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The
belligerent occupier even if he is the aggressor is entitled to
exact from the civilian population the obedience due by it to
the occupant under the rules of International Law. It is not
easy to understand how otherwise the population could expect to
be treated in accordance with International Law. This is
but one example of the necessity of maintaining the operation of
rules of war regardless of the illegality of the war.
–
Oppenheim, International Law, 1940 p 218
Our
armed resistance is entirely legal according to international
law and the UN charter, and also to Islamic law and our national
values.…All occupation forces and their aides are legitimate
targets of the resistance….Neutrality is not possible. We will
continue fighting until our homeland is liberated. This is our
right and our duty. Those who really are for peace and justice
have to accept our right to self-determination and must support
the resistance.1
–
Jabbar Al-Kubaysi
While this statement attributed to Jabbar Al-Kubaysi may have been accurate prior to UN resolution 1483, do any of these rights survive a Chapter VII resolution of the Security Council? Given that the foreign occupation of Iraq was authorized by the Security Council, and all states are bound by the resolutions, it is the writer’s view that none of these rights provide a basis for the lawful use of
force by resistance forces against UN endorsed troops in Iraq.
What
are the legal rights under international law of occupied peoples
who are subject to foreign domination? Does the right to resist
foreign occupation exist in law? What action may occupying
forces take against those engaging in violent acts of resistance
to occupation?
The
right to resist is largely unregulated by international law. The
major treaties on the law of occupation do not specify the
permissible limits of patriotic resistance to a foreign
occupation. However, neither do they rule out armed resistance
by inhabitants of occupied territory:
“…no
rules of International law can exist to prohibit private
individuals from taking up arms against the enemy…”
Oppenheim,
International Law 1940
The
failure of states to agree on a legal framework for resistance
to foreign occupation is not surprising. Powerful states who may
wish to occupy territory invariably oppose an expansive view of
the right to resist occupation. Pragmatic considerations during
sustained armed conflict also mitigate against a clear
recognition of the right to resist. The practice of both the
Allies and Axis states during World War II illustrates this
point:
British
attitudes toward violent resistance in occupied
territory...evidenced the proclivity of states to use
international positive law rather than abide by it. In other
words, when the advantage of acting in accordance with codified
laws of war was outweighed by the potential military gains
foreseeable by practically ignoring them, they were ignored. It
was not so much the case that Churchill declared members of the
(Allied) resistance lawful combatants and thus deserving of POW
treatment when captured by the Germans, rather he discussed
publicly the justness of their cause, supplied them with arms
and British military advisors, and used them in military
operations directed from London. Once the tide of war had
turned, however, the partisans in question were German, positive
law reasoning was used to condemn resistance against the Allied
occupying forces...2
(emphasis added)
For
the British and the Americans, legal categorization was
subordinate to pragmatic considerations of military utility.3
A
Nation’s Right to Resist Foreign Occupation
A
nation's right to resist alien occupation is inherent. Its
recognition under international law reflects the enduring
reality that men and women have throughout history taken up
arms—or whatever else is on hand—to defend their homeland
from invasion.4 During
World War II, the Allies gave assistance to clandestine
resistance forces operating in territory occupied by Germany.
The legitimacy of patriotic resistance to Nazi occupation and
was never questioned. However, upon capture, resistance fighters
were routinely summarily executed by the Germans without being
afforded a trial. Such war crimes were sanctioned by the Third
Reich. Germany’s wilful disregard of the basic protections
afforded by the laws of war [including the rights of members of
resistance movements in occupied territory] provided the
momentum for the 1949 Geneva Conventions. These treaties and
their protocols provide a universal right to humane treatment on
capture and the right to a fair trial.
Although
essentially unregulated by international law, the right to
resist occupation has been recognized by great and small powers,
including the occupying powers in Iraq:
Nothing
in this article (contained within the Hague Convention 1899)
must be understood as an attempt to reduce or destroy the right
belonging to the population of countries subjected to invasion
to do their duty—to show the interventionists the most
energetic patriotic opposition with all permissible means.
Major
General Ardagh
Representative
of Great Britain
Hague
Peace Conference 18995
The
Occupation of Iraq
The
occupation of Iraq is unique in a number of respects. First, it
was (and remains) a truly belligerent occupation, as Coalition
troops arrived uninvited, and there has been no peace agreement,
armistice, or formal surrender between Coalition forces and the
now deposed government of Iraq. Second, although the United
Nations did not recognize the invasion as being in conformity
with international law, it has endorsed the occupation by
acknowledging the status of the Coalition partners as occupying
powers. Third, in contrast to its reaction to the belligerent
occupation of Palestinian territory by Israel, the United
Nations has not called for the immediate withdrawal of Coalition
occupying forces from Iraq. Fourth, notwithstanding UN efforts
to facilitate the re-construction of Iraq and its transition to
responsible government, both humanitarian agencies and occupying
forces have been subjected to a constant stream of violent
attacks by local and foreign resistors. Fifth, while the
majority of the Iraqi population welcomed their liberation from
Ba’ath rule, many condemned the decision of coalition forces
to take over the governance of Iraq as occupying powers. Sixth,
US actions such as (1) the establishment of an Iraqi Governing
Council without the endorsement of an assembly of Iraqi elders,
(2) the granting of lucrative oil and reconstruction contracts
to US companies (some with close links to the Bush
administration), and (3) the failure to provide employment or
adequate financial support for millions of Iraqis have
undoubtedly fuelled resistance to the occupation.
Any
discussion of the right to resist foreign occupation in Iraq
raises a plethora of legal issues6
including:
-
The
scope and nature of the right to self-defense under
international law in the context of resistance to foreign
invasion and occupation
-
The
duties owed by the occupied to the occupying forces under
customary law, the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), and
other international instruments
-
The
scope and nature of the right to self-determination of
occupied peoples
-
The
impact of modern norms of international law upon the
legitimacy of certain acts by resistance
fighters—including inalienable human rights norms,
prohibitions on launching attacks on civilians and
noncombatants, and norms of guerrilla warfare and national
liberation struggles.
-
The
legal effect of Security Council resolutions upon the
legitimacy of ongoing violence by resistance
forces—particularly given the UN’s endorsement of the
Coalition occupation
-
The
rights under international law of those captured by
occupying forces while engaged in planning, facilitating, or
carrying out attacks on the occupying forces
-
The
right of occupying forces to punish those involved in acts
of sabotage, espionage, and acts that endanger the lives of
occupying forces
-
The
identification of those engaged in acts of resistance—are
they foreign nationals or local inhabitants?
-
The
role of the Iraqi judicial system in the trial of
resistors—are resistors patriots or common criminals?
The
Dichotomy of International Law’s Approach to Armed Resistance:
Conflicting Rights of the Occupiers and the Occupied
The
dichotomy inherent in any discussion of the legitimacy of
resistance to foreign occupation is that while inhabitants of an
occupied territory are not prohibited from taking up arms
against the occupying forces, neither are the occupying forces
precluded from launching military operations against those who
threaten their security and undermine law and order in the
occupied territory. Furthermore, the occupiers are entitled to
put violent resistors on trial, and, upon conviction for crimes
such as sabotage or killing of occupying troops, execute the
resistors.
Is
There a Duty to Obey the Occupier’s Commands?
Occupants
are no longer required to swear allegiance to the occupying
power. Nor can they be compelled to work for the occupying Army.
In Iraq today, pragmatism and economic necessity have led many
to work for the occupying powers or new institutions fashioned
by the occupiers. Many public servants, including police
officers, judges, and security and military personnel have been
retrained and re-employed by government institutions, which have
themselves been restructured in accordance with the CPA
(Coalition Provisional Authority) policy of de-Baathification.
These steps have been encouraged by the Security Council in
resolution 1483.
For
those who decide not to cooperate with the occupying powers and
engage in violent resistance to CPA initiatives in Iraq, their
fate, if captured alive, includes internment and possible trial
for sabotage, espionage, and committing acts leading to the
death or endangerment of occupying forces. Accordingly, while
not duty bound to assist occupying forces, resistors who
undermine the occupier’s efforts to maintain law and order can
still be held accountable for their conduct. Whether the death
penalty will be imposed in Iraq with respect to serious acts of
resistance is still unresolved. It is unclear at this time
whether the suspension of the death penalty in Iraq by the CPA
will extend to those who attack Coalition forces.
Do
All Resistors Have the Same Legal Status and Rights?
Not
all groups engaged in armed resistance have the same rights on
capture. Paid fighters whose income exceeds that provided to
regular Iraqi army personnel may be classified as mercenaries
under the 1977 Optional Protocol to the Geneva Convention. While
neither the US nor Iraq has ratified this instrument, the
prohibition on mercenary involvement in armed conflict may now
bind all states under customary law. Britain has bound itself to
these rules by ratifying the two Additional Protocols of 1977 to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in January 1998.
Under
the Protocol, (and arguably customary law as well) mercenaries
must be treated humanely even though they are not entitled to
the benefits of POW status. They must also be given a fair
trial.
Foreign
jihadis who have entered Iraq to kill Americans and expel them
from Arab soil for financial reward may also be put on trial as
mercenaries. However, if they are unpaid but instead motivated
by religious beliefs, they are not mercenaries.
Similarly, foreign fighters who were invited by members of the
Iraqi resistance or Baath party and who were paid amounts
similar to those paid Iraqi fighters, are not mercenaries and
are entitled to the same privileges upon capture as Iraqi
resistance fighters. These rights include POW status, release
from internment at the end of hostilities, and a fair trial in
the event of prosecution for war crimes or violations of the law
of occupation. All of those captured by Coalition forces are
entitled to be treated humanely in accordance with common
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
Do
Security Resolutions Outlaw Acts of Resistance to the
Occupation?
None
of the Security Council resolutions on Iraq address the question
of the legitimacy of ongoing attacks on Coalition forces. By
contrast, suicide bombings upon civilian targets—including the
Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, the Jordanian Embassy, the Red Cross
and UN Headquarters—have been condemned as terrorist attacks.
The
Security Council’s silence on both attacks on US military
targets and Iraqi civilian deaths at the hands of both US forces
and resistance forces is not surprising. There are good reasons
for sidestepping these divisive issues:
-
They
would have delayed and perhaps prevented agreement on a
resolution.
-
They
raise thorny political questions such as the accountability
of coalition forces for the use of lethal force, the
legality of national liberation movements in Iraq, and the
right to resist foreign occupation.
The
status of acts such as the assassination of Dr. Akila
Al-Hashimi, a Coalition- appointed member of the Iraqi Interim
Council is more problematic. She may have been targeted for
“collaborating with the enemy” and therefore considered a
legitimate target by resistance forces. However, she was neither
a combatant nor a member of the occupying forces. Furthermore,
her involvement in the civil and political reconstruction of
Iraq was sanctioned by the United Nations. While her
assassination is clearly punishable under both Iraqi criminal
law and martial law exercisable by occupying powers, it is
uncertain whether it also constitutes a punishable act under
international law. In any event, this form of violence has been
condemned by the United Nations and provides a basis for
interment by coalition forces and prosecution by Iraqi criminal
courts.
Liberation
Movements and International Law
Guerrilla
resistance to alien domination has long been recognized in
General Assembly resolutions as a legitimate manifestation of
the right of peoples to self-determination.7
The General Assembly is a forum dominated by non-aligned states
that regard intervention by powerful western states in their
internal affairs as a form of neo-colonialism. In contrast, the
Security Council is dominated by a number of powerful western
nations that hold the power to veto resolutions. Unsurprisingly,
the Council has never supported such interpretations of the
right to self-determination. However, resolution 1483 raises a
curious question: Does the failure by the Security Council to
condemn the constant attacks on US military targets signal an
implicit recognition of the right to resist foreign occupation
in Iraq?
The
ongoing Palestinian resistance to Israel's presence in the
occupied territories is the most enduring modern instance of
resistance to foreign occupation. The contrast to the occupation
of Iraq is stark. Palestinian resistors have often pointed to
the numerous UN resolutions calling for the withdrawal of
Israeli forces from the occupied territories to justify attack
on Israeli targets. No such demands for the withdrawal of
Coalition troops in Iraq have been made by either the General
Assembly or the Security Council. Instead, the Security Council
has recognized the role of the United States and United Kingdom
as occupying powers in Iraq (Resolution 1483).
In
the same resolution, the Security Council exercised its
authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to:
-
Appeal
to Member States to “deny safe haven to those members of
the previous Iraqi regime who are alleged to be responsible
for crimes and atrocities and to support actions to bring
them to justice.”
-
Call
upon “the occupying powers, consistent with the Charter of
the United Nations and other relevant international law, to
promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the
effective administration of the territory, including in
particular working towards the restoration of conditions of
security and stability and the creation of conditions in
which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own
political future.” (Emphasis added)
Decisions
of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII are binding on
all states— including Iraq. Resolution 1483 strengthens the
pre-existing right of the occupying powers to use force to quell
resistance to the occupation. The right of an occupying power to
repel attacks by guerrilla forces is also implicit in the law of
military occupation and the doctrine of military necessity.8
Resolution
1483 also condemns any attempt to restore the Baath regime to
power. It does so by endorsing efforts to bring former regime
members to justice. This effectively limits the right of
self-determination of the people of Iraq to a political future
that involves responsible government brought about through the
rebuilding of Iraq in accordance with UN principles.
Resistance
as a Form of Self-Defense
As
the preceding discussion reveals, the legality of ongoing
resistance in Iraq is a very complex issue. Armed resistance to
the initial invasion was clearly justified under the doctrine of
self-defense. However, acts of violent resistance against a
UN-sanctioned occupation can be seen as an attack upon the
authority of the United Nations itself.
Under
resolution 1483, the Security Council exercised powers available
to it where it determines that international peace and security
is threatened. The Council authorized the military occupation of
Iraq by US- and UK-led forces acting under unified command.
Additionally, the Security Council decided to engage itself
directly in the process of transforming Iraq into a state that
embraced the rule of law, human rights norms, and responsible
government. UN assistance in the belligerent occupation of Iraq
was clearly motivated by pressing humanitarian concerns arising
from the invasion. However, UN endorsement of the occupation
raises profound questions about the powers of the Security
Council and whether UN involvement in an occupation renders
further resistance to that occupation unlawful. The Security
Council has not explicitly condemned attacks upon coalition
forces—that would undercut the inherent right of self-defense
against foreign invasion and occupation. However, armed
attacks upon both civilians and military personnel working to
implement a UN-mandated agenda must be seen as a direct
violation of the principles and purposes of the UN Charter.
Furthermore, it is difficult to legitimize the use of violence
by resistance fighters against those implementing the UN’s
goals that include bringing to justice the remnants of a regime
that failed to meet the minimal standards of a civilized society
and actively engaged in widespread and systematic crimes against
its own people, including torture, summary executions, and
disappearances.
Whether
resistance fighters can successfully plead self-defense against
enemy invasion and occupation, or that armed resistance is a
legitimate expression of the right of self-determination, are
matters for military tribunals or Iraqi criminal courts.
Must
Resistance Attacks Have the Support of the Iraqi Population?
Can
the legitimacy of ongoing attacks by resistance forces on
coalition troops be measured by reference to the level of
support for the resistance among Iraqis? Must
resistance attacks be carried out or sanctioned by Iraqi (rather
than foreign) elements of the resistance forces?
Foreign
terrorist groups who have entered Iraq for the purpose of
killing Americans and undermining the objectives of the CPA may
have acted under the direction of remnants of the Baath regime
or other Iraqi resistance groups. However, given that most
Iraqis appear to resent both the Baath regime and outside
interference in their country, it is unlikely that the majority
of the Iraqi population would endorse the presence or actions of
foreign fighters. Even if these foreign fighters have the
backing of remnants of the ousted government, the widespread
publicity of Sadam's crimes against the Iraqi people by a
vibrant Iraqi free press has undoubtedly caused most Iraqis to
oppose the return of the Baath regime. Coalition forces stand in
the way of a return to Baath rule. Recent US State Department
opinion polls conducted in five Iraqi cities shortly before
Sadam Hussein’s capture suggest that the majority of Iraqis
view resistance-initiated violence as harmful to Iraq’s
future.9 The polls also suggest that most Iraqis are of the
view that ongoing attacks highlight the need for the continued
presence of Coalition troops in Iraq.10 The vast majority
considered attacks to be an effort by groups outside Iraq to
create instability in the country.11
Ultimately,
ongoing Iraqi resistance in the form of attacks by guerrilla
forces engaged in a liberation struggle against occupying troops
could be characterized as a lawful manifestation of the right to
self-determination if such actions were shown to have the
backing of the majority of the Iraqi population. The above
polling suggests that the resistance does not enjoy the support
of most Iraqis—although a US State Department poll can hardly
be regarded as an independent survey. With respect to defensive
military action by resistance forces, the position is different.
Where armed force is used by members of the former regime or
their supporters in self-defense against military operations by
Coalition forces to “root out remnants of the Baath regime,”
such resistance was permissible prior to resolution 1483 and not
dependant upon support from the majority of the occupied
population.
Mere
“Insurgents” or Legitimate National Liberation Forces?
An
insurgent has been defined as a person “who revolts against
civil authority or an established government; especially a rebel
not recognized as a belligerent.”12 The eminent
international jurist Hersch Lauterpacht uses the term insurgent
to describe a party to a civil war or civil disturbance within a
State,13 while insurgency has been defined as “a condition
of revolt against a government that is less than an organized
revolution and that is not recognized as belligerency.”14
By
contrast, resistance has been described as “an underground
organization of a conquered or nearly conquered country engaging
in sabotage and secret operations against occupation forces and
collaborators.”15
Coalition
descriptions of ongoing attacks on the occupying forces as
low-level hostilities committed by “insurgents” may be
viewed as an attempt to undermine perceptions of the legitimacy
of violent resistance to the occupation of Iraq. The use of the
term insurgent implies that the CPA and the Iraqi Governing
Council are legitimate organs of state. This is not entirely
accurate as they are unelected bodies hand picked by the
occupiers, although the UN has endorsed these groups, and they
have the responsibility of enforcing the rule of law in Iraq.
In
labeling those engaging in attacks on coalition forces as
insurgents, the coalition is purporting to deny resistance
forces the status and benefits of belligerency. In this way,
ongoing violence is reduced to an internal matter. The term
insurgent invokes images of Iraqis rising up against the
legitimate new government of Iraq. It reflects the coalition
notion that the Baathist regime has been toppled and is in
disarray and that a new legitimate (albeit interim) Iraqi
government has been installed.
Those
who reject the use of the term insurgents in favor of
belligerents may point to the following facts:
-
The
Iraqi Governing Council was hand picked by the occupying
powers—without approval by a Council of Iraqi elders or
direct election by the Iraqi people.
-
The
Baath regime—however abhorrent its crimes—was the
legitimate government of Iraq.
In
any event, use of the term insurgent does not alter the duties
and obligations of both the occupiers and those resisting the
occupation to comply with binding norms of humanitarian law in
the conduct of their military operations. Neither does it
deprive resistance forces of the right to protest the manner in
which the CPA and IGC are handling the occupation, although
Security Council endorsement of the occupation suggests that
armed resistance to Coalition forces is no longer permissible
under international law.
Resistance
Attacks and the ‘Basic Rule’ of the Laws of Armed Conflict
The
golden thread that runs through the law of armed conflict is
that parties to a conflict must at all times distinguish between
the civilian population and combatants, and between civilian
objects and military objectives, and direct their operations
only against military objectives.16 Suicide bombers in Iraq
have violated this basic rule by targeting Iraqi police
stations, courthouses, mosques, restaurants, and humanitarian
agency headquarters. Those involved in masterminding and
assisting such attacks have not only deprived themselves of the
protections of POW status upon capture; they have also
undermined the legitimacy of resistance to the occupation.
In
other instances, bombs intended for Coalition forces have
instead killed Iraqi civilians. These attacks may violate the
basic rule depending upon the intent of those planning and
executing such operations. Attacks upon Coalition
targets—including military checkpoints, army helicopters,
armoured patrols, and military compounds—do not violate the
basic rule. However in view of the Security Council’s
endorsement of the occupation, further attacks upon occupying
forces is no longer lawful.
Conclusion
From
the moment of the invasion of Iraq until the passage of Security
Council Resolution 1483, violent resistance to the occupation of
Iraq was not prohibited under international law. However, those
who engaged in attacks upon Coalition military targets made
themselves targets under the Law of Occupation. Post Resolution
1483, armed resistance is no longer lawful.
Resistors may be killed during combat
operations when they fire upon Coalition forces or fail to
surrender while armed. If captured alive, they are entitled to
POW status so long as they have complied with the laws of armed
conflict. If prosecuted by the occupying powers for violating
the laws of occupation as contained in the Fourth Geneva
Convention and The Hague Regulations of 1907, they must be
afforded a fair trial.
Resistance
fighters who indiscriminately target civilians, humanitarian
agencies, and other noncombatants violate the laws of armed
conflict and may in some circumstances be committing crimes
against international law. They are also violating Iraqi
domestic law. Although deprived of the protections of POW
status, such persons must be treated humanely.
The
execution of resistors who engage in acts including sabotage,
espionage, or armed attacks is permissible under the laws of
armed conflict, if they have been convicted after a fair trial. However, the death penalty violates UN
principles and the solemn treaty obligations of many Coalition
partners, including the United Kingdom and Australia. Resistance
fighters captured by forces from these states may not be
executed without those states violating international law and
being susceptible to liability under the principles of state
responsibility. The US is not similarly constrained (having not
ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which promotes the
abolition of the death penalty) and, therefore, is legally
entitled to execute those members of the resistance movements in
Iraq who have been convicted after a fair trial of conduct
including sabotage, launching lethal attacks upon US soldiers,
or deliberately targeting civilians during armed attacks.
However, as the CPA has suspended the use of the death penalty,
the execution by the United States of persons who may be viewed
by many Iraqis as patriots engaged in a legitimate liberation
struggle, may prove politically damaging and even fuel further
attacks. It may also expose coalition partners such as the
United Kingdom and Australia to breaches of international law
for complicity in killing of such persons in violation of their
obligations to “take all necessary measures to abolish the
death penalty within its jurisdiction.”17
Resistance
activities organized and funded by former regime members and
foreign fighters appear to lack the support of the majority of
the Iraqi population. Even if a resistance force were able to
take control of a portion of Iraq, it is hard to imagine that a
majority of the local population would support a return to
Baath-style rule or a government that included foreign elements.
International recognition of such a regime would be even less
enthusiastic. Ultimately the legitimacy of the resistance
movement in Iraq has been significantly undermined by three
factors:
-
The
involvement of former regime members who have committed
serious crimes against the Iraqi people
-
Iraqi
concerns about the involvement of foreign fighters and their
interference in Iraqi affairs
-
The
targeting by resistance forces of Iraqi civilians,
humanitarian workers, and other noncombatants.
Ben
Clarke is Senior Lecturer in International Law at the
College of Law, University of Notre Dame, Australia. He is
also a PhD candidate at the University of Melbourne/Asia
Pacific Centre for Military Law, with a thesis on the rule of
law in occupied Iraq. Clarke can be reached at bclarke@nd.edu.au.
[1]
Jabbar al Kubaysi ‘After the arrest of Saddam resistance
will intensify and unite even more’ International
Action Centre website Founded by Ramsey Clark, Former U.S.
Attorney General http://www.iacenter.org/sh_jk.htm
accessed 7 January 2004.
[2]
LaSalle, David L. “Positive Law, Natural Law and the
French Resistance in the Second World War” 6 USAFA J. Leg.
Stud. 273, at 282.
[3]
LaSalle, David L. ‘Positive Law, Natural Law and the
French Resistance in the Second World War’ 6 USAFA J. Leg.
Stud. 273, at 273.
[4]
‘It is inevitable …that the inhabitants of an occupied
area will chafe under enemy rule and under the restrictions
placed upon them in the interests of the occupants security
and that they will… acting either singularly, or in
concert, commit acts inconsistent with the security of the
occupying forces.’
Major
Richard R. Baxter ‘The Duty of Obedience to the
Belligerent Occupant’ 27 British Yearbook of International
law 1950 p235
[5]
Cited in Trainin, p. 547. (A sobering thought for British
occupying forces in the south of Iraq as they patrol the
streets of Basra and Umm Qasr.)
[6]
A detailed analysis of all these issues goes beyond the
scope of this paper.
[7]
The territory of a State shall not be the object of military
occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention
of the provisions of the Charter.…In their actions
against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit
of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such
peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in
accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.
General Assembly Declaration On Principles Of International
Law Friendly Relations And Co-Operation Among States (1970)
Nothing
in this Declaration shall prejudice…the right to
self-determination, freedom and independence of peoples
under…foreign occupation …and the right to seek and
receive support in accordance with the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the United Nations. [Para 4 ]
General Assembly Resolution 2131(XX). Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of Their Independence and
Sovereignty (1981) [8]
Indeed it is difficult to see how an occupying power could
honour its obligation to provide security to the occupied
inhabitations unless it takes active measures to quell armed
resistance and prevent suicide bombings in civilian areas.
[9]
“Iraqis Say Coalition Troops Are Vital Now but Prefer
Handoff to Own Security Forces,” January 6, 2004 http://iraqcoalition.org/polls/handoff.pdf
, page 1 (accessed January 27, 2004).
[10]
“Iraqis Say Coalition Troops Are Vital Now but Prefer
Handoff to Own Security Forces,” January 6, 2004 http://iraqcoalition.org/polls/handoff.pdf
, page 3 (accessed January 27, 2004).
[11]
“Iraqis Say Coalition Troops Are Vital Now but Prefer
Handoff to Own Security Forces,” January 6, 2004 http://iraqcoalition.org/polls/handoff.pdf
, page 3 (accessed January 27, 2004).
Results
in the 5 cities varied significantly when people were asked
whether the attacks should be viewed as an effort to
reinstate Sadam to power. Similar disparities arose when
people were asked whether the attacks were an effort to
liberate Iraq from Coalition occupation. [12]
http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary
[13]
Oppenheim’s International Law Vol. II Disputes War and
Neutrality 7th Edition (1952) p250-251, and 670.
[14]
http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary
[15]
http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary
[16]
See: Article 48, Optional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949
[17]
Article 1 (2) Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, Aiming at the
Abolition of the Death Penalty adopted by the General
Assembly on December 15, 1989. Entry into force July 11,
1991.
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