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The Dilemmas of Darfur
The Politics of Disintegration, Oil, and Foreign Intervention
“African
oil is of national strategic interest to us, and it will increase
and become more important as we go forward.” [1]
–
Walter Kansteiner
,
US
Assistant Secretary of State for
Africa
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The
current conflict in Western Sudan is an economic one. |
For
many decades, the Arab world has been a hotbed of violent conflict and
ethno-religious animosities that have often been internationalized and
exploited by foreign powers.
Arab
states have witnessed endless racial, ethnic, religious, tribal, and
sectarian conflicts, and have failed to establish legitimate
institutions that regard cultural diversity as a source of national
unity and cumulative strength. Rather, successive governments in the
region have consistently antagonized local minorities, which has
eventually created multiple crises that have in almost every case—
Lebanon
,
Iraq
,
Sudan
—acted as a pretext for regional or international intervention.
The
case of
Sudan
is a perfect example of the internal fragility of the Arab state, the
interconnectedness and overlapping between internal and international
politics, and the vulnerability to regional and international powers. [2]
The
Bigger Picture:
Darfur
in Perspective
Over
the past 19 months, international media have often represented the
conflict in
Darfur
as a case of murderous, government-backed Arab militias called
Janjaweed against a virtually helpless indigenous African population. [3]
This oversimplification has failed to put the conflict in its proper
perspective. In fact,
Darfur
’s Arabs are black, indigenous, African and Muslim—just like
Darfur
’s non-Arabs, who come from Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa, and a dozen
smaller tribes.[4]
The
conflict began in 2003, when two new rebel groups—The Sudan
Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM)—took up arms against government military installations. The
two groups represent various ethnicities, all of which speak Nilotic
languages and come from sedentary farming communities. [5]
The sedentary Nilotics of Darfur were
intermittently subjected to attacks by marauding horsemen—the
Janjaweed, nomads of various local tribes who speak the Darfuri Arabic
dialect.
Conflicts
in
Darfur
between settled farmers and nomads migrating in search for water have
been commonplace for centuries, but traditionally solutions were
reached by negotiations. In fact, nomads and farmers in
Darfur
have a long history of interdependence and intermarriage. [6]
However, during the 1980s and 1990s, conflict
caused by resource competition increased due to the intensification of
drought and desertification.
The
current conflict in
Western Sudan
is an economic one, over land between two groups facing water scarcity
in a changing ecosystem.
In
light of the grim realities on the ground, The SLA and the JEM
demanded that the Sudanese government stop arming the nomadic groups
in
Darfur
and address long-standing grievances over underdevelopment in the
region. [7]
Observers
contend that since Darfuri militants launched their rebellion, the
Sudanese government has embarked upon a “scorched-earth campaign”
in which it has deployed bombers, helicopter gunships, paramilitaries,
regular armed forces, and local nomadic tribal militias known as the
Janjaweed. Some analysts argue that the campaign has produced the
greatest single exodus of refugees in the world in 2003—1.2 million
internally displaced people and more than 200,000 refugees in
neighboring Chad [8]—and
has claimed almost 30,000 lives since it began in February. Experts
warn that without rapid humanitarian intervention, what UN officials
have dubbed “the worst humanitarian crisis in the world today”
could claim 350,000 more lives in the next nine months.[9]
The
US
,
Sudan
, and the
Middle East
: Cynicism and Strategic Interests
The
West’s sudden interest in
Sudan
suggests that strategic reasons are the main motivating
factors for action. |
|
While
the humanitarian situation in
Darfur
is indeed tragic, many analysts have questioned the true intentions of
the
US
administration in its handling of the crisis. For decades, civil wars
have taken the lives of many millions in
Africa
, yet the
US
has only expressed outrage occasionally.
Setting
aside its most recent military intervention that forced the Liberian
President, Charles Taylor, into exile in
Nigeria
, the
US
has been satisfied with making occasional statements on African
crises. [10]The
US and the rest of the international community remained silent as the
Christian “Lord’s Resistance Army” in Uganda killed tens of
thousands of people, often mutilating their bodies, displaced more
than 1.6 million people, kidnapped thousands of children, and forced
many to become soldiers or sex slaves.[11]
The
US-controlled global financial institutions, such as the IMF and the
World Bank, have contributed to obstructing the development of
Sudan
,
Chad
, and other countries in the region. The Guardian’s analyst George
Monbiot contends that the “cannibalistic IMF [is] responsible for
more deaths every year in
Africa
than the Janjaweed.” [12]
The
West’s sudden interest in
Sudan
suggests that strategic—and not humanitarian—reasons are the main
motivating factors for action.
In
July,
Washington
, backed by the European Union, began a campaign against the Sudanese
government. On July 1, Colin Powell visited
Khartoum
and threatened that if the Sudanese government did not take concrete
steps towards the disarming of the Janjaweed, the “international
community” would be considering other actions. [13]
The
Sudanese government then issued a joint communiqué with UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan, promising to “immediately start
disarming the Janjaweed and other armed outlaw groups,” “allow the
deployment of human rights monitors,” and “ensure that all
individuals and groups accused of human rights violations are brought
to justice without delay.”
[14]
Despite
Khartoum’s efforts, in mid-July Powel circulated a draft UN Security
Council resolution that threatened Khartoum with unspecified sanctions
unless it implemented the July 3 UN-Sudan communiqué. Both
Britain
and
Australia
added to
Washington
’s pressure on
Khartoum
by declaring their willingness to send troops to the troubled region
if called upon. On July 22, the US Congress unanimously called on
President Bush to consider “multilateral or even unilateral
intervention to prevent ‘genocide’ should the United Nations
Security Council fail to act.” [15]Subsequently,
a final resolution was passed by the UN Security Council warning that
unless
Khartoum
made progress in implementing the July 3 communiqué within 30 days of
the resolution’s adoption, the UN Security Council would “consider
further actions.”
The
active involvement of Western powers, especially the
United States
, in the
Darfur
crisis has led some analysts to suggest that Western moves are part of
a larger geopolitical pincer movement aimed at the gradual
disintegration of
Sudan
, spearheaded by John Garang and his Sudan People’s Liberation
Army/Movement (SPLA/M) with the active encouragement of the West. It
is no coincidence that renewed fighting in Darfur was brought to the
limelight at the very moment when a peace agreement was about to be
signed between the Sudanese government and Southern Sudan’s SPLA/M.
Allegedly, the Darfuri rebels feared that they would be left out of
any peace agreement between the government of Sudan and the SPLA/M,
and thus worked to strike a deal for themselves. According to reports
by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group (ICG), the SPLA/M
trained 1,500 Darfuri rebels in southwestern
Sudan
in March 2002. The first
SLA
political declaration of
March 13, 2003
was edited by exiled
Darfur
activists and SPLA/M leaders. Moreover, the chairman of the
SLA
, Abdel Wahid, met officially with Garang in
Asmara
,
Eritrea
in April 2004. [16]
For
years, the
US
administration has worked to dictate peace in
Sudan
on terms favorable to the southern separatists, always threatening the
Sudanese government with renewed military offensives in the south,
fully supplied and backed up by the
United States
and
Britain
. [17]This
has left the Sudanese government facing a war on two-fronts: An
unfinished war in the south and an ongoing one in the West.
The
currently influential Christian Right has for long seen the regime in
Sudan
as too “fundamentalist” and is bothered by the fact that the peace
deal between the north and south has allowed the Bashir regime to
remain in power. Hence, they see the
Darfur
conflict as a second chance to get rid of the regime in
Khartoum
. [18]
Since
the conflict in
Darfur
is usually cast in humanitarian terms, a pro-active
US
policy toward
Sudan
might work to propagate the image of the
US
as a champion of human rights amidst mounting criticisms of US
military activities in
Iraq
and
Afghanistan
.
The
Nile
remains the single most important facet of Egyptian
geopolitics. |
|
Egypt
, also, has extensive interests in
Sudan
. A US or Western involvement in its southern neighbor would
definitely have repercussions on Egyptian policy. In recent months,
Anglo-American pressure has led
Ethiopia
,
Kenya
,
Uganda
, and
Tanzania
to question the old
Nile
treaties with
Egypt
. [19]
Prior to the events in Darfur, the Egyptian response to the
US-sponsored Machakos agreement was very tepid, and many in Cairo
raised doubts that the protocols laid the foundation for an
independent southern Sudan—an outcome which would stand in stark
contrast to Egypt’s national interests in a unified Sudan under
Khartoum’s control. Egyptian officials felt that the Machakos
agreement bypassed the Egyptian-Libyan Initiative (August 1999) and
failed to recognize the national interests of
Egypt
:
Any
Egyptian government, regardless of its ideological inclinations, has
to safeguard two things: national unity, and the unhindered supply of
Nile
water.... Any regional or international development that interferes,
however remotely, with either of these two imperatives inevitably
raises alarm in
Cairo
. [20]
The
Nile
remains the single most important facet of Egyptian geopolitics;
without the river,
Egypt
would cease to exist. As early as the 1970s, Egyptian Air Force
bombers and reconnaissance aircraft routinely patrolled Sudanese
skies, and
Egypt
intervened militarily several times in the 1980s against Libyan
attempts to destabilize
Sudan
. [21]
There
is also the possibility of extensive Israeli activities in the Horn of
Africa, another source of alarm for
Egypt
. Evidence suggests that there is intelligence and military
cooperation between
Israel
and both
Kenya
and
Eritrea
to curb the so-called forces of “Islamic fundamentalism” emanating
from the Sudanese government. [22]
The
secessionist tendencies in both southern and western
Sudan
and a more intrusive role for foreign powers in the crisis provide the
ultimate opportunity to blackmail
Sudan
’s northern neighbor and influence its behavior.
The
Politics of Oil
China
and the
US
are engaged in fierce competition over oil interests in
Sudan
. |
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Oil
is a vital resource for both warring parties as well as regional and
international actors. “Oil is a symbol of the Sudanese problem:
Sudan
’s recent history of decolonization, failed nation-building and its
continuing political affairs are reflected in the story of oil.
Economic factors, such as oil exploration and extraction, show not
only that considerations of the global economy dominate political
decision-making but also clearly indicate the underlying sources of
conflict in
Sudan
.” [23]
The
US
strategic interests in
Africa
—the stability of oil states and maintenance of energy
security—were made clear in the 2003 Africa Doctrine
The
targeting of oil facilities and pipelines in
Iraq
and
Saudi Arabia
by anti-US militants has increased the urgency for alternative sources
of oil, and in light of the change in US foreign policy after
September 11, states such as
Libya
and
Sudan
are becoming increasingly important for the
US
in its bid to control the world’s oil reserves. “Libyan oil
production already ranks second to African oil giant
Nigeria
, and
Sudan
, if fully explored by oil geologists, could eventually rival oil
behemoth
Saudi Arabia
.” [24]
Sudan
’s oil resources are estimated to be worth at least US $53 billion
at current prices.[25]
Some estimates put
Sudan
’s known reserves at 1.2 billion barrels, with another 800 million
of recoverable reserves.[26]
More
importantly,
China
and the
US
are engaged in fierce competition over oil interests in
Sudan
.
China
is currently
Sudan
’s largest trading partner, and the National Petroleum Corporation
(NPC)—which is wholly owned by
China
—already has a 40% share in oil extraction operations in
Sudan
. [27]
US Assistant Secretary of State Walter Katsteiner suggested, “We
don’t foresee anything stopping the Chinese from increasing their
equity participation in oil, and I think it probably would be
problematic if they were the dominant player.”[28]
Conclusions
The
events in
Darfur
represent a multitude of interconnected dilemmas for all the actors
involved. On the one hand, the crisis clearly highlights
Khartoum
’s inability to handle cultural diversity, build a solid national
identity, or respect minority rights. On the other hand, opportunistic
foreign intervention has further inflamed the crisis.
Historically,
foreign meddling in southern
Sudan
’s civil war (particularly the supply of arms and money to Christian
and animist rebels) prolonged the conflict and delayed a peace
settlement for decades. [29]
Thus, any Western military intervention in the
Darfur
crisis would further inflame anti-Western sentiments and provide more
credibility to those who believe that the West is pursuing a modern
crusade against the world of Islam. Interestingly, recent attempts by
the
US
in both
Afghanistan
and
Iraq
to rekindle ethnic, sectarian, and tribal animosities bear a striking
resemblance to
America
’s divisive policies in
Sudan
and elsewhere in the
Middle East
. An imperial policy of “divide and rule” is in full force.
History
teaches us that civil wars tend to spill over into neighboring states
and draw in regional and international players into an endless cycle
of rivalry. The tragic conflict in
Darfur
could only be resolved when humanitarian concerns are allowed to
override opportunism and the ever-increasing politicization of the
crisis. However, as long as current trends are allowed to continue,
the prospects for stability in
Sudan
—and, by extension, the entire
Middle East
—are grim.
[2]
For a theoretical view on
Third World
conflict and national security, see Bahgat Korany et al., The Many
Faces of National Security in the Arab World (St. Martin’s
Press: New York, 1993)
[3]
Eric Margolis, “Tread Softly in
Sudan
,” Canoe
August 15, 2004
[5]
Robbert Woltering, “
Darfur
: The Logic Behind the Conflict,”
August 6, 2004
Review of International Social Questions
[10]
Kibisu Kabatesi, “Oil Driving US Move on
Sudan
,” Global Policy Forum
July 11, 2004
[13]
Norm Dixon, “Oil Profits Behind West’s Tears for
Darfur
,” Green Left Weekly
August 11, 2004
[16]
Uwe Friesecke, “Western Powers Seek
Sudan
Disintegration,” Executive Intelligence Review
August 6, 2004
[18]
Robbert Woltering, “
Darfur
: The Logic Behind the Conflict,” Review of International
Social Questions
August 6, 2004
[19]
Uwe Friesecke, “Western Powers Seek
Sudan
Disintegration,” Executive Intelligence Review
August 6, 2004
[20]
Hassan Abu Taleb, “African Cloaks, Foreign Daggers,”
Al-Ahram Weekly Online
August 8, 2002
[22]
Israel
Shahak, Open Secrets: Israeli Nuclear and Foreign Policies
(London : Pluto Press, 1997) : 68-71.
[25]
Meron Tesfa Michael, “
Sudan
: Peace in Peril”
[29]
Eric Margolis, “Tread Softly in
Sudan
,” Canoe
August 15, 2004
Kareem
M. Kamel is an Egyptian freelance writer based in Cairo,
Egypt
. He has an MA in International Relations and is specialized in security
studies, decision-making, nuclear politics,
Middle East
politics and the politics of Islam. He is currently
assistant to the Political Science Department at the
American
University
in
Cairo
.
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