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An Independent Kosova: Puzzling Questions for Many
By Omer Bin Abdullah
The much-awaited Kosovan municipal elections, held under the stewardship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), are over and a 56-year old pacifist who is acceptable to the West, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, has emerged as victor.
Leader of the Democratic League of Kosova (LDK), the territory's largest political force, Rugova has reiterated his oft-repeated call, “Independence is the only solution for Kosova.” Indeed, after his victory he stated that his party would accept nothing less than independence – despite the insistence by some quarters that pro-democracy reformers have come to power in Belgrade.
This is not Rugova’s first brush with electoral success. The highly secular former professor has twice been elected president by his people in elections that were accepted by neither the West nor Serbia. Today, however, Rugova’s victory is being hailed in the West as a triumph of the moderate forces. Thus, by default, the oppositional Democratic Party of Kosova (PDK) becomes the harder-line.
Both the Democratic and Republican parties in the U.S. share common views on Yugoslavia, and both sent representatives to support Rugova who fits nicely in the secular Western vision for the Muslim world, a model that has been crafted by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey.
Different Approaches
Rugova has advocated a policy of peaceful resistance against Serbia, a policy that stayed the course even when faced with the terror unleashed by former Serbian warlord Slobodan Milosevic.
Rugova has even met with the former president, despite the fact that Milosevic has been indicted by a U.N. court for Serb atrocities committed against Muslims, whom the western press prefers to identify as merely ‘ethnic Albanians.’ He has offered to meet with Vojislav Kostunica although he and Milosevic share a similar position over Kosova.
In contrast, as a member of the Kosova Liberation Army (KLA), the now-disbanded freedom-fighting group that gave birth to the PDK and dominated Kosovan politics after NATO ended its campaign of air strikes, opponent Hashim Thaci took up arms against the Serbian aggression. Thaci’s guerilla past is not the only mark that makes him a ‘hardliner’ in western eyes. The real irritant to the West is that a wing of his party comprising one-third of its membership is Islamically oriented. This in itself is a triumph because, under Tito, the practice and propagation of Islam was severely restricted; also, those who are really committed to Islamic have stayed away from the European-enforced political process.
Hashim Thaci, now 32-years old, was a founding member of the KLA who eventually emerged as head of its political directorate and leader of the Albanian delegation in the abortive peace talks in Rambouillet, France in February 1999.
Independence or Not?
Although Kosova is under the United Nations administration, it legally remains a part of Serbia. The new Yugoslav president Kostunica says he will bring Kosova back under Yugoslav sovereignty. However, Rugova insists that Serbian leaders and the West should recognize the desire of the overwhelming majority of Kosovars for independence although he stresses that he is committed to cooperation with the Serbs and other ethnic minorities in Kosova.
The question is with a ‘moderate’ in power now, whether or not France, the U.K., Germany, and the U.S. will recognize the country as an independent state.
In a post-election appearance in the Kosovar capital Pristina, Rugova said, “It is clear to everybody that the independence of Kosova is inevitable. It would certainly be good if Belgrade recognized the fact. Otherwise the international community will at some point recognize the independence.”
Rugova seems committed to Europe. When asked about the chances of his meeting Kostunica, he told reporters, “… we have to wait a little bit and see what direction they are taking and how democratic and pro-European those changes are.” Indeed, Kostunica, recognizing Rugova’s stance, has clearly stated his preference for meeting the pacifist leader separate from the remaining Kosovar leadership.
The West has been exceptionally welcoming to Kostunica and, despite his insistence to host an indicted war criminal, Milosevic, they have restored Yugoslavia’s U.N. seat and lifted other sanctions.
The obviously Western warming to Rugova and even British press reports that the idea of supporting full independence for Kosova has been discussed in secret talks by senior U.S. officials who include special envoy, Richard Holbrooke, is obviously met with by the stark reality of the U.N. Security Council resolution stating the "commitment of all member states to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).”
This scenario is complicated by a report issued by the political think tank, the International Crisis Group, that some Western governments may already be trying to stall the development of Kosova's independent economic and political institutions. British officials say that further fragmentation in the Balkans would increase instability, and that a state as small as Kosova would be unsustainable.
Rugova meanwhile considers the electoral victory as a mandate to negotiate independence from Serbia. He and the West will have to tread carefully because Thaci’s PDK, also strongly favoring independence, has not accepted defeat. Instead, it has accused the LDK of intimidating its supporters and preventing others from voting. It also says the polling staff employed by the U.N. manipulated the vote, charges that the OSCE says it is investigating.
Even if we accept the argument that the people of Kosova appear to have voted for an experienced politician that they believe will effectively negotiate the future of the province and maintain its stability, the Hashim Thaci factor cannot be excluded. Thaci’s freedom fighters have made a valuable contribution to the Kosovar struggle for freedom. PDK insists that by launching a war against the Serbs in February 1998, they in effect managed to subcontract NATO to eject Serbian rule from the province. Moreover, like all the Albanian parties contesting the election, the LDK too ran on a platform that called for unconditional independence from Yugoslavia of which it legally remains, if not for the moment in reality, a part.
Serbian voters boycotted the poll, and Kostunica has said that he does not recognize its results. He insists that they would “significantly contribute to the legalization of a mono-ethnic society” in Kosova. He says that it would be very dangerous for regional stability to allow Kosova to leave Yugoslavia. Instead, he wants to reestablish Yugoslav sovereignty in Kosova, something rejected by all Kosova Muslims.
However, independence is fast becoming a reality because almost half the Kosovar Serbs have left the province and the Muslims have set up their own judicial and political systems.
While diplomats and officials from the U.N. administration in Kosova may believe that a compromise might be easier to reach with Rugova, his election may in fact make little difference.
If in the future, he is seen as being soft on Belgrade, it may give the post-KLA parties – Thaci and Ramush Haradinaj, the charismatic 32-year old former guerrilla and head of the Alliance for the Future of Kosova (AAK) – just the opportunity they need to make a comeback. Certainly, the West, not wanting a party with any hue of Islam, has as its interest boosting Rugova.
The poll shows who holds the confidence of Kosova's Albanians – an important indicator of how the Kosovars may act in the run-up to parliamentary and presidential elections to be held next year. It is seen as a major step towards creating institutions for the province.
Rugova has another challenge – although the 66% of some 901,000 Kosova residents who voted for him gave him victory in almost all municipalities, it will be important to see if men installed in power by the KLA in the 30 local municipalities now give up their jobs to the newly elected authorities.
Another scenario is that if the Kosovars find their path to independence blocked, many former guerrillas will take up arms once again, especially since they believe that they have been shortchanged in the polls.
Kosovar leaders know that they are not in the best place to defend their interests. Kostunica's status as president of a sovereign state means that his views will carry weight at the U.N. summit, while Kosova must rely on the non-partisan U.N. to represent its interests. The consequence of this is that there is even greater pressure among the Kosovar leaders to strive for immediate freedom.
The Kosovar situation has a greater implication for southeastern Europe as well, where fears of Muslim empowerment exist. The Kosovar call for freedom is being opposed by Macedonia where ethnic Albanians account for a quarter of the country's population, and leaders of that community back the creation of an independent Kosova. Macedonians fear their own country's integrity and ethnic balance, and are anxious that Kosova’s independence could lead to the creation of a Greater Albania that would cut across national boundaries. Addressing the Southeastern European Cooperation Process (SEECP) conference in Skopje on October 24th, 2000, Macedonian president Boris Trajkovski warned that the situation in Kosova had repercussions for regional security.
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