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Australia’s
September 11th
The Future of
Australian-Islamic South Asian Relations
The recent attack in Bali has incurred
a catastrophic human toll on its victims and has had the effect of
further destabilizing an already politically and culturally
untenable relationship between Australia and the Islamic world
(primarily South East Asia).
In
the aftermath of the attack, which took the lives of approximately
one hundred Australian nationals, one cannot help recount images of
the result of the attacks of September 11th. To
Australia, the Bali attacks were its own equivalent of September 11th.
At the critical stage following the attack, Australia is in a state
of mourning. While it mourns however, Australia is calculating and
measuring a response commensurate with its losses.
Since
the attack, Australia and other western powers have placed
significant pressure on the Indonesian government to weed out
Islamic fundamentalists that support terrorism. However,
questions remain as to the future of Australia’s relationship with
Islamic South Asia. Is Australia slowly following the path of the
United States and becoming the “America” of the Southern
Hemisphere? Could the military relationship between the United
States and Australia potentially shift the primary focus of the
“war on terror” to Islamic South Asia? A preliminary answer to
these questions is yes. Alternatively, is the price of appeasing the
antagonists of the “war on terror” more than Indonesia and
Islamic South Asia can bear?
Australia’s relationship with Indonesia has a troubled history.
Indonesia strongly opposed
Australia’s part in the international peace keeping mission that
took place in East Timor in 1999, which it viewed primarily as a
matter of domestic concern. Since the resolution of that conflict,
both Australia and Indonesia have attempted to mend their political
relationship. The two countries hit a deadlock in August 2001 when
both refused to accept 433 boat people rescued from a sinking
Indonesian ferry headed towards Australia. Furthermore,
Indonesia’s handling of Australia-bound Middle Eastern
asylum-seekers that set sail from the archipelago remained a thorny
issue between the two nations. Immigration and the handling (or
mishandling) of refugees remains a major point of contention, and
will likely be widened now with the recent attacks in Bali.
The
attacks of September 11th created an ambience of distrust
between Indonesia and Australia. On October 11, 2001 the Australian
Department of the Parliamentary Services released a paper to
legislators entitled: “Indonesia and Transnational Terrorism.”
The document served as a quasi-intelligence report that discussed
Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. While the document said: “the
vast majority of Indonesian Muslims practice a moderate form of the
religion,” the focus of the paper was the threat that Indonesian
Islamic organizations pose.1
Levels
of mistrust between the two countries, developed further as both
nations began to work together to formulate a bilateral agreement on
counter-terrorism, which was tentatively reached in March of 2002.
The Bali attacks, to a great extent, may dishevel the fragile
economic and diplomatic frameworks established since East Timor,
which became strained further after September 11th.
The
ANZUS Treaty: Will Australia be the “America” of the Southern
Hemisphere?
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In
a memoriam for the 9/11 victims in the US Embassy in Canberra,
Australian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of
Trade Mark Vaile (back) offered “unqualified support for
actions taken since” 9/11.
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Since
September 11th, Australia has been posing a significant
threat to the political stability of Islamic South Asia. In the
aftermath of September 11th, Australia invoked the ANZUS
treaty or the “Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and
the United States of America.” This treaty was signed in 1951 by
all three parties. However, recently, New Zealand unofficially
withdrew itself from the treaty during the 1980’s, following a
disagreement with the United States in which New Zealand refused to
allow the United States access for nuclear frigates (allowing access
would have violated long established New Zealand policies). ANZUS
creates obligations upon the United States and Australia to defend
the other from attacks. In part, ANZUS states in Article V:
For
the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is
deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of
any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its
jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels
or aircraft in the Pacific.2
The
term “armed attack” in Article V is not an exacting definition.
Within the meaning of the treaty, Australia or the United States
could make an argument that an attack on a party’s nationals in a
foreign country constitutes an “armed attack” for the purposes
of ANZUS. Theoretically, the United States and Australia, could
possibly justify retaliation against Islamic groups in Indonesia
through this interpretation. However, at present, there is a minimal
danger of this occurring. Nonetheless, the danger is self-evident.
If an attack takes place on Australian soil, and the source comes
from an Islamic South Asian group, then perhaps a real danger exists
of Australia and the United States retaliating pursuant to ANZUS.
Conversely, if the United States is faced by an “armed attack”
from an Islamic South Asian group, under the above interpretation,
Australia could act as the long arm of the United States.
Australia
will likely base and pledge its support for United States
unilateralist action against Iraq based on ANZUS. To lend support to
the previous interpretational argument, Iraq has not committed an
“armed attack” against the United States, nor has it posed an
“imminent” threat to the United States. Yet, Australia will
likely assist the United States militarily, pursuant to ANZUS.
This
shows a dangerous propensity. If Australia will act militarily to
vindicate the interests of its ANZUS counterpart, than certainly it
will not hesitate to enlist the “assistance” of the United
States to commence its own “war on terror” in Islamic South
Asia. If and when further attacks continue against Australia and/or
Australian nationals, the ANZUS treaty may be the tool that both
Australia and the United States implement. In a recent
address President Bush noted:
I
told the Prime Minister of Australia and I told Prime Minister Blair
this morning that I’m absolutely determined to continue to lead
the coalition. They recognize the need for us to continue to work
together. And it’s a sad day for a lot of people around the
world… but it also is a day in which we’ve got to realize that
we’ve got a long way to go to make the world more secure and more
peaceful.
The
failure of the United States to examine the root causes of September
11th holds deep implications that have not yet been fully
realized. Australia is at a similar crossroads. Will Australia
address the hard, painful questions that the United States summarily
ignored after its tragedy? Surely a justification for the attacks in
Bali cannot be proffered. But when examined in its context the issue
becomes clearer. Why target Australians? A complex response is
because Australia has chosen to not only align itself with the
United States, but also to staunchly support military action
directed at Muslim nations. According to a recent report: “But far
from uniting the nation behind the war on terrorism, Howard has
drawn immediate rebuke. Many Australian commentators are now saying
that the Bali bomb attack was Australia’s price for allying itself
with America in the first place - that dead Australian teenagers are
payback for the Afghan campaign and the moves to attack Iraq.”3
Phil Adams, a journalist for The Australian, asserted:
I’d
tried to remind Australia that rushing to America’s colours was,
as demonstrated in Vietnam, a health hazard. Before we signed up for
the war against terror, wherever that might lead us, I thought it
important to remember that the US has been the most trigger-happy of
nations. With a long history of bellicosity and a culture of
violence. It is now my sad duty to say...I told you so.4
Australia’s
invocation of ANZUS, and affirmation to support the American “war
on terror” will only lead to future acts of terror against
Australia and/or its nationals. Unqualified support for the “war
on terror” will further marginalize the Islamic culture and
society of South Asia, and create a climate that is ripe for
terrorism.
Australia
and the United States are on similar paths, and share similar
interests in international security. One can only expect a more
fortified relationship between the superpower of the northern
hemisphere and the superpower of the southern hemisphere.
Domestically speaking, in both nations, a cultural divide exists
between Muslims and non-Muslims. The events of September 11th,
simultaneously in both nations, created an even further divide. The
attacks on Bali could place this relationship in a level of
untenability.
In
the immediate days following the Bali attacks, according to the
report, an Islamic school was attacked and vandalized along with the
family home of the local Imam. According to a recent BBC report:
There
are some Australians who have never been comfortable with Muslims in
Australia. Sydney Daily Telegraph, expressed feelings that a
sizeable number of Australians seem to share: “It’s about time
we woke up to the fact that the problem of world terrorism today
lies firmly rooted in Islam,” the letter read. The uncomfortable
fact is that racism lurks just below the surface in Australia. For
some, the Bali attack is all the justification they need to give
vent to their prejudice.5
Muslims
in Australia face a credible threat and danger of a backlash from
their fellow countrymen. The Australian Muslim predicament is
analogous to the American Muslim predicament faced in the aftermath
of September 11th. In the immediate days and weeks
following September 11th, American Muslims, Islamic
schools and Mosques became the popular target of hate crimes,
perpetrated by non-Muslims. Islamic communities in both nations have
found themselves in the harrowing position of themselves mourning
the attacks and being blamed simultaneously for those attacks.
Indonesia’s
Response to the Bali Attacks
Indonesia’s
response to the attacks in Bali was swift. Within days, President
Megawati made an executive decree that put anti-terror legislation
in place. The decree is retroactive, meaning that it applies to the
attacks in Bali. Pursuant to the decree, anyone who commits an
“act of terror” will be executed by a firing squad. Furthermore
the decree allows authorities to suspend habeas corpus for up to six
months for those merely suspected of conducting “acts of
terror.”6 Many in the West had
been quick to criticize Indonesia for “sitting on anti-terror
legislation” following September 11th.
However,
a response to that criticism is that Indonesia was wary of passing
legislation that could incur possible infractions of civil rights
and civil liberties. Achieving democracy in Indonesia after
President Suharto has been a tumultuous process and an uneasy
transition. Anti-terror legislation, prior to the attacks in Bali,
could be seen by many Indonesians as a partial return to the
autocracy of the Suharto regime that paralyzed peaceful and moderate
Islamic practice. Despite this however, some Muslim organizations in
Indonesia have pledged their qualified support to the Indonesian
government. One of the largest of such groups, Muhhamdiyha, had this
to say: “The Muhammadiyah can understand the need for such
regulations, so that our security personnel, from the police or the
intelligence, will have a legal umbrella to act against
terrorism.”7
From
the outset, Indonesia has taken strong measures, contrary to Western
criticism, to control the fringe element of Islamic militancy. These
strong measures have come at a price, however. The first price will
be paid by Indonesians whose lives could fundamentally be altered
because of the anti-terror legislation, which could limit religious
freedom of members of the world’s largest Muslim nation. The
second price will be paid by the Indonesian government, which will
be seen by many Indonesians after the enacting of these measures as
the “long arm” of Australia and the United States.
Is
this price too much? Yes. The price will be too much for Indonesian
Muslims to bear. If Indonesian Muslims are confronted once again
with autocracy and foreign intervention, the political spectrum of
Indonesian Muslims will change from left to moderate to right to far
right where the seeds of terrorism lurk.
Australia
and Indonesia (as well as Islamic South Asia) are at a dangerous
crossroads. Australia is in a state of mourning, and has thus far
taken a relatively measured approach toward Indonesia and Islamic
South Asia. However if further attacks occur from the fringe
element, Australia and the United States will likely shift the
“war on terror” towards the region, thus creating a further
cultural and political divide.
Indonesia
is in the un-enviable position of facing imperialist threats from
the United States and Australia as well as the possibility of a
significant domestic backlash if it returns to the autocratic
policies of Suharto. The effect of such pressure and legislation
will only shift the moderate political dynamic that is so strong in
Indonesia towards a far right ideology that is consistent with
terrorism.
Thomas
J. Haidon is an American attorney and activist residing in
Wellington, New Zealand. He received a Jurisdoctorate (J.D.) with a
certificate of international law from the University at Buffalo
School of Law and a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from
Niagara University. He has studied at the American University in
Cairo and Birzeit University, Palestine. He is currently pursuing an
L.L.M. in international law. You can reach him at thaidon@justice.com
1-
Wilson, Chris. “Indonesia
and Transnational Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Trade Group (a pdf file)
2-
“Security
Treaty Between the United States, New Zealand and Australia“
(a pdf file)
3-
Appleton, Josie. “Backlash
over Bali“ October 17, 2002.
4-
Adams, Phillip. “Empire’s
Always Right,” The Weekend Australian.
5-
Hughes, Dominic “Sydney’s
Muslims Fear Revenge Attacks,” BBC Online.
6-
McDowell, Patrick. “Indonesia
Issues Anti-Terror Decree,” Associated Press.
7-
“Indonesia’s
Muslims Back Terror Law,” BBC Online.
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