opposition groups in the north of Afghanistan and was known for
its military support for those groups. Furthermore, Iran had
been suffering from more than two million Afghani refugees inside
Iran. Those refugees had been pressuring the Iranians both
on economic and security issues.
Also, the U.S. was not
a great friend to the Islamic Republic of Iran. On the
contrary, a history of hostility and conflicting interests has
been well marked by both sides. Efforts were made to bring
the two sides together, especially when Mr. Khatemi came to office
in Iran, but it was to no avail.
Furthermore, Iran
demanded an identification of the terrorists. What happened
on September 11th could not be accepted on the official level, but
credible and solid evidence was needed to convince participants -
or potential participants - of the ‘good case’ the U.S. had
against bin Laden. If such evidence was available and if the
coalition against terrorism was under the auspices of the United
Nations, Iran would have become part of the coalition.
This, however, was not
the case. Iran had to make quick calculations of the
situation. Participating in the American led coalition would have
cost the Iranian government its credibility on the domestic level;
how could siding with the ‘Great Satan’ against a Muslim
country be justified, especially with anti-American sentiments
prevailing inside Iran? The regional level was not different
either, with the media showing Muslim anger at the war. Iran
could not risk becoming another Pakistan in the eyes of Muslims
around the world.
Not siding with the
U.S. meant siding with ‘the terrorists,’ as stated by the
American president in the early days of the crisis. This
would imply that Iran could be a target in the military campaign
against terrorism. In dealing with the dilemma, Iran stated
from the very beginning that it sided with justice, not with or
against the American government. Iran started looking for
other fronts to side with. Iranian diplomats worked on
regional, humanitarian, and international levels.
On the regional level,
Iran tried to coordinate its efforts with Syria, Saudi Arabia and
Egypt. These countries were able to establish a position
against terrorism on the one hand, and against waging a war on
Afghanistan without solid evidence on the other. Their
people felt quite strongly against the American campaign.
Thus they realized it was for their best interest to create a
unified position and make the most of it. They were able to
help the Islamic Conference Organization to issue a statement
against attacking the civilians of Afghanistan.
Humanitarian efforts
were another part of the puzzle. From the beginning of the
crisis Iran declared the closure of its borders with Afghanistan,
stopping any movement from or to the Taliban territory. The
American government considered this a good move against the
Taliban. Later, Iran unofficially opened its borders,
allowing refugees to flee Afghanistan and at the same time helping
Afghani refugees in Iran to return to their families, especially
after the air raids had started. Since 1996, with the
Taliban in power, Iran had been suffering from the numbers of
refugees escaping from Afghanistan (around two million); they were
perceived as a threat to the Iranian state on security and
economic levels.
The Iranians started
building refugee camps along the borders with Afghanistan and on
the Afghani side. These efforts were not always successful
due to the reluctance of the Taliban, but in cases of success Iran
continued to guard against the flow of refugees into Iran.
By participating in the humanitarian efforts, Iran was able to
enhance its image on both regional and international levels.
This improved image could maximize Iranian benefits.
In a desire to have a
say in determining the future of Afghanistan after the possible
fall of the Taliban, humanitarian efforts were not sufficient for
the Iranian government. Diplomatic efforts were also made
with the Russians, reaching what is known as the 6+2
understanding. Countries of Central Asia; Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, Turkministan, Pakistan and Iran plus China, the United
States and Russia were to be responsible for planning and
‘drawing’ the future of Afghanistan.
From the first day of
the American attacks Iran declared its condemnation of the raids
and called for an immediate cease-fire. Even though Iran
hosts a number of Afghani opposition leaders, it stated that it
could not tolerate any attempt to disturb its borders. The
Iranian leadership declared its stand a number of times and it
only recently declared that the recent developments in Afghanistan
were a clear manifestation of the absence of morality in the world
to the point of ignorance. The Iranian president added that
the Afghan nation is oppressed not only by the ignorant rulers who
generate violence and present an ugly image of Islam to the world,
but also by the modern, yet apparently ignorant powers, who were
attacking it.
Nevertheless, the
question remains: What will be the future of Iranian relations
with the United States, Afghanistan, or regional powers such as
Egypt and Saudi Arabia in case of prolonging the war? Will
Iran become a target? Will it help in pinpointing other
targets, or will it help bring a solution to the dilemma the
region faces?
Amal Hamada is
Assistant Professor of Political Science in Cairo University.
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