|
And
Back to Palestine…
|
|
Dahlan:
An alternative to Arafat?
|
Last
week Al Wasat magazine reported that a document found by IDF forces
in a raid on one of the Palestinian security centers caused a lot of
worry among Israeli military and intelligence circles. The document
was drafted by members of the Palestinian Preventative Security
Services (PPSS) and explained in detail the role of a Palestinian
Shin Bet (Israeli general intelligence) collaborator in giving
information on the whereabouts of Sheikh Salah Shihada moments
before the prominent Hamas leader was assassinated. Apparently, the
collaborator in question was not Israel’s only source; the
information was reinforced by another Shin Bet agent in the ranks of
Hamas.
The
document criticized the incautious behavior of the Hamas leadership,
who had obviously been infiltrated and were not acting with adequate
secrecy, although the Sheikh was known to be a target for Israeli
assassination.
The
Israelis found the document particularly disturbing because of its
sympathetic tone towards the “terrorist” organization, and
because it recommended instructing Hamas and other militant factions
on how to take precautionary measures against infiltration. It
seemed to be an indicator that, far from implementing Israeli
demands to eradicate the roots of “terror” in the territories,
the PA (Palestinian Authority) security forces were actually
sympathetic to and willing to aid these organizations.
As
it turned out, the head of the PPSS in Gaza ignored the
recommendations of the junior and medium ranking officers who
drafted the document. The document was filed and never saw light
until it was captured by Israeli forces.
Abu
Mazen and Dahlan will not be allowed to fail |
|
The
incident might just be a manifestation of a more widespread
phenomenon that is taking place in the Occupied Territories. Only
hours after the new Palestinian Prime Minister Abu Mazen declared to
the Legislative Council his determination to stop the violence and
disarm all Palestinian factions, a suicide bombing took place in Tel
Aviv, for which the responsibility was claimed by Hamas and the
al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, a military wing of Fatah, the largest
faction of the PLO and the power base of the PA.
It
seems that middle and junior ranking security personnel are acting
in a manner that is not necessarily consistent with the discourse of
the political leadership. “They have become very decentralized
since the outset of the Intifada,” explains Middle East affairs
expert Dr. Walid Kazziha. “Most decisions of on-the-ground actions
are made at the local leadership level.”
This
is unsurprising in light of the Israeli government’s policy of
destroying the PA’s infrastructure ever since Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon came to power. Means of communication between towns, cities
and refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza have been severely
damaged, and the constant Israeli blockades mean that local units
have to frequently act on their own initiative. Three years into the
Intifada these units have developed into small local leaderships
that are highly independent from their central political leadership.
This is true for the PA’s security and governing bodies as well as
for opposition organizations.
Will
it be possible for the new Palestinian Prime Minister to lead such a
loose body of government to achieve what he set as his goals?
Abu
Mazen will have enormous backing from the US and probably Egypt to
put an end to Palestinian militant action. According to Dr. Emad
Gad, the expert on Israeli affairs at the Al-Ahram Center for
Political and Strategic Studies, the interests of international and
regional powers are clearly to stop the violence and proceed with
the roadmap, putting an end to the turbulent atmosphere of the
Middle East. Abu Mazen and Mohammed Dahlan, the new state minister
for security affairs, are both important tools to achieve this end.
“They will not be allowed to fail,” adds Dr. Gad.
The
Palestinian factions on the other hand seem determined to stick to
their arms. Abu Mazen’s speech to the Legislative Council was
denounced by Fatah’s own al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, who
threatened to “react adequately and vigorously” against any
attempt to disarm its elements.
|
|
Jibril
Rajoub still commands loyalty
|
Hamas,
Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
(PFLP) have made similar statements, making it clear that they are
ready to go very far to keep their arms. “It’s the only thing
left for us,” said Abu Ahmed Foad, Head of the Political
Department in the Damascus office of the PFLP. “If the PA goes too
far, then we’ll do what we’ve got to do,” hinting that the
organization is ready to fight back against the PA’s security
forces if it is forced to.
However,
many seem determined not to let things get out of hand. All are
aware that if they cannot reach a compromise through dialogue, the
result will be a civil war that would only serve Israeli interests.
The Palestinian Ambassador to the Arab League Mohammed Subeih
insisted that “[the factions and the PA] will reach an agreement
during the dialogue that will take place in Cairo soon.” He blamed
Israel for the failure of previous talks, stating, “Whenever Abu
Amar convinced the militants to lay down their weapons, the Israeli
government would go ahead and provoke them into retaliation.”
A
leading member of the Hamas Politburo in Damascus who requested
anonymity also expressed hope that the issue would be solved through
dialogue. When asked whether events similar to those of 1996 were
expected to be repeated, he said that he couldn’t answer such a
question. “All I can say is that Hamas has never raised arms
except against Israelis.”
The
Palestinian factions are aware that if they cannot reach a
compromise the result will be a civil war |
|
There
are however precedents of armed clashes between Hamas and PA. The
assassination of Hamas leader Yehia Ayash in 1995 provoked Hamas and
Jihad into a series of retaliatory operations that took the lives of
some 60 Israelis between February and March 1996. Arafat then
launched a strong campaign against the Islamic movement, and the
result was fierce armed clashes and a large number of detentions.
Again in December 2001, following a large Israeli campaign against
PA controlled areas in retaliation for suicide bombings in Jerusalem
and Haifa, Arafat ordered Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, founder and spiritual
leader of Hamas, to be placed under house arrest, in addition to the
detention of several members of Hamas and Jihad.
But
Arafat has always been very careful in handling this card. According
to Dr. Kazziha he sometimes has to “give something” to the
Israelis and the Americans, so he takes some measures to subdue the
factions, which of course has the additional benefit of reasserting
Arafat’s own authority and power in the Palestinian political
theater. Yet he is aware that waging a full-scale campaign against
those popular groups would be a fatal adventure, and that his
legitimacy as a leader of the Palestinian people could come to an
end. The solution he has practiced for a long time is to maintain a
flexible position and always leave space to maneuver so as to
withstand the opposing pressures from international and regional
powers on one hand and domestic Palestinian powers on the other.
The
Israelis, however, have become aware of this strategy of not going
too far against resistance movements, and are not satisfied with it.
Reports by the IDF and Shin Bet concluded that Israel cannot depend
on Arafat anymore for security against Palestinian militants, and
hence he was deemed “irrelevant as a negotiating partner,” as
Sharon declared in early 2002. During the following year Israel
would take matters of security into its own hands by maintaining a
strong military presence in the West Bank and Gaza. But this was
only a temporary solution. The final answer to the problem would
have to come from a Palestinian governing body capable of
maintaining a controlled atmosphere in the Territories. The bet is
now on Abu Mazen and Gaza strong man Mohammed Dahlan.
Waging
a campaign against the popular Palestinian groups would be a
fatal adventure |
|
Dahlan
has signaled several times over the past year that he could be the
alternative to Arafat. He has several assets to make him a good
candidate for the Israelis and the Americans, including his fluency
in Hebrew, the experience of years of peaceful negotiations, his
good relations with Israel and the United States, in addition to his
influence in Fatah’s Tanzeem militia in Gaza and his fierce
attitude towards Hamas and Islamic Jihad. According to IDF and Shin
Bet intelligence reports, Dahlan in his new position has the
willingness to suppress both Palestinian factions. But his ability
to do so is another matter. In Gaza, where he served as Chief of
PPSS for several years, he has a strong power base and could
probably manage to crack down on his rivals. However, the security
apparatus of the West Bank, which is more of a problem to the
Israelis, is loyal to former Chief of the West Bank PPSS Jibril
Rajoub and to Yasser Arafat. Their obedience to Dahlan in the case
of his openly opposing Arafat is a question that remains to be
answered.
Khaled
Ezzelarab is a Foreign
Trade Analyst in the Egyptian Office of the Minister of Foreign
Trade and a writer. A graduate of Economics and International
Relations from the American University in Cairo , he is currently
studying for his Masters. You can reach him at kezzelarab@islam-online.net
|
