Securing Middle Eastern oil flow is one thing, killing the children of Iraq and destroying the fabric of Arab and Muslim dignity and human rights, is another.¹ UNICEF

With the 9/11 attacks on the US, the idea of American exceptionalism faded away. The notion that the US is “a place apart, protected by its oceans” crumbled with the twin towers of the World Trade Center.² More importantly, the new world (dis)order created in the aftermath of 9/11 was one in which the US internationalized its own domestic agenda, and attempted to superimpose its objectives on the world through the use of military and political means.

What the US failed to grasp is that the world did not change on September 11^th, it is the US which has changed in response to an alarming wake-up call. As the US changed, “others shifted their behavior in reaction/response, setting a spiral of action and reaction in which commitments and relationships keep shifting.”³

If Bush pursues his war on Iraq, he will be setting a disastrous global precedent for the principle of unilateral pre-emptive attack.⁴ A war with Iraq is destined to radically transform not only the entire Middle East, but the entire relationship between the US and the world.

The Bush doctrine, cast in clear-cut, Manichean, “light” and “dark” terms, was manifested clearly in his speech, delivered on September 20th, 2001: “Either you are with us [civilized and good], or you’re with the terrorists [barbaric and evil].”⁵ In early August, Bush boasted that he would use all the tools at his disposal to topple Saddam Hussein, whom he called “a threat to civilization,” who was “thumbing his nose at the world.”⁶

As US military preparations continue to mount, bombing raids by British and US warplanes on northern and southern Iraq intensify - with 28 bombing raids so far this year – and war fever pushed oil prices over $30 a barrel.⁷ In addition, the US announced its willingness to attack anywhere, anytime, without the need to take the opinions of its allies seriously. As Donald Rumsfeld commented on Arab objection to an attack on Iraq: “Allies will fall into line if the US makes it clear that it will act, alone, if necessary.”⁸

The failure to capture Osama bin Laden or Mullah Omar has made the overthrow of Saddam Hussein the ultimate prize for White House planners. Setting aside multiple unsupported claims that Iraq has some weapons of mass destruction or that Saddam has links with al-Qaeda (an organization that is essentially committed to the overthrow of all regimes in the region – Saddam’s included), the real aims of the proposed US attack are obvious: “Iraq is an obstacle to the imposition of a new pax-Americana on the world’s main oil producing region.”⁹

With relentless talk about an eminent US attack on Iraq, it becomes imperative that one examines the strategic uncertainties involved in the proposed attack and the possible fallout on the region. Unfortunately for the Arab and Islamic World, the proposed attack comes at a time when most Arab leaders continue to conduct their diplomacy in an ad-hoc fashion and have no short or long-term strategy for dealing with American grand designs. In addition, the sanctions regime imposed on the people of Iraq for over a decade has brought starvation and disease to millions of innocent Iraqis.

UNICEF has shown that economic sanctions have contributed to the death of half a million children. For the period 1990 to 2000, UNICEF found that of 188 countries surveyed, Iraq suffered the worst change in mortality levels amongst children under five years old. Child mortality rates in Iraq actually more than doubled during the decade.¹⁰

Despite the huge power disparity between the US and Iraq, there is a great deal of uncertainty with regards to the outcome of a confrontation between both countries – should it happen. In fact, some have noted that a misstep in Iraq could leave President Bush with a “Bay of Basra,” reminiscent of Kennedy’s “Bay of Pigs” fiasco in Cuba.¹¹

Strategic uncertainties involve multiple factors, least of which include: competing regional interests, the level of the armed forces’ loyalty to Saddam Hussein, the impact of international sanctions and nationalism on public sentiments and the response of Kurdish and other minorities to an attack.¹²

US Military Options… A Pandora’s Box

Invasion

This scenario envisages a situation where 100,000 to 120,000 troops (plus reserves – hence reaching 250,000 troops) are involved in a full-scale invasion on Iraq. The attack would be preceded by massive cruise missile bombardment and its main thrust would be from Kuwait, Qatar and perhaps Turkey.

US air power would accompany troop movements and would come mainly from Turkey, ships in the Gulf, and possible US airbases in Saudi Arabia. The real difficulty involved in such a scenario is that countries in the region might not allow the US to use their bases to launch an attack on Iraq. In addition, if American troops would come to Baghdad, this could turn into an urban, house-to-house, battle that is reminiscent of the Somali war theatre.

This in turn can lead to massive loss of life on both sides. Civilian casualties would inflame the passions of the Muslim world against the US and thousands of US lives would be risked in street battles.¹³ In addition, the US would have to deal with the consequences of occupying an Arab capital in a country without a prospective leadership and facing the threat of dismemberment.

The Afghani model

In the same way the US linked up with the forces of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, special forces would act in support of the Kurds in the north and Shi’ites in the south.¹⁴ The difficulty in this scenario stems from the fact that strong ethnic cleavages exist between opposition groups who are already highly disorganized and contentious. In addition, competing regional interests make such a scenario even more difficult.

The Iraqi National Congress (INC) is the best known of the exiled opposition groups. It was founded in 1992 as an umbrella organization of mainly Kurdish and Shi’ite opposition members. The INC had a stronghold and a small army based in US-protected Kurdish territory in northern Iraq. The group was promised funding by President Clinton, but only a fraction of the proposed $100 million reached the group.

In 1995, the INC attempted to coordinate an offensive against the Iraqi army in collaboration with the CIA with close support from American and British aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones.¹⁵ The attempt ended in failure, with hundreds of deaths reported. A year and a half later, the INC was routed from northern Iraq after Saddam’s troops overran their base in Arbil.¹⁶

The Kurds make up 20% of the population and are the only Iraqi opposition group with significant military forces inside Iraq itself. However, they are not necessarily anxious to confront Saddam. Kurdish opposition groups, led by Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani, suggest they have 70,000 guerilla fighters, but they are afraid that they might jeopardize their already established autonomous region in northern Iraq.

In addition, the factions depend on Baghdad for cheap fuel and benefits from the oil smuggling business encouraged by the regime across northern Iraq.¹⁷ More importantly however, is the fear of being abandoned again by the US. Twice in the past – in 1991 and 1996 – the US persuaded them to rise up against Saddam. Both times the US left them on their own with disastrous results. In 1991, 1.5 million Kurds were forced to flee and thousands died. In 1996, the US aborted the mission hours before it was set to begin and thousands had to be airlifted to safety.¹⁸ In addition, Kurdish aspirations are diametrically opposed to those of Turkey, which, in turn, will not tolerate a Kurdish state to its south, fearing that its own Kurdish minority would try to join forces with the Kurds in Iraq.¹⁹

The Shi’ites make up 60% of the population and are mostly located in the south. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) is the main armed Shi’ite opposition to Saddam. The group’s leadership does not agree that a US strike against Iraq is the best way to topple Saddam. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that its supporters in Iran would agree to join forces with the US, nor vice versa. Iran announced its neutrality in any conflict and has no intention of collaborating with the US on Iraq. The Shi’ite community was involved in a failed uprising against Saddam in 1999, partly in response to US urgings. The US failed to support the insurrection and hundreds, if not thousands, of Shi’ites were killed as a result.²⁰

A military coup

This scenario involves a massive air campaign against Saddam’s security apparatus, including three Republican Guard armored divisions around Baghdad, allowing dissenting groups within the military to launch a coup.²¹ The Iraqi National Accord (INA), set up in 1990, consists of military and security defectors and is the prime supporter of a coup from within.

Some estimates put the number of Iraqi officers living in exile in Europe and America at 1,000. The INA suffered a setback in 1996 when Saddam’s intelligence services infiltrated group operations and up to 100 officers inside Iraq were rounded up and some executed.²²

In addition, Saddam has taken many measures to tighten his protection since September 11^th. His inner circle of guards, known as Al-Himaya, is made up exclusively of close relatives. The next circle is Al-Murafiqoun, also related by blood or from impeccable families. The outermost circle is the elite Special Security Organization (SSO) run by Saddam’s own son, Qusay.²³ Experts inside and outside Iraq count 15,000 to 25,000 Saddam loyalists in Qusay’s SSO and the Special Republican Guard, the elite of the elite, who are expected to put up a tougher fight.²⁴

Future Scenarios – A Post-Saddam Era?

Even if the US were to overcome the previously mentioned obstacles, a highly unlikely occurrence, the post-Saddam era does not seem to be promising. No one can envision who or what would replace Saddam Hussein. Many worry that the country could disintegrate along ethnic, tribal, or sectarian lines, threatening to bring total chaos to the region. Regional powers do not seem to be at ease with the idea of American occupation of Iraq. Turkey will definitely not tolerate a Kurdish state in northern Iraq and also, a pro-Iranian Shi’ite state in the south, would be highly unacceptable to the US. In fact, if a post-Saddam era would come about, it is most likely going to be an era of turmoil, uncertainty, regional rivalry and instability.

One of the possible scenarios is the radicalization of the Middle East and the outgrowth of numerous Islamist groups intent upon inflicting harm on the US and its interests worldwide. One only has to recall what happened in Saudi Arabia, after “infidel” US troops were invited by the Saudi leadership to protect the country from Iraq in 1990. Many experts back then predicted that nothing would happen to upset US interests in the region after its victory over Iraq. However, scenarios of turmoil materialized six years later when Osama bin Laden, motivated by the continued US presence in his country, managed to create an organization aimed at targeting US interests worldwide and bringing down pro-US regimes.²⁵

Popular anger at the US as a result of its unequivocal support for Israeli occupation, the presence of US troops (this time, not invited, but as an occupying force in an Arab capital), images of civilians massacred in Iraq and Palestine, added to what already happened in Afghanistan, is bound to inflame anti-US popular sentiment.

It is also worthy to note that the only country that enthusiastically supports an attack on Iraq is Israel. The installation of a pro-American government in Iraq, with possible US bases in that country, would greatly strengthen Israel’s position in the region. More specifically, Israel would be able to pressure Syria to dismantle Hizbullah and impose upon it a settlement that could lead to the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.²⁶ Syria would not be in a position to resist, with Israeli troops in the Golan and American troops in Iraq.

In addition, a US victory could mean a psychological blow to the Palestinians, many of whom are known to be supporters of Saddam. In such chaotic circumstances, Israel might seek to end the “Palestinian problem,” once and for all, by implementing a long-awaited plan, euphemistically called “transfer” by the Israelis.

Theodore Herzl, the ideological father of Israel, wrote in his diary in 1895, that the “only way” to have an ethnically pure Jewish state would be to forcefully “transfer” to Jordan all Arabs living in Palestine.²⁷ Such radical ideas have been entertained by Ariel Sharon and some of his top advisors, like Rehovam Ze’evi, who was assassinated by Palestinian gunmen several months ago. Ze’evi once argued that this plan meant the forced expulsion of the populations of the West Bank, Gaza and even Arabs living in pre-1967 Israel, to Jordan.²⁸ For Jordan, this would mean the destruction of its monarchy and the realization that the old slogan, “Jordan is Palestine,” has returned.

Kareem M. Kamel is an Egyptian freelance writer based in Cairo, Egypt. He has an MA in International Relations and is specialized in security studies, decision-making, nuclear politics, Middle East politics and the politics of Islam. He is currently assistant to the Political Science Department at the American University in Cairo.

1- “UNICEF: Sanctions Doubled Deaths of Iraqi Children,” The News Circle: Arab-American Magazine, September 1999.

2- Michael Hirsh, “Bush and the World,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2002).

3- Paul G. Frost, “Surprises, Challenges, and Opportunities Since September 11,” Schlesinger Working Group Report Spring 2002 (Georgetown University: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy).

4- Seumas Milne, “The Cost of Bush’s War,” Guardian Unlimited August 22nd, 2002.

5- Michael Hirsh, “Bush and the World,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2002).

6- Seumas Milne, “The Cost of Bush’s War,” Guardian Unlimited August 22nd, 2002.

7-  Ibid.

8- Tony Karon and Scott Macleod, “Why Arabs Aren’t With Bush on Iraq,” Time.com August 29th, 2002.

9- Seumas Milne, “The Cost of Bush’s War,” The Guardian Unlimited August 22nd, 2002.

10- “Not In Our Names,” Originally published in the International Herald Tribune, 20th March 2002.  

11- Howard LaFranchi, “The Iraqi Equation: How to Subtract Hussein,” The Christian Science Monitor June 26th, 2002.

12- Ibid.

13- Tony Karon, “Summer of Saddam,” Time.com July 31st, 2002

14- “War With Iraq – The US Considers its Options,” Guardian Unlimited.

15- “Who’s Who In Iraqi Opposition,” BBC News August 20th, 2002.

16- Ibid.

17- Tarik Kafala, “Analysis: Region Opposes Attack on Iraq,” BBC News March 18th, 2002.

18- Faye Bowers and Peter Grier, “US Making Peace With Kurds – To Battle Iraq,” The Christian Science Monitor August 23rd, 2002: 1

19- Tony Karon, “Summer of Saddam,” Time.com  July 31st, 2002.

20- “Who’s Who In Iraqi Opposition,” BBC News August 20th, 2002

21- “War With Iraq – The US Considers its Options,” Guardian Unlimited.

22- “Who’s Who In Iraqi Opposition,” BBC News August 20th, 2002

23- Johanna McGeary, “Inside Saddam’s World,” Time.com May 4th, 2002.

24- Ibid.

25- Timothy M. Phelps, “Dilemma Over Iraq,” Newsday August 16th, 2002: A08

26- “There’s a Catch for Israel if the US Strikes Iraq: Report” IslamOnline.net August 30th, 2002.

27- John K. Cooley, “In Mideast War Scenarios, Both Roads Lead to Iraq,” The Christian Science Monitor August 22nd, 2001.

28- Ibid.

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